


SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY



R. N. KAUL, M. A., LL.B., B. LITT. (OXON)

*Department of Philosophy,
University of Allahabad.*

With a Foreword

BY

Dr. Amaranatha Jha,

M. A., D. LITT., F. R. S., L.

Vice-Chancellor

University of Allahabad.


ALLAHABAD

RAI SAHIB RAM DAYAL AGARWALA

PUBLISHER

1946

Price Rs 3.



FOREWORD

BY

Dr. Amaranatha Jha,

M. A., D. LITT., F. R. S. L.

Vice-Chancellor

University of Allahabad.


Man is an individual with special aptitudes and talents. He is also a social or political being who has certain obligations to the Society and the State. The educator's task is to bring out, develop and perfect his individuality and also to equip him for his place in society and his work in life. The philosopher deals with the eternal verities and with conduct. The scientist seemed at one time to be steeped in abstractions, suggesting, as Stevenson said, that he wrote of life as with the cold fingers of a star-fish. But the scientific philosopher or the philosophical scientist recognises that there are things which endure and are eternal. The poet, in the words of Bradley, says what he means, but his meaning seems to beckon away beyond itself, or rather to expand into something boundless which is only focussed in it. The social philosopher casts his net wide and takes into it practically every aspect concerning man's life, private as well as public. He has not yet made his subject of study rigid, formal, and purely abstract. It is intellectual as well as emotional. That way salvation lies.

I commend Mr. Kaul's book in the hope that it will stimulate interest in a useful as well as cultural subject.

Amaranatha Jha

Allahabad

February 26, 1946.



PREFACE

The publication of this book needs both an explanation and an apology. Books on Social Philosophy are not many in number, while the subject is rapidly gaining in importance. The present writer has ventured to put his somewhat disjointed thoughts in cold print in the hope that some confusions may be cleared up. Even, however, if this study adds to the puzzle, the writer would be amply rewarded. For Philosophy is not an attempt to solve ultimate problems but mainly to focus the reader's thought on them. There was really no intention of publication, however, at any stage in the writer's mind. The War brought about, along with other dislocations, such a scarcity of Text-books for our Undergraduate students that the writer was pressed with requests for immediate publication of his Lecture-notes. It is with the genuine desire of helping the students out of their difficulty that these notes have been put together in a shape suitable for the Press.

The explanation leads to the apology. If the general scheme of the book is vague and blurred, if the sequence of ideas is loose and disjointed, if the expression is hasty and amateurish, the writer craves for indulgence from the readers. These lectures were delivered in the session 1943-44, and never repeated. No model Text-book was available and our syllabus covers modern topics like Marxism, Fascism and Gandhism. The writer, however, does not claim that, had he enough time and leisure at his disposal, he would have succeeded much better. But many errors in thought and expression might have been avoided.

Finally, certain debts have to be acknowledged. The book entirely owes its existence to the love and con-

fidence bestowed upon the writer by his *pupils* as well as to the sympathy and encouragement received from the Vice-chancellor and the Head of Philosophy Department. To them all he owes a deep debt of gratitude. Dr. Amaranatha Jha has been an unfailing Patron and Guide for the last 23 years. Professor R. D. Ranade has been the dynamic force behind all that the writer has been able to do. Without these two gracious friends and counsellors, the writer could not have emerged out of the whirlpool of psychic life, in which he so frequently keeps falling. In preparing the book the writer has freely drawn upon the standard works of several eminent authors, to whom he has referred in the body of the book. To all of them he expresses his deep sense of obligation.

Special thanks are due to Principal N. C. Mukerji for elucidation of many thorny points in connection with Gandhism, to Mr. P. N. Haksar, Bar-at-Law, in connection with Marxism and to Dr. Amaranatha Jha, in connection with Education. The late Dr. Beni Prasad was mainly responsible for the writer's interest in Hobhouse, and it is a great pity that he did not live to see the book in print. Amongst the devoted pupils, Messrs. Vyas Narain Shukla, Jagannath Singh, T. A. Philip and Dayal Saran placed their services at the writer's disposal ungrudgingly in correcting the Proofs and preparing an Index. To all of them, and to many others, he owes debts which can hardly be repaid.

Lastly, thanks are due to Rai Saheb Ram Dayal Agarwala and the management of the Shanti Press for accommodating the writer's whims in keeping the price within reasonable limits, inspite of high cost and scarcity of paper. The whole thing has been a labour of love both to the author and the publishers.

R. N. Kaul

7, Bank Road,
Allahabad.

Feb. 19, 1946

57817

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE SCOPE OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Page.

Science and Philosophy. Science and Values. Ends and Ideals. Ends and Means. The 'Non-attached' man. Efficacy and Limitations of Large Scale Social Reform. Can we change Human Nature? The Scope of Social Philosophy. Its Practical Value. Three Main lines of Progress. Social Philosophy and Social Science. Max Weber on the Aim of Sociology. Hobhouse's Conception of Sociology. Functions of Sociology. Its Methods. Social Philosophy and Sociology. What Society ought to want. The Sophists and Socrates. Social Values. Social Philosophy and Ethics. Is Social Philosophy a continuation of Ethics? Social Theory of Cole. Social Philosophy and Politics. Social Philosophy and Economics. Social Philosophy and Psychology. Social Philosophy and Biology

1

CHAPTER II

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIETY

Definition of Man: Three main aspects of Human Life. The Social nature of Man. Is Society natural to Man? "The Unsocial sociableness of Man" The Social Tie. The Parental Feelings. Love and Aggression: Ambivalence of Freud. Reciprocity

of Response. Self-interest. Self-assertion passes into Power. The Inter-weaving of the Self-assertive and the Social. Common and Divergent Purposes, leading to Types of Social relation-ships. The Inter-relation of Minds in Society. The Group mind. Social Purpose. The Unconscious Purpose in Social Movements. Hegel and Engels on Social Purpose

25

CHAPTER III

THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE

The Natural Basis of the Family. The Conventional Aspect of the Family. The Family in Ancient India. The Child as Centre. Educational Functions of the Family. V. F. Calverton: The Bankruptcy of Marriage. Economic Functions of the Family. Marx and Engels on the Family. Community of Women. Weakness of the Family. Plato's Strictures on the Family. Plato's Abolition of the Family in the Ruling Class. Declaration of the Rights of Woman in the Republic. Community of Wives and Children. Rousseau's Criticism of Plato's Scheme. Gandhi's Conception of Marriage. Up-bringing of Children. The "Pan-sexualism" of Freud. Oral Stage. Narcissistic Stage. Oedipus Complex

43

CHAPTER IV

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

What is Education? Acquisition of Techniques. The Vehicles of Knowledge. Social Structure and

Function. Primitive and Modern Societies. Education and the Individual. The Unique Individual. Education and Society. Locke's Contribution to Education. The Individual and the Society. Rousseau's Contribution to the Problem, Pestalozzi, Herbart, Froebel. Two Aims of Education. Education in Ancient India. Tagore's Educational Ideals. Concluding Remarks	68
---	-----	-----	----

CHAPTER V

PROPERTY AND SOCIAL GRADATION

Family and Property. The Right of Property. Evolution of Property. Rise of Industrialism. Significance of Capitalism. Psychological Basis of Private Property. Acquisitive Instinct in Children. The Emotional Element in Property. Money and Power. Property, 'Sacred' or 'Theft'? Incentive to Effort. Feeling of Security. The 'Ethical Equivalents' of Property. Sense of Responsibility. The Marxian View. Social Discontent and Property. Freud on Communism. Hindu View of Property, Social Gradation. Max Weber's Definition of Social Class. The Marxian View of 'Class'. The Marxian View Criticized. The Caste System in India. "Varna". A Parallel in Plato's Republic. "The Threefold State": Rudolf Steiner. Difference from Plato's conception. Plato defended against Mackenzie's criticism. Philosophy *versus* Poetry. Difference from the Indian Conception ...

CHAPTER VI

THE STATE

The State and Society. Ginsberg and Hobhouse on the State. The State and Government. The Nation State. Marxism and Nationality. The Views of Springer and Bauer Criticized. Is India a Nation? Origin of the State. Theory of Divine Origin. Theory of Force. Theory of Social Contract. Thrasymachus: Might is Right. Hobbes' Theory of Social Contract. Spinoza and Locke. The Social Contract of Locke. The Social Contract of Spinoza. Difference between Spinoza and Hobbes. The 'positive' motives in Spinoza. The germs of Organic Theory in Spinoza. Rousseau. Germs of Democracy. Criticism of Rousseau's Theory. Evolutionary Theory. The Organic Theory. The Political Doctrine of Kant. Hegel's Political Philosophy. Morality embodied in the State. Hegel's Political Absolutism. The Marxian view of the State. Historical view of the State. Lenin on the State. ... 129

CHAPTER VII

THE STATE (*continued*)

Representative Democracy. The Doctrine of Equal Rights. Dangers of Representation in Democracy. Strength of Democracy. Democracy in practice. Reliance upon Law. Legalism in Democracy. Evolution of the Democratic Idea.

Equalitarianism in Democracy. Socialism in
 Democracy. Our Business Civilization and Demo-
 cracy. Essential Characteristics of Capitalism.
 I. Competition for Profits. II. Mechanization of
 Industry. III. Exploitation of Human Labour-
 power. Marxian Theory of Surplus Value. IV. Cor-
 porate, Absentee Ownership. Industry versus
 Business. Democracy and Nationalism. Demo-
 cracy and Education. Democracy and Dictator-
 ships. Alternative to Democracy. Communism
 and Fascism or "Scylla and Charybdis". Com-
 munism. Russell on Communism. Russell on
 Fascism. Rise of Fascism. Fascism and Capital-
 ism. Fascism and War. The Philosophy of
 Fascism. The Ancestry of Fascism. Lust of
 Power. The Philosophies of Fichte and Nietzsche.
 Fichte's Metaphysics. His Political Philosophy.
 Morals above Democracy. The Racial Doctrine.
 Irrationalism and Lust for Power. ... 161

CHAPTER VIII

COMMUNIST DEMOCRACY

Communist Democracy. Fascism and Commun-
 ism have really nothing in common. H. G. Wells
 on Communism. The Socialistic Pattern. Russell
 on Communism. Democracy *minus* Capitalism.
 The Socialism of Bertrand Russell. The Break-
 down of the Profit Motive. War and Socialism.
 Modern Industrialism and War. A Psychological

Explanation of the Tragic Situation. The Outlook for Homo Sapiens	195
--	-----	-----	-----	-----

CHAPTER IX

GANDHISM : WAR AND PEACE

What is Gandhism? Gandhism, a Utopian creed. Utopian Socialism of Gandhi. The Spiritualism of Gandhi. The Scientific Attitude. The Search for Truth. Science <i>vs.</i> Religion. The Ultimate Values. Popularity of Gandhism. Non-Violence or Ahimsa. Non-Violence and Social Reform. Non-Violence and the State. Duality in Moral Conceptions. The Technique of Non-Violence :				
A Digression	208
Appendix	(1)
Readings and Questions for Discussion				
Index	(12)

300/8c

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY FOR BEGINNERS.

CHAPTER I

THE SCOPE OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

There is a fundamental difference between the motives and methods of Science and Philosophy. While Science studies the different facts of experience, philosophy develops the meaning and implications of experience as a whole.

Science and Philosophy.

Science is purely descriptive. It is perfectly satisfied if it relates a fact to its class, a plant to its species, or if it traces a phenomenon to certain mediating conditions, as when sound is traced to waves, or if it brings certain events under well-known laws, as when Newton brought Kepler's discoveries under the law of gravitation. Science gives us a general history of *what* happens without raising the further question *why things are what they are*. Again, matter, life, consciousness and *value* are facts of experience studied in their abstract *isolation* by science, while for philosophy they are all inter-connected as *in human personality*. We are *one*, and therefore the world is one. The experience which philosophy studies is concrete and whole, while the subject-matter of Science is abstract and partial. Philosophy does not reveal anything wholly *beyond experience*, but presents to us the order and being of experience itself, taken as a concrete and integrated whole. The objects of science are *selected* from

experience. We select *phases* of events for study in science. We can look upon *man* as either a physico-chemical being, with certain weight and measurement, or a biological unit of the human species, or as a psychological, ethical or religious being. In this sense, the subject matter of science is *abstractions* from the real, plane diagrams from the solid object. It is a true enough representation of certain aspects of experience, and useful for certain specific purposes. The useful is not, however, necessarily true. The *ultimate structure* of the universe is not known to science. Thus there is a tendency in science to make relative truths into absolute ones, provisional hypotheses into final statements.

Science in the course of the few centuries of its development has undergone a great change. The *love of knowledge*, to which the growth of science is due, is itself the product of a two-fold impulse. We may seek knowledge of an object because we love the object or because we wish to have *power* over it. The former impulse leads to the kind of knowledge that is *contemplative*, the latter to the kind that is *practical*. In the development of science the power impulse has increasingly prevailed over the love impulse. To the man who wishes to change his environment science offers astonishingly powerful *tools*, and if knowledge consists in the power to produce *intended changes*, then science gives knowledge in abundance. But the desire for knowledge has another form, belonging to an entirely different set of emotions. The mystic, the lover, and the poet are also seekers after knowledge—not for the purposes of power, but for the

Science and
values.

ecstasy of *contemplation*. Science in its beginnings was due to men who were in love with the world. They perceived the beauty of the stars and the sea, of the winds and the mountains. Heraclitus and the other early Greek philosophers felt the strange beauty of the world almost like a madness in the blood. But, step by step, as science has developed, the impulse of love which gave it birth has been increasingly thwarted, while the impulse of *power* has gradually usurped command in virtue of its unforeseen success. The lover of nature has been baffled, the tyrant over nature has been rewarded. This is the fundamental reason why the prospect of a scientific society must be viewed with apprehension. Knowledge is good and ignorance is evil. Nor is it power in and for itself that is the *source of danger*. What is dangerous is *power wielded for the sake of power*, not power wielded *for the sake of genuine good*. Power is not one of the *ends of life*, but merely *a means to other ends*, and until men remember the *ends that power should subserve*, science will not do what it might to minister to the good life.

What, then, are the *ends of life*? This is the sphere of *values*, which lies outside science, except in so far as science consists in the pursuit of know-

Ends and Ideals. ledge. Science as the pursuit of power must not obtrude upon the sphere of values, and scientific technique, if it is to enrich human life, must not outweigh the ends which it should serve. This is the province of Philosophy—the pursuit of beauty, culture, wisdom and goodness. Our world has a heritage of such *ideals* but unfortunately we have been handing on this heritage

only to the less active and important members of each generation. The government of the world and its key-positions of power have fallen into the hands of men, in whose thoughts and feelings traditional wisdom has no place : mechanism and organisation are what interests them. Mere increase in the production of material commodities is in itself *not* a thing of great value. To prevent extreme poverty is important, but to add to the possessions of those who already have too much is a worthless waste of effort. To prevent crime is necessary, but to invent new crimes in order that the police may show skill in preventing them is less admirable. The new powers that science has given to man can only be wielded safely by those who, whether through the study of History or through their own experience of life, have acquired some reverence for human *feelings* and some tenderness towards the emotions that give colour to the daily existence of men and women. A world without delight and without affection is a world destitute of value. These things the scientific manipulator must remember, and if he does, his manipulation may be wholly beneficial. All that is needed is that men should not be so intoxicated by new power as to forget the truths that were familiar to every previous generation. A new *moral* outlook is called for, in which submission to the powers of nature is replaced by *respect for what is best in man*. Science having delivered man from bondage to nature has the further task of delivering him from bondage to the *slavish part of himself*. Here it is that philosophic insight of the true values is superior to scientific technique.

About the ideal goal of human effort there exists in

our civilization, and for nearly three thousand years there has

Existed, a very general agreement. In
Ends and Means. the Golden Age to which we look for-

ward there will be liberty, peace, justice and brotherly love, 'Nation shall no more lift sword against nation', 'the free development of each will lead to the free development of all'. But with regard to the *roads* which lead to that goal there is no such agreement. Here unanimity and certainty give place to utter confusion, to the clash of contradictory opinions, dogmatically held and acted upon with the violence of fanaticism. There are some who believe that the royal road to a better world is the road of *economic reform*. For some, the short cut to Utopia is *military* conquest and the hegemony of one particular nation; for others, it is armed revolution and the dictatorship of a particular class. All these think mainly in terms of social machinery and large-scale organization. There are others, however, who approach the problem from the opposite end, and believe that desirable social changes can be brought about most effectively by changing the individuals who compose society. Of the people who think in this way, some pin their faith to education, some to psycho-analysis, some to applied behaviourism. There are others who believe that no desirable change of 'heart' can be brought about without super-natural aid. There must be, they say, a return to religion—but they cannot agree on the religion to which we should return.

But what is the '*ideal individual*' into whom the changers of heart desire to transform themselves and others? Here again there is a bewildering multiplicity

of ideals from which we have to choose. Every age and class has had its ideal and each one is the fruit of particular social circumstances. In Greece, there was the ideal of the magnanimous man, a sort of scholar and gentleman, there has been the feudal ideal of the chivalrous man, the 18th century ideal of the 'philosopher'; the 19th century idealised the '*respectable*' man, the present century is witnessing the rise and fall of the 'liberal man' and the emergence of the "sheep-like social man and the

The 'non-attached' man.

god-like leader." Here a significant fact comes to light : all the *ideals* of human behaviour formulated by those who have been most successful in freeing themselves from the *prejudices* of their time and place are singularly alike. Liberation from prevailing conventions of thought, feeling and behaviour is accomplished most effectively by the practice of '*disinterested virtues*' and critical intellect. But the way in which intellect is used depends upon the *will*. Where the will is not disinterested, the intellect tends to be used merely as an instrument for the rationalization of passion and prejudice, for the justification of self-interest. Such liberated individuals have generally come to the conclusion that the ideal man is the '*non-attached*' man : non-attached to his bodily sensations and lusts, to his craving for power and possessions, to the objects of his various desires : non-attached to his anger and hatred as well as to his exclusive loves : to wealth, fame, social position, even science, art, speculation, philanthropy. Non-attachment to self and to what are called 'the things of this world' is associated in the teachings of philosophers and founders of religions with attachment to an ultimate

reality greater and more significant than even the best things this world has to offer. But '*non-attachment*' is not a 'negative' attitude of indifference or isolation from the social environment : it imposes upon those who practise it the adoption of an intensely positive attitude towards the world. It entails the practice of all the virtues—the practice of charity, courage, generosity and disinterestedness, as well as the cultivation of intelligence. The non-attached man is one who puts an end to pain, not only in himself, but also, by refraining from malicious and stupid activity, to such pain as he may inflict on others. He is the happy or 'blessed' man as well as the '*good*' man. Such are the ideals for society and for the individual which are widely and generally accepted. But instead of advancing towards the ideal goal, most of us are rapidly moving away from it.

Real Progress is progress in charity, in humanity and in our regard for truth. There is a definite regression in contemporary social and political affairs in all these matters. Technological advance is rapid, but without progress in charity, such advance is useless. Indeed, it is worse than useless. It has merely provided us with more efficient means for going backwards. There is, for instance, organised lying, taking the form of propaganda, inculcating hatred and vanity, and preparing men's minds for war. It has been said that at no period of the world's history has organised lying been practised so shamelessly and so efficiently, (thanks to the modern advance in technique—the Press, the Radio, the State-controlled system of education) and on so vast a scale as by the political and economic dictators of the present

century. The chief aim of these liars is the eradication of charitable feelings and behaviour in the sphere of international politics. We are becoming more and more idolators, our idols being the nation, the class and even the deified individual (Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini.)

The question, then, is, how can existing society be transformed into the ideal society, described by the prophets, which we all desire? How can the average sensual man and the exceptional ambitious (more dangerous) man be transformed into those "non-attached" beings, who alone can create a society significantly better than our own? The answer to these questions is not so simple as the questions are. Human activity is complex, human motivation exceedingly mixed. By many thinkers, this many-sidedness of men's thoughts, opinions, purposes and actions is insufficiently recognised. Over-simplifying the problem, they prescribe an over-simplified solution. When we try to '*explain*' a complex situation, we want to analyse the situation into its simpler constituents, and then try to discover causal connections. Causation in human affairs is multiple—any given event has *many causes*. Hence, it follows that there can be no single sovereign cure for the diseases of the body politic. The remedy for social disorder must be sought *simultaneously* in many different fields,—the political, the economic and the field of *personal* behaviour. In every field we have to *realize* the ideal *ends* at which we all profess to be aiming. This involves us in a discussion of the relation of *means to ends*. Good ends can be achieved only by the employment of appropriate means. The end cannot justify the means, for the simple and obvious reason that the means

employed determine the nature of the ends produced.

This is the purpose and content of *Philosophy* as applied to human affairs. What sort of world is this, in which men aspire to good and yet so frequently achieve evil? What is the sense and point of the whole affair? What is man's place in it and how are his ideals, his systems of values, related to the universe at large? It is in the light of our conceptions and beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality that we formulate our conceptions of right and wrong: it is in the light of our conceptions of right and wrong that we frame our *conduct*, not only in the relations of private life, but also in the sphere of Politics and Economics. Thus our philosophy, so far from being irrelevant, is the finally determining factor in all our actions.

There is a widespread belief that the ends we all desire can best be achieved by manipulating the structure

Efficacy and
limitations of
large scale
social reform.

of society by carrying through of certain large-scale political and economic reforms. Their aim is to create social circumstances of such a nature that

individuals will not be given opportunities for behaving in an undesirable, *i.e.*, an excessively 'attached' way. This is a branch of '*preventive ethics*', at which the reformer aims. He believes that man's environment can be so well organized that the majority of temptations will never arise. In the perfect society, the individual will practise non-attachment, not because he will be deliberately and consciously non-attached, but because he will never be given the chance of attaching himself. It is obvious that social reforms have, in the past, had the effect of reducing

the number of temptations into which individuals may be led; when the absence of temptation has been prolonged for some time, an *ethical habit* is created: we begin to think that the evil into which we are not led is something monstrous and hardly even thinkable. Generally we take to ourselves the credit that is really due to circumstances. But there are many people who believe themselves to be fundamentally human, and actually behave as humanitarians, would behave quite differently in changed circumstances. The English, *e.g.*, on the whole are a good-humoured and kindly people *at home* and generally imagine that they would be quite incapable of performing or watching cruel acts, but their ethical standards undergo a profound change when they cross the Red Sea, on their way to the East. Things which would be absolutely unthinkable at home are not only thinkable, but do-able and actually done abroad.

Hence the importance of preserving intact any long-established habit of decency and restraint and the vital necessity of avoiding war, whether international or civil. For war, if it is fought on a large scale, destroys more than the lives of individual men and women; it shakes the whole fabric of custom, of law, of mutual confidence, of unthinking and habitual decency and humaneness, upon which all forms of tolerable social life are based. Long immunity from war and civil violence can do more to promote the common decencies of life than any amount of ethical exhortation.

We see, then, that large-scale manipulation of the social order can do much to preserve individuals from temptations which might otherwise be almost irresistible.

But we must not forget that reforms may deliver men from *one set of evils*, only to lead them into evils of another kind. It often happens that reforms merely have the effect of transferring the undesirable tendencies of individuals from one channel to another channel. An old outlet for some particular wickedness is closed; but a new outlet is opened. The wickedness is not abolished; it is merely provided with a different set of opportunities for *self-expression*: e.g., the recent history of that main source of evil, the lust for power, the craving for personal success and dominance—the passage from violence to cunning, from power in terms of military strength and the divine right of aristocracy to power in terms of *finance*. In

Can we change
Human Nature?

Russia, where it has become impossible for individuals to use *money* as a means for dominating their fellows, (on account of the abolition of private ownership of the means of production) the lust for power has been deflected into another channel—there the symbol and the instrument of power is *political position*. Men seek not wealth but a strategic post in the hierarchy,—position there is more important than money. Ambition has been divorced from avarice more or less effectively but the lust of power manifests itself in a chemically pure form. The Cynic smiles indulgently and says 'You can't change *human nature*.' But the anthropologist and the historian replies by pointing out that human nature has in fact been made to assume the most bewilderingly diverse forms, the most amazingly improbable ones. It is possible to arrange a society in such a way that even the lust for power cannot easily find expression, e.g., in some primitive cultures. Scientific

progressiveness and our capacity for making rapid social changes has been associated in our age with *aggressiveness*. But, is this association necessary, inevitable or inherent in the nature of things? Or is it arbitrary and accidental? If the latter, we can certainly dissociate the two and try to build a new culture, a new pattern which will be a blend of the old and the new. Thus, the 'unchanging human nature' can be, and has been, profoundly changed. Most of our associations of behaviour-patterns in human societies can be dissociated and their elements reassociated in other ways. Large-scale manipulations of the social structure bring about such 'changes in human nature' but these changes are rarely fundamental. They do not abolish evil, they merely deflect it into other channels. But if the ends we all desire are to be achieved there must be more than a mere deflection of evil; there must be *suppression at the source, in the individual will*. Hence large-scale political and economic reform is not enough. The attack upon our ideal objective must be made, not only on this front, but also and at the same time on all the others. The forces *in man* as well as those *without* him must be simultaneously tackled.

Social Philosophy "concentrates its attention on the social unity of mankind, and seeks to interpret the *signi-*

ficance of the special aspects of human life with reference to that unity."

The Scope of Social Philosophy.

(Mackenzie) It primarily means the effort to study *Values, Ends, Ideals*, —not what exists or has existed or may be expected to exist, but rather the meaning and worth of these modes of existence. This must not,

however, be taken to imply that it can afford to ignore what exists as historical or political or economic *fact*, or what has been ascertained in the course of the development of particular social sciences. We cannot safely ignore anything in philosophy. But it is not the special province of Social Philosophy to discover facts—it has to accept its facts from other sciences. It has to interpret the significance of these facts, to critically evaluate them.

According to *Hobhouse*, the work of *Social Philosophy* consists in setting before ourselves "*a conception of the harmonious fulfilment of human capacity as the substance of happy life*", and in enquiring into the conditions of its realization. We consider laws, customs, institutions, in respect of their functions not merely in maintaining any sort of social life, but in maintaining or promoting a *harmonious* life. The value of such theoretical discussion lies in clearing up the conditions of success, in measuring results, in recognising elements of success and failure, and planning necessary readjustments. Social Philosophy is not an attempt to apply abstract principles without experience. On the contrary, the only valid principles are those that emerge out of our experience, and the function of the highest generalisations is *to knit our partial views together in a consistent whole*. To promote unity of aim among men of good will, and lay a basis of *co-operation* between those attacking different sides of the social problem, is the practical problem of Social Philosophy.

We must confess at the start that social philosophy like philosophy in general, has no directly practical

results. It "bakes no bread", it can not give us any detailed *recipes* of social, political or economic reforms. Its practical value, however, lies in helping us to see what are the *guiding principles by which our course has to be directed*: it gives the practical reformer a general sense of direction, a goal, a purpose, an ideal, in the light of which he shall organise his *recipes*. Human life is highly complex and variable. But its complexity and variability can be fairly explained and made intelligible by emphasising *the ideal to which it constantly looks and tends*. When we study the ideal, we study *man and society* in a *dynamic* fashion,—not what it is, but *what it has in it to become*: its *potentiality* of progress and achievement, and not the limited actuality of frustration and retardation. Man, we must remember, is midway between an animal and god, and is not wholly subject to the conditions of either. It is thus not enough to treat human life as the life of *reason* and to lay down mere *abstract principles* for its guidance. We have to study all the aspects of human life with imaginative insight as well as with scientific precision. The experience of life has to be called in, the poets and the prophets have to be called to our aid, as well as the more abstract and scientific thinkers.

Progress consists from the lower to the higher. Hence we have chiefly to aim at the *control of what is lower in our nature and surroundings by what is higher*. We may roughly and broadly stress three main aspects of the kind of control that it is important to secure: (i)

Three main
lines of progress,

the control of natural forces by human agency; (ii) the control of individuals by the *communal spirit*; (iii) self-control. The first leads to the development of science, industrial and economic development: the second leads to political development, improvement of legal codes and finally to harmonious international relations. The third leads to educational and cultural development, the strengthening of character, the subordination of the lower needs, the control of the animal impulses and the wise direction of the higher desires. It is important that progress along these lines has to be *simultaneous*, otherwise there would be a one-sided development, leading to the starvation and degeneration of the other sides. Again, there is a *progressive realisation of our social ideals in these three aspects*, the last being the most important, as it reacts on the first two. It is no use if we gain the whole world, but lose our soul. This is the danger of modern western civilization, which has tended, on the whole, to emphasise the importance of gaining control over the *forces of nature*, to the neglect of the other two aspects. The result is that we have tended to become enslaved by *our own instruments*. "Things are in the saddle, and ride mankind" said Emerson. Thus, though modern science and economics should give us plenty of food and clothing, on account of international discord and spiritual degeneration, we find *poverty and hunger facing us inspite of plenty*. Such is the correlation of the various needs and aspects of human life that *neglect of its higher aspects affects even the lower*, though we may give our whole-hearted attention to the latter.

In the broadest sense, sociology is the study of the

whole life of man in society. It is the study of human interactions and interrelations, their conditions and consequences. But no science could make any progress if it attempted to deal with the whole tissue

**Social Philo-
sophy and social
science.**

of human relationships in their infinite details : so recently there has been an attempt to limit the field. Two types of answer have been given by sociologists to this attempt : (a) the conception of sociology as a clearly *defined specialism* designed to mark sociology off very clearly from other branches of social study : (b) the view of it as a synthesis of all social studies. According to *Max Weber*, a leading sociologist of the first type, the aim of sociology is to interpret or 'understand' *social behaviour*, which does not cover the whole field of human relations. It is defined as activity which, in the intention of the agent, has

**Max Weber on
the aim of
sociology.**

reference to, and is determined by, the behaviour of others. The laws of sociology are empirically established probabilities or statistical generalisations of the course of social behaviour of which an interpretation can be given in intelligible terms. The analysis and classification of types of social relationship, however, have to be conducted *in the abstract* without full knowledge of the terms which in *concrete life* they relate. This leads to *special sociologies*, e.g., the sociology of religion, of art, of law, of knowledge, and we have the problem of relating these to the general systematic sociology. As all parts of social life are intimately related and interwoven, changes at any one point have repercussions that affect the whole. Thus we are led to the *second type of views on sociology*, viz., that societies should

be studied as *wholes*, and that the nature of the interactions between its various elements should be understood. There is, therefore, clearly need for a *general and systematic sociology* which, utilising the results arrived at by the specialists, is concerned more particularly with their inter-

**Hobhouse's con-
ception of Soci-
ology.**

relations and seeks to give an interpretation of social life as a whole.

This conception of sociology is represented by Hobhouse for whom sociology is a *synthesis of numerous social studies*, but the immediate task of the sociologist is two-fold: (i) as a *specialist*, he must pursue his studies in his particular part of the social field, (ii) he must prepare the ground for the ultimate *synthesis*, by a discussion of the central conceptions from which such synthesis might proceed, by an *analysis of the general character of social relationships* and by a study of the factors of *permanence and change*, and *the nature and conditions of social development*. Thus synthesis and detailed or specialised study are both necessary and must proceed simultaneously. The chief functions of *sociology* are (i) to provide a classification of the *types and forms of social relationships*, specially of those which have come to be defined in institutions and associations, (ii) to determine the relation between different *parts or factors of social life*, (iii) to disentangle the *fundamental conditions of social change and permanence*. This leads Sociology to

**Functions of
Sociology.**

deal with the general laws of Biology and Psychology, on the one hand, and to stand in friendly relation to History, Jurisprudence and Anthropology, for empirical data, on the other. The method of Sociology

is thus a combination of inductive generalisation (obtained by means of the comparative method or by statistical methods) with deduction from more ultimate laws of

Biology and Psychology. But we need
 Its methods. not commit ourselves to the view that *Sociology is in the long run nothing but Applied Psychology*, and we can leave open the possibility of arriving at independent laws governing the life and evolution of human societies as such.

This emphasis on the *synthetic character* of Sociology, put forward by Hobhouse and generally accepted now-a-

Social Philo- days, leads us to the question: how to
 sophy and Soci- distinguish *Sociology as a science*
 ology. *from Social Philosophy*. On the whole,

we may say that while *sociology, as a science, deals with facts, social philosophy deals with values*. Thus the latter is normative and regulative, rather than positive or historical.

Thus, *Sociology* is the science which attempts to lay bare the natural laws which govern society conceived of as a manifestation of *organic life*. It traces cause and effect in the life of societies, informs us of the conditions favourable to the continued vitality, integration and growth of societies, of the consequences that may be expected to ensue from certain conditions, circumstances, pursuits, beliefs, policies, etc. It does not attempt to dictate to us the *direction* which *we ought to go*, but the knowledge it provides increases the hold of statesmen and social reformers over nature and so enables them to achieve more easily and with less risk of failure whatever objects they may set themselves. It enables us to diagnose a situation

and predict certain results. It sets limits to utopian dreams, holds the statesman and social reformer within the bounds of reality and nurtures their practical faculties. Thus, sociology refrains from giving us any information on the subject of the *ends which we ought to pursue*. (Barnes : Fascism pp. 82-83). This latter is the task of Social Philosophy. Rational progress is only possible when it is known *to what end it is desired [to progress]*. It is important to know *what society is*, not what *it thinks itself to be*, for in this it may be mistaken. What *society needs* is not necessarily what it *wants*, nor, it must be added, is it necessarily what it is *going to want*. But this implies a reference to a *standard*, a *norm*, in the light of which we could decide what *society ought to want* in harmony with its fundamental nature. We may illustrate this by reference to the period of Greek History,

**What society
ought to want-**

when Socrates and Plato appeared on the scene. The Sophists, who were the recognised teachers of the day, had one great shortcoming, viz. : they were the teachers, but not the *leaders of the age*, for they only *followed* the tendencies of the age, and supplied not what it *needed*, but what it *demande*d. The moral instruction they gave was, as a rule, merely the *reflection* of the morality practised and accepted by the average man, neither

**The Sophists
and Socrates.**

better nor worse. Against this, Socrates and Plato stood up for a profound analysis of the *real needs of society*, and for putting up objective standards of thought and action, in place of the relative and subjective whims or caprice of this or that individual. Thus, though Socrates was condemned to

death, we may say that *he expressed more faithfully than his judges the morality which his society stood in need of.*

Thus we may say that, though *Sociology and Social Philosophy* are intimately inter-woven and must be studied side by side, they must not be confused, and at each stage in the inquiry, we ought to know whether we are dealing with *facts as they are*, or with what we regard as *desirable or moral*. "We must avoid thinking either *that things happen because they are good* or *are good because they happen*, otherwise our statements of fact will be biassed and our judgments of value corrupted." (Hobhouse) Thus the study of *sociological fact* and the study

of *social values* should be kept distinct: though in a complete study of human life the two types of inquiry must be brought together and there would be a final synthesis, but not a fusion, of Sociology and Social Philosophy.

Social values.

This leads us to the next question, what is the relation of Social Philosophy to the science of Ethics? Both are

Social Philosophy and Ethics.

primarily normative, both deal with *ends, ideals, values*. Ethics deals with the ends that are aimed at by individuals in their daily activities. It is concerned primarily with *the conduct of individuals*. Social Philosophy is concerned with *communities and social institutions*. But individuals always live within a community and these communities are composed of individuals. Thus the ultimate ends pursued by the *individuals* and by the *communities* are essentially the same, though there is enough material relating to the two sides to form separate studies. It is possible to

treat Social Philosophy as a *continuation of Ethics*, as we find in Plato and Aristotle.

Hobhouse follows the same practice. Social and political institutions, according to him, are not ends in themselves. They are organs of social life, good or bad, according to the *spirit* which they embody. Thus Politics and Social Philosophy must be sub-

Is Social Philosophy a continuation of Ethics?

(I)

ordinate to Ethics. This need of a reasoned ethical basis for social and political reform was first recognised in England by Bentham and Mill. Mackenzie, however, finds it desirable to give Social Philosophy an independent start. In this he is supported by Prof. Cole, for whom "social theory is not subordinate but complementary to Ethics,"

(11)

(12)

which he defines as "the theory of *individual conduct*." (*Social Theory*) For Hobhouse, on the other hand, Ethics must not be studied "in fragments but as a whole". It is the theory of *Ends or Values*, whether realized in *social relations* or through *individual conduct*. His method is

Social theory of Cole.

to lay down *first* a theory of Ends, and then to deduce the *principles of social organisation* therefrom.

According to Ginsberg, Social Philosophy consists of two parts, *critical or logical*, and *constructive or synthetic*. The former is concerned with the *logic of the social sciences* and with the validity of the methods and principles which they employ. It discusses such problems as whether law in the sense of necessary connection can be said to hold in the field of human endeavour, and how such regularities are related to the human will; or whether the element of individuality introduces a factor of *uncertainty*

fatal to any serious sociological generalisation. On its constructive side, Social Philosophy is concerned with the *validity of social ideals*. From this angle it is an application of the results of Ethics to the problems of social organization and social development. It is clear, then, that Social Philosophy is more than merely *Applied Ethics*. It is the *Philosophy of history* and the *social sciences* in general. Thus it is both deductive and inductive in method, both logical and ethical in character.

In modern times, political science has come to be concerned essentially with three problems, partly philo-

Social Philoso-
phy and Politics.

sophical and partly scientific. *Firstly*, it is the study of the actual forms of Government and the conditions of their rise, persistence or change; *secondly*, it deals with the nature of the *ends* which Governments should serve and with the moral basis of authority; *thirdly*, it is an investigation of the technique or art of governmental *administration*. It is clear that Social Philosophy has no direct interest in the first and the third sets of problems of political science. It is, however, fundamentally interested in the second, viz. in political theory. It studies actual forms of Government or the practical art of administration, only as indirect aids to the formulation of a satisfactory theory of the State. In this respect, the scope of Social Philosophy is narrower than Politics. But, in another respect, its scope is *vastly wider*. Social Philosophy arises out of the demand to extend the field of theoretical inquiry to other institutions than the state, e. g., the family, property, morals, religion and art, regarded as social products and seen in their relations to each other. Again, Social Phi-

Philosophy attempts to interpret the whole course of human history as part of a wider "Weltanschauung" (philosophical-world-view). Thus it has a direct connection with the Philosophy of History.

Industry and commerce form so large a part of the activities of human societies that their place is necessarily considered with some care in Social Philosophy. The science of Economics deals with the details of all the complex problems that arise in this connection.

Social Philosophy and Economics.

Economics has lately developed into an exact science, as the problems in this field are to a great extent capable of being stated in terms of *quantity*, and lend themselves readily to mathematical treatment. But its exactness has sometimes been questioned and its practical applications have sometimes to be modified in the light of investigations carried on by the other social sciences. Hence, Economics has recently been defined as the science not only of *wealth* but also of *welfare*. Again, the recent conflict between Capital and Labour, and the increasing demand of the wage-earner to receive proper attention, on account of the growth of the *democratic process*, has led the Economist to revise his theories in the light of modern political and international developments. Thus, Economics provides many intricate and practical problems to the student of Social Philosophy.

What is specially characteristic of human life is the presence of *mind*. The human desires, instincts and emotions cannot be ignored in considering the growth and activities of human societies. These aspects of human nature are studied in their more purely individual

manifestations by Psychology. But their social manifestations and implications have been recently studied by Social Psychology, which provides a starting-point for the study of Society. Crowd Psychology is a special aspect of Social Psychology, while the study of the origin and growth of language is another aspect. All these studies have great relevance and importance for a proper understanding of the true ends of human society.

Social Philosophy and Psychology.

Lastly, as human beings are the highest stage in the development of life in the world, Biology is invaluable for our study. With the advent of the theory of Evolution, advanced by Darwin, and later modified and de-

Social Philosophy and Biology.

veloped by other Biologists, we start with a new conception of the growth of human society. Herbert Spencer, in England, and Comte, in France, deserve special credit for emphasising this connection of Social Philosophy with General Biology.

CHAPTER II

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIETY

X Various definitions of man have been attempted: "a featherless biped", "a laughing animal", "a tool-using animal", "a speaking animal": a rational

Definition of
Man: Three
main aspects
of Human Life.

animal seems the best, as the possession of reason is man's most distinctive mark, by which all other characteristic fea-

tures may be explained: better still, "an animal with the potentiality of reason, and capable by its gradual cultivation of transforming the activities and the circumstances of his life". The physical organism is the apparatus which man uses, so we can widen our definition thus: a rational animal of a particular type, with a peculiar and a complicated structure by which his thoughts, feelings and actions are largely determined. Recognising that man is an animal of a particular type we must go further and recognise that in some respects animal life resembles the life of plants, (growth and reproduction of species) though, in other respects, it is evidently higher and more complex, having some capability of locomotion, some degree of sensitiveness to surroundings, instinctive tendencies to action; higher animals have also complex emotions and large powers of adjustments to the conditions of their lives. (Cf. Animal Psychology). Thus we may once more widen our definition of man as essentially

a plant, with highly complex animal characteristics super-added, crowned with the potentiality of thought and all that thought implies. This rather cumbersome definition of man (given by Mackenzie) has one great advantage : viz., it lays emphasis on the life of man as having three main aspects, a vegetative, an animal and a peculiarly human aspect. The glory of human life depends on this complexity : but it is also the source of our difficulties and sometimes of our degradation : it also makes a psychological analysis of the human behaviour exceedingly intricate and complicated. On account of a mixture in us of Divine Reason and animal appetites and passions, we may become more beastly than any beast, though we are capable of rising to lofty heights which are truly Divine.

In considering how far we can maintain that man is essentially social, we have to take account of all the main factors in his constitution. The factors of nutrition, growth and reproduction (which are the vegetative elements in man) lead even in animals to more or less definite forms of association ; sexual differentiation and intercourse, the protection of the young, who are helpless in some degree for a certain period, the storing of food and the protection of life from common dangers, these can be done effectively only by co-operative action. Hence most of the more highly developed species of animals are naturally gregarious. Societies, said Aristotle, are first formed for the sake of life ; though it is rather for the sake of good life that they are subsequently maintained.

The care of the young, the preservation of food and drink, the provision of adequate shelter and protection,

would thus suffice to account for the existence of human societies, even if there were no other circumstances to account for them. It is not natural for a man to be alone, and some form of social unity is implied in his essential structure (vegetative.) The form of association, however, may vary from time to time and place to place: modes of social behaviour within a single species, though always natural, cannot be always uniform.

Secondly, there are the facts more definitely connected with animal nature that make some form of association natural. The instinct of prey, the fighting instinct itself, leads to organisation of associations for defence and for attack: thus, even the fighting instinct becomes a bond of union. Strife, as well as love, brings the animals as well as the human beings together. According to Heraclitus, "the cessation of strife would mean the cessation of life." In human life, we may say that both co-operation and competition, both love and strife, help to give rise to social unity. Mutual aid and rivalry lead to the formation of tribes and peoples. Thus human beings would be naturally social, even if the distinctive attributes of humanity were not added to those common to us with plants and animals.

But finally, Reason, as the special characteristic of man, is essentially a unifying power. The accumulation of

Is Society natural to man?

knowledge is a co-operative pursuit, to be continued from generation to generation. The preparation of the young to think, and to apply thought in the guidance of their conduct, requires a longer and more intimate association than their preparation to walk or fly. The use of tools and machinery introduces both more mutual aid and more

complex forms of competition than the use of teeth and claws. The use of language binds man to man, and generation to generation, in a way of which no animals are capable, and at the same time introduces a deeper cleavage, and a more intense opposition, between different races and peoples, an opposition that often gives rise to more complex modes of union. Thus, even the diversities that we find in human societies lead us to affirm that some form of association is *natural* to man. *Society rests upon a natural basis.* All the most fundamental facts of human nature give rise to some form of social unity. "There is a natural principle of attraction in man towards man", said Butler. The task for the modern social psychologist is, however, to analyse the various impulses and instincts in man, so as to explain his complex social behaviour. In all social relations we find that two opposed elements in human nature are subtly inter-woven, the one strain is pre-eminently assertive, the other is pre-eminently gentle and tender. This mingling of opposites was expressed vividly by

"The unsocial sociableness of man."

Kant in the phrase, "*the unsocial sociableness of man*"; the same duality in human emotions is expressed by the Freudian concept of "ambivalence." Man wants to win for himself a place among his fellow-men "with whom he cannot live at peace, yet without whom he cannot live at all." Thus we find that self-assertion and aggression are blended, in various and subtle ways, with the opposite elements of self-surrender and a craving for reciprocity in human nature. To interpret this duality in human nature and its expressions in social life is one of the first tasks of Social Psychology.

According to some psychologists, the social interest has been derived from gregariousness or the "herd-instant", which gives to the opinions

The Social Tie. which come from the herd, an authority and a quality of certainty and utter convincingness. In this way, it moulds the whole system of morality and religion : conscience is, on this view, the sense of discomfort aroused by the disapproval of the herd : religion is based upon the realisation of inadequacy or dependence felt by individuals and the consequent yearning for completion and absorption within the larger whole. Other psychologists have treated gregariousness not as a single instinct but as a group of tendencies, including imitation, suggestibility and sympathy. Tansley considers gregariousness in man to be secondary, its function being to regulate and control the self-preserving instincts. Westermarck thinks that man was not originally gregarious, but lived in separate families, and that it was only with the increasing food-supply, when tribal life became possible and advantageous, that the gregarious instinct established itself owing to its usefulness. He distinguishes from it the social instinct which is characterised by the tendency to co-operate, by pleasure in the company of other members, and a feeling of mutual kindness. Drovers thinks that the phenomena usually brought under the herd instinct are only inadequately explained by it. What man needs is far more subtle and varied. He needs the responses of others and the active interplay of interests. The fact that solitude has such a devastating effect on the human mind shows that a more complex and deeper explanation is required than mere herd-instant.

Other writers have sought to derive the social impulses from parental love. Darwin originated this idea and

**The Parental
Feelings.**

McDougall who has developed it in modern times, holds that it is the only altruistic factor in human nature : from it, all truly altruistic striving, directly or indirectly, proceeds. This instinct was primarily material, but later was transmitted to the members of the other sex and generalised, so as to be evoked not only by the distress of the child, but by the need of any weak or defenceless creature. Whether we agree to derive all social impulses from the parental feelings or not, we have to grant that life within the family provides the child with the earliest pattern of other-regarding behaviour, and in that sense is of fundamental importance for social life.

An important theory of the foundations of social life has been elaborated by Freud in his later work. Ac-

**Love and Ag-
gression : Ambi-
valence of
Freud.**

According to Freud, social life is the result of a struggle between love and hate, or the erotic and aggressive tendencies. He is profoundly impressed by the deep-seated feelings of aversion and hostility which infect the most intimate emotional relationships in man ; this is especially to be observed in the case of children. He regards the element of aggression as primary or underived, and capable, in the absence of inhibiting factors, of unprovoked cruelty : *homo homino lupus*. Social life depends on the control and curtailment of this impulse. This is achieved with the aid of Love or Eros, which he uses in a very wide sense, so as to include Platonic love, sexual love and all forms of attraction. Of the 'libido' thus

understood the sexual instinct is only a part, viz., that part which turns towards the object. Thus all tenderness to others, according to Freud, is *diffused and aim-inhibited sexuality*. This is the root of the family and all wider groups : theoretically, Eros is capable of binding into a unity the whole of mankind. Yet in a sense there is a conflict between the wider libidinal force and sex as embodied in the family. Thus cultural or social life is in great measure based on the restrictions everywhere imposed on sex relations by custom and law. There is a restriction at once of the aggressive elements in human nature and of sexual appetite, by the formation of ideals and the mechanism of identification with the elders in the family or the community. This leads to the evolution of *Conscience*—the inward monitor. In this way, the hostile and aggressive attitude is either turned inwards or transmuted by the formation of a common tie and a common ideal. Social life is a process, in which the primary impulses are controlled, repressed, and sublimated in the service of Eros, which wages battles against the aggressive elements in human nature and the inherent enmity of all against all. Ginsberg, in commenting on this account, modifies the Freudian antithesis. According to him, aggression is not a primary tendency to hurt or destroy, but rather an intensified form of self-assertion and self-expression, brought into play under conditions of obstruction, or the fear of obstruction, or of loss of independence. It is also an enhanced form of self-feeling and the enjoyment of mastery or power over others (Cf. "Freudian Narcissism..") Again, considering Freud's conception of the social tie as essentially libidinal, he asks,

"Would it not be better to admit the existence of social impulses in their own right, the proper object of which is not sexual satisfaction, but wider intercourse and reciprocal response?" (Ginsberg : Sociology p. 107.) The family, on this view, is a social group, in which social needs and relationships are complicated by relationships of sex and dependence ; and it is necessary to take account of the wider society of which the family is an integral but not self-sufficient element, in order to interpret all the complicated social relations. He thus comes to the conclusion that the *Social Interest* is not to be derived from any one single tendency, such as gregariousness, or sex or the tender impulse of the parental instincts. The fundamental drive is a need to go outside of ourselves, and to enter into relationship with others. (Cf. the transition from "Narcissism" to "Object-love" in Freud.)

It is not necessarily a desire to co-operate in the service of common ends, nor is it as such benevolent : rather, it is the need of some *reciprocity of response*, which is essential to mental development and constitutes a root interest of the human mind. In sex love the social feelings and impulses are individualised and fused with sex in the strict sense. It is this duality in love which accounts for the conflict between sexuality and sociability, the "ambi-valence" of Freud. For the concentration of the social impulses in one person must tend to diminish interest in the wider social life. A highly individualistic society which inhibits social contacts and a free expression of social interest may drive the individual to find relief in a closer sexual life or some form of passionate

love. Apart from sex, we may have a strong sentiment for particular persons, to whom we may come to stand in a relation of intimate and individual responsiveness. Then there are the benevolent or protective tendencies, the impulse to pity, or to help or protect others in need, and *sympathy*, which is a compound of imaginative insight and tender impulse, a tendency to respond to the needs of others, stimulated by an imaginative grasp of their situation, and by a kind of identification with them which leads us to imagine ourselves in their position. The craving for a response is also characteristic of the antagonistic impulses, and specially of the desire for mastery and *power*. It is also involved in the desire for the approval of others and the dislike of their disapproval. The general social need of others to complete our own lives is thus partly specialised, and partly fused with other specific tendencies in the relations of social life.

Some psychologists, like Ribot and McDougall, speak of an instinct of *self-assertion*. Ribot called it 'positive self-feeling' and contrasted it with 'negative self-feeling'. This contrast has

Self-interest.

further been elaborated by McDougall, who speaks of 'self-assertion' or 'self-display' and 'self-abasement' or 'subjection' with their corresponding positive and negative emotions. In his earlier expositions, McDougall connected self-assertion especially with self-display found in the animal kingdom, in connection with courting or mating. Later, he links it up with 'combat' and 'leadership' within the herd in gregarious animals, and includes under it such tendencies as the impulses to domi-

neer, to lead, to assert oneself over, or display oneself before, one's fellows. As to combat, aggression is recognised by Freud and most psychologists as an integral part of the human personality, as an original and underived instinct. William James thought that man was the most ruthlessly ferocious of beasts. Recently, however, some anthropologists have argued that primitive man was gentle and peaceful but the evidence for this hypothesis is inconclusive. The question remains whether there is in man an inner need to fight, to hurt or to destroy, as there is a need to love or to eat and drink. Should we not rather say that the impulse is secondary, and aroused only when other impulses are interfered with? A great deal of pugnacity is certainly connected with thwarting, while it is sometimes the expression of heightened self-feeling; in other cases, it is the desire for the active exercise of power. But whether there is also an original craving to hurt or to destroy, remains a question, which requires, according to Ginsberg, further investigation. The Freudians, however, basing their case mainly on the observation of the behaviour of children, have come to the conclusion that Hatred and Love are equally important factors in any satisfactory explanation of human activities.

Self-assertion is, in any event, wider than pugnacity or self-display. It is not an instinct, but a general character-

**Self - assertion
passes into
Power.**

istic of the whole make-up of personality, since every activity is an assertion of self, or a mode of self-fulfilment. It passes easily into self-regard and self-interest, and with it is connected the desire for power or domination. This is assertion intensified and made conscious of itself. Here

the experience of resistance is of great importance. When resistance is overcome successfully, there is a heightened self-feeling and from the enjoyment, there arises the longing for the exercise of faculty against resistance, the desire to pit oneself against others, the will to overcome and dominate. From this, coupled with the desire for distinction and joy in activity, there develops a desire for power as such, as an end in itself, which ultimately becomes an anti-social factor.

There is no necessary conflict between self-assertion and the social impulses, since in satisfying the benevolent impulses we also express or assert ourselves. There are many people who satisfy their desire for self-display and power in activities useful to society.

The inter-weaving of the self-assertive and the social.

On the other hand, calculated self-regard or self-love may come into conflict with particular impulses, whether self-regarding or other-regarding. Thus, self-love may be overcome by anger and envy, or by an exaggerated and ill-regulated sympathy. Butler thought that the dictates of enlightened self-interest and benevolence are not fundamentally at variance. The causes of conflict are due far more generally to "disharmonies within the self", and to the clash of collective or group loyalties. Families, occupational groups, social or economic classes or nations, each develop their own self-assertiveness in actual or potential antagonism to others. The conflict between egoism and altruism has been much over-worked. The clash is far more often between interests in which mingled altruism and egoism appear on both sides. This is another example of the blend of opposite elements in

social relations, which we see also in the mixture of domination and good-will in social leadership, of possessiveness and self-devotion in family relationships, of competition and co-operation in economic life; it is thus essential to bear this duality of human nature in mind in the sociological interpretation of Group life.

Individuals come into relations with other individuals through their common or divergent interests in other

Common and
divergent pur-
poses, leading
to types of
social relation-
ships.

objects. (a) Different groups or individuals may have a similar attitude to the same object : e.g., a common antipathy or fear or a common love : the former may serve to unite individuals in war. On the other hand, a love for the same object may either unite or separate individuals, according to the nature of the object sought; (b) different persons may have different or opposite attitudes to the same object or person. This may facilitate co-operation and exchange, or breed rivalry and conflict. (c) When the nature of the object sought is such that its attainment involves joint action, (either supplementary and indifferenced, or complementary, as in specialised division of labour), it leads to co-operation. (d) But the nature of objects or ends also affects the character of the personal relations, according as they constitute competitive or non-competitive goods, i. e., according as they are or are not diminished by use and affected by scarcity of supply. In the field of economic activity, competition is the rule, because the object generally cannot be shared : while in the sphere of knowledge or other spiritual possessions, their sharing in them does not diminish the amount available; as a matter of fact,

knowledge increases by sharing and teaching, so that its possession by some actually increases the chance of its being attained by others. Thus knowledge increasingly leads to co-operation and not an unhealthy competition. (e) Some objects affect all individuals alike, while others have a specific appeal to a limited circle. This also affects our social relationships. It is, thus, as a result of the clash of interests in these different relations, and the efforts to their readjustment that there arise the different forms of association and institutions, varying in range, permanence and coherence with the purposes they embody, and the kind of relations they come to define.

So far we have considered social relations from the point of view of the individual. The relations between the

**The inter-
relation of Minds
in Society.**

individual and society are, however, far closer than this account would suggest. In one sense, society is the condition of our having any ends at all, as social life moulds all our ideals and gives form and definiteness to all our impulses. "Man", says Fichte, "only becomes man among men." One of the chief characteristics which distinguish us from other animals is our power of learning and of mutual stimulation. The influence of social environment upon mental development is truly great, though heredity is also a relevant factor. Firstly, the social environment acts selectively upon the inborn potentialities of individuals, eliciting some and inhibiting others. Whether tendencies are repressed, sublimated or given full play depends to a large extent upon the type of family life and the traditions of the larger society. Secondly, the manner in which the inborn tendencies express

themselves is also determined by the social tradition. The inborn tendencies have a certain plasticity, and their mode of expression, repression or sublimation is, in varying degrees, socially conditioned. Thirdly, on the side of knowledge, the influence of society upon individuals is not less profound and intimate. The individual imbibes methods and principles from the social environment and 'thought' depends on it, not only for its expression, but for its inner life. (Dewey's Instrumental or Pragmatic logic is only an exaggerated emphasis on this social aspect of our thinking.) Social environment acts both as a stimulus and a selective agent, encouraging and assimilating every thing which fits in with its general requirements and resisting and repelling whatever is incompatible with its needs. This applies not only to thought on social policy, when dominant group interests often unconsciously control the stream of thought, but even in the pure sciences, which also have their social atmosphere, hostile to new or revolutionary ideas. Finally, society provides a mechanism of transmission and accumulation which makes possible the building up of cultural systems, such as language, the sciences and arts. It is this profound penetration of the individual by society, (in the ways outlined above), which has given rise to the problem of the *group mind*. That man is a social animal has been an axiom of

The group mind. Social Science and Philosophy since Aristotle, but what makes his position unique is his remarkable combination of individuality and sociality, his power of pitting his will against the will of the community, and of gaining an inner independence which enables him to react, in turn, upon the community. This

profound duality is somewhat obscured when society is described as a mind, after the analogy of the individual mind. Society is a complex net-work of relations between minds. What is meant by calling a society a unity is that it tends to maintain itself as a whole, by the efforts of its parts towards mutual adjustment, and that in this self-maintenance, what counts is not so much the individual efforts, as the way they are corrected, modified, and adapted to each other in the final result. Thus common actions may have consequences which are never willed or foreseen by those who took part in them. The terms 'common mind' and 'common will' really should be taken to refer to a mass of dispositions, or tendencies to thought, feeling, and action, widely dominant in a group. Such a set of dispositions does not constitute a unitary mind or a general will. The psychological factors involved in large-scale and group action are extremely inchoate and obscure, "impalpable congeries of hopes and fears," which certainly has not the character of voluntary decision. As has been well said, "what is general in common action is not will, and what is will is not general."

If society is a net-work of persons or wills, and is not possessed of the kind of unity which we ascribe to an individual self, the next question we

Social Purpose. have to answer is whether we can regard purpose as applicable to social wholes. This has been doubted by Idealists, on the one hand, and Marxians, on the other. In history, says Engels, "only seldom does that occur which is willed.....out of the conflict of innumerable individual wills and acts, there arises in the world a situation which is quite analogous

to that in the unconscious natural world Historical events thus appear to be ruled by chance, but wherever on the surface chance seems to dominate, it is always itself dominated by hidden inner laws, which only remain to be discovered." From a somewhat different point of view, Bosanquet says in a striking passage :— "It is not finite consciousness that has planned the great phases of civilization, which are achieved by the linking together of the achievements of finite consciousnesses. Each separable intelligence reaches but a very little way, and relatively to the whole of a movement, must count as unconscious. You may say there is intelligence in every step of the connection ; but you cannot claim as design of finite intelligence what never presented itself in that character to any single mind..... Nothing is properly due to mind which never was a plan before a mind." (The Meaning of Teleology, page 11.)

These arguments are not quite convincing. Even in the individual, the purposes by which he is guided, range, in varying degrees of clarity, from a vague unconscious restlessness seeking relief to a clear, conscious and deliberate planning. The results arrived at are often quite different from those we foresaw or desired at the outset. Finally, a man's character is deeper than his consciously formulated aims, and he may act in accordance with his real character, as guided by his *unconscious* springs of action, though he may himself be unable to formulate any definite principles of his conduct. In social movements we are concerned with vast and complicated interactions which are to a much greater extent unconscious than in the case of the individual,

and cannot be easily apprehended completely by any *one* mind. Here, too, there are varying degrees of clarity in the apprehension of ends. Large scale movements mostly "do not reach the stage of *will*" proper ; perhaps they do not go beyond the stage of trial and error." (Ginsberg.)

The unconscious
purpose in
Social move-
ments.

Nevertheless, human passions and motives are constantly at work, and could we but disentangle the forces involved, we should see in historical movements everywhere individuals setting up complex webs of relationships, and in turn, being borne along by them.

Hegel and
Engels on Social
Purpose.

That human needs are a driving force in history is held both by Marxians and the Idealists. "Nothing", says Hegel "has been accomplished without interest on the part of actors. . . . nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion." Similarly Engels insists that "nothing occurs without conscious intent or willed end." Purposes then operate, though they may not be in themselves sufficient to bring about changes. But the question remains, are they social purposes? Hegel's answer is not helpful, for a purpose of which nobody knows anything is not a purpose. According to Marxians, the laws governing the interactions of human purposes are not psychological laws. Sociology is more than merely Applied Psychology. But the purposes are always in individual minds : minds are interrelated, and the interrelation itself may become an object of *conscious* endeavour. Whether there is an *integrated social will* and a *social purpose* in any actual society or social organisation is a matter

for detailed examination. The theoretical possibility may be realized *in fact* or may not have been realized. To the degree to which social purpose has been realized in a given society, group or civilization, to that extent, it may be said to possess integration and a general will.

CHAPTER III.

THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE.

That the family is natural to man is apparent from the fact that it is natural to most of the more highly developed animals. It is obvious that the care of the young becomes increasingly important in the higher types of animal life, because they tend to be more and more helpless at birth and are more and more in need of care and protection for their development and nurture, and for a comparatively longer duration. We also find that the instincts of the parents become gradually adapted to cope with the biological necessity. The critical burden of responsibility and care and protection falls generally upon the parents, and mainly upon the mother. This may be taken as constituting what Mackenzie calls "the natural basis of the family". Thus the monogamous family which would, prima facie, seem to be the best adapted for achieving this biological end, has been declared by many as being the ideal social institution for the true and proper nurture of the human animal. Here both parents can normally devote themselves wholeheartedly, and with cordial co-operation, to the necessary task. This form of family life is seen in its greatest perfection and beauty chiefly in certain species of birds, e. g., the common sparrow, which in other respects are

not at all closely akin to human beings. On the other hand, dogs and cattle and other mammals, more allied to man, show no definite sanctity to the marriage tie. Thus it has been urged by many thinkers to-day that polygamy and polyandry are more natural to man as well as the other higher mammals. Mackenzie, however, thinks that some birds are closely akin to human beings in an essential point, viz., the need of special care and preparation for the young. "Flying is the natural mission of many birds, as thinking is of men, and the young are, in general, quite unfitted for either of these functions". This argument is very far-fetched and, though attractive and original, is hardly logical. Swimming, preying, speed in running, are equally the natural missions of other animals but no one suggests that the fish, the tiger and the greyhound require a protracted period of early training or the monogamous family. The fact remains that discussion about matters, where intimate human emotions are involved, cannot always be based on logical and rational grounds.

Though we may grant that the family is a natural form of association, we have to ask the question, why the family as a social institution has, in all times and climes, tended to foster the growth of a number of rigid conventions, traditions and even ritual. If we look to the origin of the word "family" itself, we can trace it to the Roman "*famulus*", a domestic slave; the *familia* meant primarily "a collection of slaves attached to a household". (*Domus* appears to be the nearest equivalent in Latin for what we understand by a family.) Later, the family

The conventional aspect of the Family.

came to mean, not merely the slaves, but all the persons included within the household; all regarded, more or less, as property of the head of the family—the father. In the Ten Commandments we have practically the same conception: “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is thy neighbour’s.” It is significant that the children are not mentioned here. It is also noteworthy that while there is a commandment to honour father and mother, there is no commandment to respect children. Possibly it may have been thought that Nature herself might be trusted to teach this. Perhaps the framers of the commandment cited above felt ashamed to include children among the chattels and possessions. Whatever the reason for the omission may be, it is clear that the father, and not the child, was regarded as the centre of the family, and for nearly two thousand years the family as a social institution in Europe has suffered from the idea of property and Patriarchal domination.

Fortunately, this was not the original conception of the family in Ancient Hindu Society. Our culture *always* put the child as the head and the **The Family in Ancient India.** *centre* of the entire family; no man could attain salvation, unless he had completed his earthly existence by begetting children. Though the male child was given the place of honour, the girl was also given much respect, and was even worshipped in her father’s home, as being the potential mother of the succeeding generations. Much thought and attention was given to her early home training in the

domestic arts and crafts, she was taught to look upon her womanhood and motherhood as the highest privileges, and above all, her aesthetic, cultural and religious education were given proper prominence. The truly feminine virtues of endurance, humility, chastity and sympathy were given the first place in the recognised moral code, though intellectual and physical culture were not neglected. It was recognised that the woman has not to compete with man, but to supplement him, as his life partner in the great task of the upbringing of the new generation. In any case, whatever the evils that crept into the Joint Hindu Family later on, there is evidence to show that the modern emphasis on the importance of the child was not only anticipated in the Hindu Scriptures but even, perhaps, overstressed. The child was never to be scolded or beaten, till it was five years old, but only loved, honoured and obeyed. Much of the psycho-analytical literature, during the last decade or two, on the upbringing of children, only reiterates this fundamentally sound position of the orthodox Hindu.

Taking the child then as the natural basis of the family, we have to regard its preparation for life as the primary function of this institution.

**The Child as
Centre.**

"If we may treat the family as a little state, the child is its legitimate sovereign" (Mackenzie). The child's wishes may not always be carried out, but the normal function of the family is to secure what is best, or the best available under the circumstances, for the nurture of the children, with a view to their preparation as citizens of a larger community. The other functions involved in the life of the

family are then to be regarded as subordinate to this fundamental conception. But what is logically first is seldom first in the temporal order. A family is founded *in time* by the marriage of two persons of opposite sexes. But marriage need not always result in children, and even, when it does, the union is generally prolonged beyond the period during which the care of children is essential. Hence it is not unnatural to regard love between persons of opposite sexes, rather than the care of children, as the fundamental basis of the family. This is, indeed, a natural basis, and we see it in animal life, as well as in that of human beings. But we find, on reflection, that it is normally subordinate to the other basis. There may be intense love between individuals of the same sex or between brothers and sisters, leading to associations of a very delightful and valuable kind ; but these cannot be called families. It is the possibility of children to be cared for that differentiates marriage from all such associations based on personal affection and friendship. Free love between adults may lead to a fine and valuable mode of union, but unless the union is based on the care of children, it cannot be regarded as the essential foundation of the family. The modern argument for "companionate" and "trial" marriages appears somewhat shallow as compared with the old argument for a permanent marital tie, when we consider this question of the child as the centre of the family.

Again, it is natural that when the parents become feeble and the children come to maturity, the latter should make some recompense for the care that has been bestowed upon them. Even in animals some appearance of

gratitude for benefits received is often observed. As the aged persons are often in special need of help, it seems most appropriate that they should receive it from those whom they have brought into being. It must not, however, be imagined that marriage becomes meaningless in the absence of children. The modern use of contraceptives may, in the near future, bring about a situation in which the childless marriage would create new problems for the social philosopher. At present, however, the tendency in all totalitarian countries is to encourage, rather than to discourage, families.

The care of the young means primarily the preservation of life and health. (satisfaction of purely vegetative needs,)

**Educational
Functions of the
Family.**

but it also includes the development of the animal instincts, especially the need of movement and expression. In man, it falls naturally within the province of the family to cultivate at least the rudimentary use of language, the wise control of the instinctive urges and the elementary rules of social behaviour. The natural love and affection of parents, and especially of mothers for their offspring, an affection which they have in common with the lower animals, makes it generally true that no others are so well adapted to care for them in their early state of helplessness. In some parents natural affection and instinct may be comparatively weak, as it may sometimes be stronger in those who are not parents. But we may treat these as exceptional cases which only serve to prove the rule; these are mostly below or above the *norm*. Again, we have to admit that natural love is not always an adequate guide for human beings in the nurture of the

young. Those who have made a special study of children and their needs would, in many ways, be better fitted to deal with them; but this normally does not apply to the first *five*, or at least to the first *three* years of life. Obviously, where one or both of the parents die, or are seriously ill or incapable, or are compelled to be much away from home, or when a child happens to be very different in temperament from its parents, or extraordinarily precocious and gifted, or feeble-minded and backward, the conditions are abnormal, and special attention, or clinical guidance and treatment, may become necessary. It seems certain that any arrangement that altogether does away with the element of parental care must be a second-best alternative. Even when the children go to school, the family would appear to be the natural centre for some of the most important aspects of education, especially those relating to conduct and the cultivation of the affections.

The family, in a larger sense, is also a natural centre of educational influence. *The parents learn a great deal by teaching.* The effort to convey ideas to immature minds always serves to clear up the ideas of those who have to make the effort. Apart from this, there is a certain inspiration in any close intercourse with the younger generation. "A child.....brings hope with it and forward-looking thoughts." There is a rich and invigorating experience of a certain expansion of the soul in entering into the lives of those who are younger. It sometimes seems to be an added life to the older, some sort of re-juvenation of the entire personality. This is the common experience of all teachers and parents who enjoy their task and

responsibility.

Another important educational influence is the inter-parental one. In any married couple there are bound to be many differences in temperament, taste, and outlook on the world. If there is the tie of natural affection and intimate association in wedlock, much can be learned by mutual intercourse, if there is emotional maturity on both sides and the desire to understand each other. This aspect of family life deserves more emphasis in modern times, as it has gone into the background on account of the prevailing notion in Europe and America that marriage is a "bankrupt" institution. A modern author says, "The disintegration of the family and the decay of the marital institution of the modern world, accompanied by the rise and revolt of youth, are revolutionary developments in our civilization." This disintegration and decay are only a phase of a more fundamental revolution that is already tearing at the roots of our social and economic life..... There is no endeavour in this book to exaggerate the importance of sex in social life. There is an endeavour, however, to attack the stupid silences that have obscured and distorted its consideration in the past What we see, then, in the revolution in morals which has occurred in our age, is the harbinger of a revolution in social life which is hastening upon us. The old society is in a state of decay. Its old morals have become bankrupt. The new morals are an outgrowth of its rapid disintegration and chaos".

The importance of this aspect of family life is one of the strong arguments in support of monogamy. In a polygamous relation, the position of women tends to

become degraded, and can hardly be such as to yield that close personal tie of equal fellowship which monogamy makes possible. The modern industrial development in Europe which has given rise to the democratic process, the emancipation

V. F. Calverton: *The Bankruptcy of Marriage*.

of women, universal Adult suffrage and the influx of girls to the universities, the factories and the Public services on terms of equality with boys, has brought about a situation, in which no modern woman wants to enter into the marital relation with any but an equal status. Woman's freedom is no longer a passive thing, but an active, dynamic reality in Europe, America and Russia today. Very often women sever themselves entirely from their old existence, demand a divorce and forge their way into a freer life. This revolt attests the growth of feminine resolution and intelligence. The working woman in Russia is constantly instructed in the nature of her rights, and in the importance of their expression. Marriage as a consequence can never become an *institution of inequality*, as it has been in the past in Russia, and still is in other nations today. "With the removal of the *religious* element in marriage, and the establishment of the right of the woman to obtain and determine the destiny of her property after marriage, the developments in divorce follow in natural sequence". The most revolutionary factor of the new Russian morality is that of the free divorce. Divorce can be got by mutual consent, or even at the instigation of one party, on the ground of incompatibility. "The mutual consent of the husband and wife or the desire of either of them to obtain

a divorce shall be considered a ground for divorce": this is the clear and unambiguous statement of the code in the United States of Soviet Republics. The bourgeois English family, on the other hand, carries with it "an odious sense of stuffiness and narrowness, moral and intellectual". (Carpenter: Love's 'Coming of Age'.)

These aspects of the family make it clear that the modern trend of opinion is highly dangerous. The so-called craze for equality and freedom in the modern girl is landing her into the chaos of futility and frustration, if she chooses to remain unmarried, into divorce and other complications, if she lightly enters the bond of marriage. She is on the horns of a dilemma. Swift said that unhappy marriages were largely due to the fact that girls are taught to make nets instead of cages. A judicious treatment of the problems connected with the intersexual intercourse should have a prominent place in the general education of the young men and women to-day. This is a matter to which a good deal of attention was given in ancient Indian society. "But the modern Indian youth, who has imbibed "little knowledge" and no insight, is in a most unfortunate position. "How to be happy, though married" is a book which is worth careful consideration.

As the care of the young, especially in its earlier stages, falls almost necessarily upon the mother, the father is normally called upon to provide for her support, as well as that of the children. This economic aspect of the family is so important that sometimes marriages tend to be arranged largely on financial grounds; and

Economic Functions of the Family.

even when they are not so arranged, financial considerations are seldom without weight. The economic needs of the family are sometimes prejudicial to its unity, and may seriously interfere with the discharge of its educational functions. In comparatively primitive conditions of life, the family may support itself by labour carried on within the home or its immediate neighbourhood ; but the growing complexity of life renders this less and less common. The father may be so constantly away as to be almost negligible for the special purposes of the family. That the mother should be frequently employed in outside work, that even the young children should be sometimes employed in the discharge of economic functions at a time when their energies should be reserved for growth and education, is a powerful indictment against the maladjustments of modern society. At any rate, under these circumstances, the family is liable to fail, and often does fail miserably, in the discharge of its proper function, viz., to justify its existence as an educational centre.

Indeed, this aspect of the family was so prominent in the mind of Marx & Engels that they came to the conclusion as far back as the year 1847,

Marx and Engels on the Family.

that there is practically no family life among the large majority of the workers

in the factories and mills in a modern industrial area.

The problem has assumed serious proportions in the world to-day, as the growing tide of industrialism has overtaken the backward countries like India and China. Those who have seen the condition of the workers in Ahmedabad and Cawnpore, for instance, will have to admit that a very large proportion of our rural population

is, slowly but steadily, drifting towards a life of the slums, by sheer economic pressure, and the evils of drinking, gambling and public prostitution are now growing so rapidly in our own country that this has already become a social problem of the first magnitude. The words of the authors of the COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, prophetic as they are, are unfortunately beginning to apply with full force to our own country, which can hardly in any sense be called truly industrialised on a grand scale. When we consider that, during the last three years on account of the rapid expansion of industry in India, the population of a city like Cawnpore has increased by about two lacs, the overwhelming majority of which are male, bachelor workers, *among whom the family is practically absent*, we begin to realise that marriage and the family, as a social institution, exists only for those *rich and middle class members of society*, who are indifferent to the real miseries of the large majority of our population.

“On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution”...

Communism of women.

.....“The bourgeois claptrap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parent and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of modern industry, all family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple

articles of commerce and instruments of labour
Nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois at the community of women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the communists. The communists have no need to introduce community of women; *it has existed almost from time immemorial* Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common and thus, at the most what communists might possibly be reproached with is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalised community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident, that *the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system, i.e., of prostitution both public and private.*" (The Communist Manifesto.) We have to admit that the above is a powerful indictment against the bourgeois morals and standards, which has remained unanswered for 97 years, and the sincerity of the attack, together with its relevancy to the world affairs today, make it imperative upon us to meet the charge. The fact cannot be denied that the real point aimed at by the communists is to do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production.

**Weaknesses of
the Family.**

We are now in a position to conclude, from the various considerations referred to above, that, though the family is deeply rooted in nature, and especially in human nature, there are some essential weaknesses that tend to make it ineffective and even pernicious in its influence. These defects are all connected with certain conflicts that arise between the family and some other important interests in

human life. The chief of these interests would seem to be those of industry, politics, comradeship, culture and art. Human nature, as we have seen, is diverse and multiple, not a simple unity. There are various currents and cross-currents in man and society, both conscious and unconscious. We have to satisfy all the conflicting urges of mankind, and yet to preserve *the final unity of purpose in the human society*. This is the task of Social Philosophy.

We have already referred briefly to the economic interests of man as disturbing the unity of the family.

Plato's stric-
tures on the
Family.

Plato, however, it is worth noting, does not appear to have felt any special difficulty on this score. In the ideal Republic which he so carefully and elaborately sketched, he did not intend to interfere with the family life of the industrial class. He assumed that children would, in general, follow the employment of their parents, or at least would not greatly diverge from these, and he seems to have held, that on the whole, it is only right and natural that they should stick to the career for which there are definite facilities, both of home influences at a comparatively early age, and of early home training by some simple form of apprenticeship. But Plato was more afraid of *the conflict between the Family and the State*. Consequently, he urged that those who are to be specially concerned with the defence and government of the State should be released from the limiting interests of the family. Even to-day it remains true that there is acute conflict between the claims that the family makes upon an individual and those that are made by the State. In particular, the claims of the State to provide a suitable education for all its citizens,

and to secure that they are adequately fitted to fulfil their special functions in the life of the larger community, interferes somewhat with the claims for parental control that are apt to be put forward from the point of view of the family. If, however, we agree to regard *the child as the sovereign of the family*, and the parents as merely councillors, then this difficulty is largely solved, at least in theory. The child, then, remains the sovereign of the family until he becomes the subject of the State, in which also he may eventually acquire a partial sovereignty. This view regards the parents as the trustees of his welfare till they can find a better trustee in the shape of the School, the University or the State itself.

In the fifth book of the Republic, Plato definitely insists on the abolition of the Family in the ruling class.

Plato is rightly regarded as a pioneer in the enfranchisement of women. From this point of view he was perhaps the most daring innovator that the world has ever seen. In no part of his teaching is "his antagonism to convention more marked than in his views concerning the education and duties of women." (Plato : Adam, Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) Plato starts the question of women's share in the State by observing that among animals females not only bear the young and bring them up, but also take part in other business. The care of flocks, for instance, or hunting, is the function of dogs, irrespective of sex. Why, then, should not women follow the same pursuits as men, so far as their strength allows? But if they are to do so, they must receive the same education as men in both music and

Plato's abolition of the family in the ruling class.

imp.

gymnastics. Plato is undaunted by any national prejudice allowing a perfectly free and open field in all walks of life to men and women alike. All that he cares about is to find the best person to discharge a given work, and he

**Declaration of
the rights of
Woman in the
Republic.**

declines to erect any artificial barriers. For this bold *declaration of the rights of Woman*, Plato deserves our admiration and respect, and women in all ages and countries owe an immense debt of gratitude to him. Mackenzie considers it "doubtful whether he really deserves much credit for this", and in this respect he merely shows his anti-Platonic bias. By quoting an obscure passage from the *Timaeus*, (a comparatively insignificant dialogue of Plato,) in support of his contention, Mackenzie really adds insult to injury. The fact remains that no fair critic of the Social Philosophy of Plato can afford to ignore the definite statement and declaration of the rights of women in the Republic. In the *Laws*, which is a work of ripe age, Plato is not a whit less convinced of the good that will accrue to a state through the education of women and their full co-operation in public affairs. The legislator ought "not to let the female sex live softly and waste money and have no order of life, while he takes the utmost care of the male sex, and leaves half of life only blest with happiness, when he might have made the whole state happy." (The Laws : 806 c, tr. Jowett)

If mankind is to be improved by breeding, care must be taken that the best men should unite with the

**Community of
wives and
children.**

best women. The rulers are to decide what persons are to be joined in wedlock at the hymeneal festivals, keeping

their methods of procedure a secret only known to themselves. When children are born of good parents, they are to be reared in a State "fold" or nursery, regarding as their parents all those who were brides and bridegrooms at a marriage festival a certain time before their birth. In this way the guardians will become *one family*, and by sharing one another's joys and sorrows, they will be bound together by community of pleasure and pain. Moreover, as they may have no private property in lands, houses, or other goods, they will be free from all quarrels occasioned by the *possession of money or children or kindred*. (The Republic, Book 5, 464E.)

Women, then, are to share with men a common education, common responsibility for bringing up children, common guardianship of the city in peace and war. This, according to Plato, is the natural relationship of the sexes. His co-educational proposal arouses distrust, not so much on its own account but because of the community of wives and children that seems to follow from it. *To secure and preserve the unity of the State Plato was forced to destroy the family as the social unit*, lest the bonds of kinship and ties of natural affection might challenge the supremacy, or lead to the disruption, of the State. This

Rousseau's criticism of Plato's scheme.

has been considered as a great defect in his ideal Republic, and on this ground his communistic scheme has been severely criticised by *Aristotle, Rousseau*, and many others. Rousseau says, "Having got rid of the family, there is no place for women in his system of government, so he is forced to turn them into men.....I refer to that subversion of all the tenderest of our natural feelings, which

he sacrificed to an artificial sentiment which can only exist by their aid. Will the bonds of convention hold firm without some foundation in nature? Can devotion to the State exist apart from the love of those near and dear to us? Can patriotism thrive except in the soil of that miniature fatherland, the home? Is it not the good son, the good husband, the good father, who makes the good citizen?" (*Emile*, Everyman's Edn., P. 326). These are formidable questions, but we must admit the strength of Plato's position. The family must give place to the State, as the National State must give place to the International Federation of all peoples in the world. The greatest good of the greatest number must be the acid test of Social Justice and Goodness. The lower must yield to the higher, in the interest of the whole.

According to Mahatma Gandhi, marriage is, and ought to be, a sacrament: the union is not the union of bodies

Gandhi's conception of marriage.

but the union of souls, indissoluble even by the death of either party. "Where there is a true union of souls, the remarriage of a widow or widower is unthinkable, improper and wrong. Marriages, where the true law of marriage is ignored, do not deserve the name. If we have very few true marriages nowadays, it is not the institution of marriage that is to blame, but the prevailing form of it, which should be reformed." Again, "marriage is a fence, that protects religion. If the fence were to be destroyed, religion would go to pieces. The foundation of religion is restraint, and marriage is nothing but restraint". (*Young India*, June 3, 1926.) Again, about a decade later, Gandhiji, (writing in the *Harijan*, March 20, 1937, on

"*Married Brahmacharya*", says: "When a man has completely conquered his animality, involuntary incontinence becomes impossible, and *the desire for sexual gratification for its own sake ceases altogether*. Sexual union then takes place *only when there is a desire for offspring*." According to this view, the sexual act is "*only a means for procreation, never for self-indulgence*." But our account of the Family and Marriage as a Social institution is based on a clear recognition of the vital urges of normal, healthy men and women. When we grant that the *vegetative* and *animal* aspects of human nature are as fundamental as the *rational* aspect, we mean that man has to become *a complete animal, before he can become a complete human being, and long before he can attain Godhood*. It is in this sense that the famous Urdu poet of Delhi, *Ghalib*, says. "*It is very hard for man to become truly human*."

("आदमी को भी सुयस्सर नहीं इन्साँ होना "

(آدمی کو بھی سوسر نہیں انسان ہوتا)

Gandhiji is making the impossible attempt to make us godlike, before making us truly human. To preach a humanitarian religion is difficult enough in the present century ; to preach Divine religion is a vain attempt. It is enough, if we could be persuaded to love and serve humanity ; to love God is impossible, unless we are first able to love our neighbour.

We must, then, first try to understand human nature, and work out the vital urges by giving them proper guidance and wise direction. Self-restraint in connection with religion is difficult to understand ; self-restraint in

connection with marriage seems psychologically contradictory. It is because Gandhiji has captivated the hearts of thousands of educated young men and women throughout this vast country that we are compelled here to make a pointed reference to his conception of marriage. By his sincerity, courage and devotion he has impressed the educated youth of this country with his pathological ideas about sex and Brahmacharya, and created a confusion in their adolescent and impressionable minds. We feel that Gandhiji, who deserves universal respect and admiration is most misleading, when he writes about matters in which he goes against all recent scientific research. Contemporary studies of glands in Physiology and the psycho-analytic treatment of the Child and the Adolescent in Psychology have conclusively shown that self-restraint has got serious limitations, and that much creative energy for intellectual and social work can be released, if sex is allowed to work off its energy normally and spontaneously. The Freudians have done a very valuable service in pointing out the nervous disorders produced in later life by wrong handling of young children in sex matters. Educational reform in this respect is most needed, especially in very early childhood. The difficulty is greatly increased by the practice, in modern bourgeois society, of leaving children, during their first years, largely in the hands of *Ayaks*, totally uneducated women, who cannot be expected to know, still less to believe, what has been said by scientists in highly technical language necessary to escape prosecution for obscenity. This is the ultimate reason why the Family as a social institution must be defended, against the powerful attacks of Plato and the Marxians. The care

and health of the child is of fundamental importance to society. The mystic argument of Gandhiji, viz., the spiritual union of two souls in order to create a new soul, loses all its charm, if the new soul brought into being is not properly looked after, and this is impossible under the conditions of modern society, if the sex instincts of the parents themselves are frustrated by limiting intercourse and practising self-control, instead of Birth Control. The Gandhian view must be corrected and supplemented by the psycho-analytic account of the upbringing of children.

We have to close this chapter on the Family with a few remarks on some essential matters in this connection.

Upbringing of children.

Our argument really would serve as the link between this and the succeeding chapter which deals directly and expressly with Education. Till, however, our society has devised a permanent institution like the State Nurseries (*Creche*) of Russia, we cannot safely discard the Family, however much we may be in full accord with the argument of the Communists. But before we deal with the delicate and complex question of the right upbringing of children, we have to digress a little in order to find out the causes which give rise to active opposition to the Freudian view of sex and sex education.

The active opposition to Freud takes an *emotional* form, when Freud is accused of being "*sex-mad*", of "*reducing everything to sex*", or of "*Pan-sexualism*." This is really due to the fact that there is a heavy social ban on various aspects of sexuality, so much so that the very word "*immoral*" is commonly used as an equivalent for

The "Pan-sexualism" of Freud.

"*sexual*". The part of his conclusions that has proved the most unacceptable relates to the *sexuality of childhood*. The popular view is that the sexual instinct *first* manifests itself during adolescence, and that any signs of it during childhood are to be regarded as a *diseased precocity*. Freud maintains, on the contrary, that children conceal the sexual nature of their interests *from themselves*, and still more from adults, which the latter reciprocate, by ignoring them, or else, by punishing them as being simply "naughty". Only a general conspiracy of silence and blindness could manage to overlook facts that are patent for everyone to see,—such facts as the bodily preoccupations and habits of children, their curiosities, loves, jealousies, and so on.

According to Freud, the sexual instinct is active from the first day of life to the last, but it manifests itself in a greater variety of ways, the nature of which is often unrecognised, than is generally supposed. It is a complicated instinct, and is made up of various components that have to fuse into an entity, and often fail in doing so. It has to undergo a rather elaborate course of development during which various difficulties may arise, errors in development, *arrest at certain stages*, and so on. This development has to be passed through *twice over*, first in early childhood, *below the age of five*, and next in the *years following puberty*. In the interval, the "latency period", there is no progress in this development. Leading medical psychologists now generally agree with Freud in this matter, viz., *that the sex urge has its roots in the period of early childhood*. The myth of the 'innocent child' has been exploded. Norman Haire, the famous

British sexologist, writes : "If we assume that children are 'pure angels', i. e., sexless beings, the sexual instinct must apparently descend on them like a bolt from the blue, when they feel the first stirrings of it. Such a hypothesis, however, is contrary to all experience and conflicts with all the psychological laws which govern the development of man", "The sexual instinct is clearly *innate*, although it manifests itself during childhood in a form different from that which it assumes in adults" All experts to-day agree that the sexual instinct is in evidence *even in sucklings*" Science has given the word 'sexual' a much wider connotation. It means, in the case of children, *a tendency to seek pleasurable sensations, which* as they develop, clearly assume a sexual character."

The first stage is termed the *Oral stage*, the activity consisting of the various forms of sucking and swallowing ;

Oral stage.

it can be subdivided into two phases, sucking and biting respectively. To begin with, the *nutri-tive and oral-erotic* impulses are indistinguishable from each other, but it soon becomes evident that sucking has acquired some significance of its own, quite independent of hunger ; every nurse knows how a child's restlessness can be stilled by giving it a "comforter", and this need has nothing to do with any desire for food. Later on, the child replaces the nipple and the comforter by its thumb, often continued into nail-biting and allied habits like *holding the pencil* in the mouth, or *adult smoking*. This is the *auto-erotic stage of the libido* : *there is no object-love* : the child seeks for a gratification in its own body, but there is

hardly any sense of "I". In the second stage, called the narcissistic stage, the ego has developed

Narcissistic stage.

and is taken as the object of the instinct ; we might say that the child loves

itself, a capacity it never entirely gives up. The third stage is the "critical" one. Here the child seeks in the outer world for objects not only of its affection, but also of its conscious and unconscious sexual phantasies, and these relate to the members of its own family, brothers and sisters or playmates, and then to the parents. Diffi-

Oedipus complex.

culties arise in the latter relation, which constitutes the famous Oedipus complex, where there is a sexual attitude

on the part of the child towards the parent of the opposite sex, together with rivalry towards the one of its own. This complex Freud regards as the central one in the whole unconscious ; on the way in which the child deals with it depends, more than on anything else, its future character and temperament, as well as any neurosis it may at any time develop. This "infantile sexuality" is the most novel and important of the Psycho-analytical contributions to psychology, as it is this knowledge that furnishes the key to the understanding of adult problems. Every adult problem in the realm of sexuality, friction and difficulties in marriage, social problems like prostitution, birth-control and various abnormal practices and attitudes, all are capable of explanation in the light of our newly gained knowledge concerning the early stages in the development of this complicated instinct.

We can now return from our digression to the question of upbringing of children, which has been emphasised

by the psycho-analytical conclusion that *all character is permanently formed for good or ill by the age of five*, during which period the child has to go through a complicated emotional development that it has taken mankind fifty thousand years to achieve, — the civilising of his primary instincts. Reflection on this outstanding point must increase our *tolerance* for childish difficulties and misdemeanours, and our *patience* in dealing with them. *Love* is as necessary for a child's mental development as food is for its bodily development, and yet it has to be gradually weaned from certain manifestations of the love-instinct. Next only to love and patience, one would put *honesty*, in the order of importance, in child upbringing. When we *pose as model of perfection to our children at the cost of truth, when we mislead them by giving false information on their real curiosities about sex and other matters, we are showing our own lack of emotional maturity and adjustment.*

H. ROYBANA DUTTA
S. K. V. S. K. V. S. K. V.

hardly any sense of "I". In the second stage, called the narcissistic stage, the ego has developed

Narcissistic stage.

and is taken as the object of the instinct; we might say that the child loves

itself, a capacity it never entirely gives up. The third stage is the "critical" one. Here the child seeks in the outer world for objects not only of its affection, but also of its conscious and unconscious sexual phantasies, and these relate to the members of its own family, brothers and sisters or playmates, and then to the parents. Diffi-

Oedipus complex.

culties arise in the latter relation, which constitutes the famous Oedipus complex, where there is a sexual attitude

on the part of the child towards the parent of the opposite sex, together with rivalry towards the one of its own. This complex Freud regards as the central one in the whole unconscious; on the way in which the child deals with it depends, more than on anything else, its future character and temperament, as well as any neurosis it may at any time develop. This "infantile sexuality" is the most novel and important of the Psycho-analytical contributions to psychology, as it is this knowledge that furnishes the key to the understanding of adult problems. Every adult problem in the realm of sexuality, friction and difficulties in marriage, social problems like prostitution, birth-control and various abnormal practices and attitudes, all are capable of explanation in the light of our newly gained knowledge concerning the early stages in the development of this complicated instinct.

We can now return from our digression to the question of *upbringing of children*, which has been emphasised

by the psycho-analytical conclusion that *all character is permanently formed for good or ill by the age of five*, during which period the child has to go through a complicated emotional development that it has taken mankind fifty thousand years to achieve, — the civilising of his primary instincts. Reflection on this outstanding point must increase our *tolerance* for childish difficulties and misdemeanours, and our *patience* in dealing with them. *Love* is as necessary for a child's mental development as food is for its bodily development, and yet it has to be gradually weaned from certain manifestations of the love-instinct. Next only to love and patience, one would put *honesty*, in the order of importance, in child upbringing. When we *pose as model of perfection to our children at the cost of truth*, when we *mislead them by giving false information on their real curiosities about sex and other matters*, we are showing our own lack of emotional maturity and adjustment.

H. ROYBANK OF
Sullivan Iowa

CHAPTER IV.

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

"Into the complicated societies of mankind", says Henry A. Mess, (Social Structure : Allen and Unwin)

What is Education ?

"there are continually being born new individuals who have almost everything to learn ; almost everything, because specific instincts play a comparatively small part in human life and social heritage plays a very great part. The new individuals have to receive the social heritage of their society, or at least a part of it ; and in doing so *their own lives should be enriched* and also they should be adapted to life in that society. This acquisition of the social heritage by the new individual is *education* in the widest sense of that term." Thus Education includes a good deal of absorption of knowledge and of attitudes from the life around him, a process which is facilitated by man's innate powers of memorising and of generalizing, powers which do not appear all at once at birth, but which slowly develop through childhood and during adolescence. Such capacities may be very much strengthened by suitable and proper guidance and training. But such absorption, assimilation (or unconscious "*Imitation*" of Plato) from the surroundings, is only a small fraction of education. The older persons in each generation do their best to facilitate the process by a good deal of

teaching, much of which is informal and casual. But there is also formal education, which in modern societies is usually given by a specialized class of men and women, teachers by profession. In the narrower sense, formal education is the deliberate and planned direction of influences on the young, and the deliberate transmission to them of part of the social heritage of their society." (Mess)

What then is specifically transmitted? Education, both formal and informal, is much concerned with the acquisition of techniques. Some simple lessons in adaptation to environment must be learned by every member of a society ; it is, for instance, essential that every

Acquisition of techniques.

person growing up in Europe should learn to avoid traffic dangers, whilst in India the child should learn early to avoid over-exposure to sunlight and heat in June. There will be, in most societies, techniques which, though they may not be vitally necessary, are highly desirable, and are taught to all ; thus everyone in modern civilization and society is now taught to read and write. Also, there is *elaborate specialization of functions in all societies* : many techniques are learned by some only, and it may be by very few.

Secondly, there is the teaching and learning of what Mess calls "the vehicles of knowledge, languages and terminologies". The choice of language or languages in which instruction shall be given is a matter of great importance, both because it determines the range of information to which there is access and also because strong sentiments attach to words and to combinations

of words. Familiarity with a particular language and with a particular literature is an important element in the sentiment of nationality, *and education is, therefore, a powerful instrument in the creation and maintenance of national feeling.* It is an important part of the technique of an Imperialist nation to enslave the *dependencies* by imparting to them education through the medium of the foreign language.

**The vehicles
of knowledge.**

This technique was first developed by the Romans and its most scientific and systematic application has been in our country. The Wardha Scheme of National Education, sponsored by Gandhiji, attacks the pivotal issue of National revival through mass education, by substituting the mother tongue for English as the medium of instruction at all stages of teaching, Primary, Secondary and University.

In the next place the developing members of a society acquire the ideas, the sentiments, the attitudes and ways of behaviour, which are current in that society. To a large extent this is the result of informal education, but in most societies resort is had to formal education also. Thus there usually is dogmatic teaching about religion and morality, and this may be given by parent, by priest, or by teacher. Some account is also

**Social struc-
ture and func-
tion.**

given of the structure and of the functioning of the society. Even in a primitive, pre-literate society we find, for instance, as Dr. Meek tells us, "that among the Ibo the children are taught by their parents to be punctilious in the correct use of the terms applied to family relationships, family being a wider and more

complicated group than that which goes by the name among us." Much use is made of *ritual* in all primitive societies to impress ideas and attitudes current in such societies.

In literate societies, where formal education is more developed, ritual still plays some part; the scholars may participate in national or local celebrations, the national anthem will be sung, the mayor of the town may visit in pomp and grandeur. But the part played by *ritual* is smaller than it is in primitive societies, and more reliance is placed upon books and the verbal lesson. Some knowledge of the structure of society is given, though to a large extent in an indirect form, through History, Geography and Literature, and in the case of senior children through Economics and Civics. But it is practically certain that in almost all the modern countries of the complicated Western civilization, the majority of citizens acquire a very vague idea of the social structure: sometimes there is a deliberate attempt on the part of society

Primitive and
Modern socie-
ties.

to confuse the large majority of its citizens, the masses, rather than to clarify them, to mislead them for purposes of exploitation rather than to enlighten them with the knowledge of essentials. The Marxian attack on Bourgeois education is, to a very large extent, justified. In any case, it is pretty clear that in this respect the citizen of a modern state is less adequately educated than are many preliterate and primitive peoples. It is noteworthy that the Wardha Scheme of Education directed its attention to this important aspect of teaching, by including an elementary knowledge of *National History*

and *Civics* in the Curriculum⁴ of the Primary Basic Course. In Soviet Russia, however, we find a notable exception to the rule. Education, in that country to-day, expressly tries to make conscious to the mind of the peasant and the worker the important role he plays, and has increasingly got to play, in the *Society of the Future*. That is, perhaps, the secret of Russia's mighty stand against Hitler's terrific onslaught in the Ukraine and other areas.

Education can also facilitate the transmission to members of the new generation, of ideas, sentiments, attitudes, and habits. Much of it is done informally, at home or in the small neighbourhood group; some of it is the informal and casual accompaniment of formal education; and some of it is a direct subject of formal education. In these various ways, differently proportioned in different societies and in different spheres, the new generation is assimilated to its predecessors in such matters as religion, patriotism, social gradation, sex behaviour, and in countless other matters great and small.

So far we have considered education as an instrument of social control, a process of shaping members of the new generation to the requirements of society. But we can also consider education from the standpoint of the welfare of the individual scholar. "Each child has unique potentialities, each has his own desires and his own ambitions, each will have to play an individual role in society. Body and mind can be brought to high efficiency, personality can be enriched, facilities can be afforded for self-expression, he or she can be equipped to face the inevitable competition of life. In an individualistic and

**Education and
the Individual.**

highly competitive society, education will often be regarded by teachers, and still more by parents, as preparation for a career, and scholars will naturally adopt the same view." (Mess)

The unique Individual.

Thus, teachers, parents, the child himself, will co-operate to see that the maximum of efficiency be imparted to each child, the personality of each be fully enriched.

But are not these two aims of education mutually exclusive or necessarily opposed to each other? If per-

Education and Society.

sonality is enriched and the innate spontaneity of each child encouraged and fully developed, how is he going to adapt himself or herself to the needs and demands of a more or less rigid social structure? These are difficult and fundamental questions, and in order to answer them successfully, we shall have to deviate a little from our straight path. We have to show how the educational problem of to-day has arisen, and what the verdict of History is. We have to go as far back as John Locke, the English philosopher of commonsense and compromise, who put this fundamental question and whose greatest contribution to History of Education lies not in the answer he gave, but in the clarity with which he asked the question.

The system of education outlined by Locke swings between the *two* natural impulses of the teacher, *viz.*, a desire to impart information and a desire to develop and

Locke's contribution to Education.

train intellectual initiative. The first is the commoner motive of the two, but the second is of immensely greater

value. By tradition an upholder of instruction in the paths of truth, Locke was by nature a devotee of that truth towards which no mind can win unless by its own persistent efforts. "Certain confusions follow ; Locke, the instructor, is not wholly consistent with Locke, the seeker, and the inconsistencies are sufficiently obvious ; but in spite of these, a resultant compromise remains, admirable in many ways, and typical of much that is best at least among English educational ideals ".

It is unfortunate that Locke's notion of the child as a "tabula rasa", written upon by experience only, as an empty sheet of paper, misled him fundamentally. The garden of the child's mind was wrongly regarded by him as *virgin soil*, to be sown by the *teacher in accordance with a formal pattern*. But he was well aware that truth can germinate anew in the "*originative* and not in the passively recipient mind". His "*formalism*" is pleasingly contradicted at every turn by his reliance upon "the desire of the young to create their own understanding." The contradiction in Locke's mind between *education and instruction* is really due to the isolation of two extremes, extremes that centre in the *individual* and the *social* conceptions of life. Individual freedom and natural activity must be developed in the child : but it is equally necessary to teach him the accumulated, traditional wisdom, *the realized truth, of the past ages*.

The contribution of the individual to the society is no less important than the contribution of society, passed on by the educational system, to the development of the individual. The ideal of individual liberty is "*a diver-*

**The Individual
and the Society.**

sity-ideal "; the ideal of a tradition of social control is " *a unity ideal.*" *Education*, in the strict sense of "*drawing out*" that which is in the individual child, is a process that favours individualism. *Instruction* is a process of social guidance, in the sense of "*building into*" the child that which the society sees as truth. To advocate either process in opposition to the other is the extreme of educational folly. Locke's essential wisdom, the wisdom of a great philosopher and seeker after truth, consists in holding fast to "*the two vital aspects of educational verity*", in spite of his logical hatred of a contradiction. Education, even to-day, wonders how to combine the two within a unified doctrine. "Locke's system asks a question; it gives us not a solution but a paradox; it states the ideal but leaves for later educators, how to realize the ideal."

We have now to see how Rousseau comes into closer touch with this problem, if not exactly with its solution.

Rousseau's contribution to the problem.

Rousseau was brought up practically without education, and grew up a critic, but, as one writer brilliantly points out, "a critic without a criterion." "Uncentred, he tended to become self-centred." The outlook which he brought to bear upon education was that of *Society's duty to the Individual*. Free himself in a sense, though tragically unfitted to use freedom, Rousseau saw the world around him in bonds and fetters. Once and for all, he threw aside the notion of a child's nature as "a shell to be moulded, hollowed out and filled; *natural growth, rightly conditioned, was the only education.*"

It was Rousseau's absolute, uncompromising statement

of this crude ideal and its wide acceptance, even in all its crudity, that gave impetus to the *devising of method*. He himself, however, lacked all *methodology*, and that is why many critics have lost their tempers while reading Rousseau. But we must not reject a sound principle on account of its unsound application. It is often maintained that "too much liberty is bad for a child, or for any one". But there is no such thing as too much liberty. There is the practical question, "what do you want your liberty for?" This is where further ideals are required. It is these further ideals which "*education for liberty*" has to teach. These ideals Rousseau lacked, and in that blindness he wrote of liberty as though it were the only ideal in the world. Ignorant liberty, however, is no liberty at all; education has to perfect it by giving knowledge. Idle liberty, again, is no liberty at all; education has to turn it into *liberty of action* by training and developing the natural human desire for fruitful activity. *Selfish liberty*, finally, is liberty shackled by the bonds of self, a contradiction in terms. *True liberty is social*. Rousseau himself knew well enough, in theory, that *true liberty in its essence depends upon the relation between the individual and the society*. But he only perceived one way of reform: *Society must give freedom to the Individual*. It is equally true, however, that individuals must give freedom to society.

Two factors are essential in the realisation of an ideal; the ideal itself, and *the actualities of the world* in which it has to make good its position. Rousseau stands almost solely for the ideal itself; we have to turn to the three great successors of Rousseau, — to Pestalozzi, Herbart and

Froebel, — to see the ideal of "*education in freedom*" brought into any relation with actuality. Others had to interpret the ideal which Rousseau with such piercing, if partial, vision. The contrast between education by means of free development and training through fear and constraint is really the contrast between *the individual and the social aspects of life*. In so far as constraint is necessary, it is justifiable, only when it is "*social constraint*." For Rousseau "the chain work of social solidarity was evil, not made up of living links, but of cold metal forged upon the limbs of the *unconsenting many* by the *powerful few*." Thus law ceased, for him, to be a social expression, and constraint became a function of unsocial tyranny. If so, education, as Rousseau dimly saw, has the principal part to play in clearing the road for social liberty, that true and only liberty in which the individual and the society are at one, and *constraint gives place to consent*. Merely to state such an ideal is to demonstrate its Utopian quality. But there is nothing wrong with an Utopian ideal, if it is a true one ; indeed, all great ideals are Utopian. The only error is to leave out any of the slow, necessary steps by which alone they can gradually be approached. The great mistake of Rousseau was that he left out nearly all the steps, and "his plan for a boy's education leaves the reader with the uncomfortable conviction that Emile would in the end have fallen into most of the pitfalls that entrapped his creator." It was left for Pestalozzi to begin the building of "*a safe causeway from the actual towards the ideal*", and, indeed, to start his building from "the very bedrock of stern actuality."

The disciple of Rousseau transcends the pure *naturalism*.

of his earlier master, but his method lost nothing of naturalism, while combining with it the teaching of experience and authority.

Pestalozzi, Herbart, Froebel.

Pestalozzi says, "The good to which you wish to direct (the child) must not depend upon your varying moods and temper; it must be a good which is *good-in-itself* and in the nature of things, and *which the child can recognise for itself as good*." Here we have *the true reconciliation between freedom and authority in educational method*." Whatever the child does gladly, whatever brings him credit, "whatever helps him to realize his greatest hopes, whatever rouses his powers and enables him to say with truth *I can*, these things he wills."

These principles of Pestalozzi do not call for an easy lip-service, but for an effort of constructive thought from the teacher. They were further worked out by Froebel, Pestalozzi's disciple and his eventual successor as a light in the educational firmament. To the practical genius of this great idealist philosopher, a follower in the footsteps of the great German idealists, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, the first question for the educator was not "what shall we teach?" but "to search out a rule in accordance with which teachers teach less and learners learn more." Comenius had long ago based his educational system upon the dictum, "*Children learn to do by doing*." Froebel gave fuller content to the motto by changing it to "*Children grow by doing*." *Activity is the only educative process*, and all teaching must be judged by the extent to which it induces *vital activity* on the part of the child. Froebel's further criterion was the tendency of the child's activity. The child must not become too self-centred, too much

engrossed in the vortex of his own thoughts and feelings. *His activity must be made social.* "The kindergarten" said Froebel, "is the free republic of childhood." The social element implies *social control*, and children must be accustomed from the very beginning to *law and order, and therein find the means of freedom.* The teacher must be felt as the *interpreter*, not the arbitrary inventor, of the *social law that reigns in the small community.* Between the educator and pupil, between request and obedience, there should rule invisibly a third something, to which educator and pupil are equally subject." The child is a member of a fellowship, and the teacher a mouth-piece of the laws of fellowship. We must appeal to the innate "community sense" of the child, to his innate reason and sociability, his natural instinct of helpfulness. The call of social duty can be translated into a call "to come and help",—a call that draws the child out of self-pre-occupation into a clear recognition that others have need of him. This pre-supposes a school in which the activities of the children have been made *genuinely social*, as they are made by Froebel's system.

It is not a soft and easy path that Froebel opens up, as is sometimes supposed. It is a way that demands steady thought and courageous self-discipline from the teacher and pupil alike. It is not a nursery game, preliminary to serious education; it is education as serious and as real as any that has been conceived, and far more serious and real than any that is practised. The way of Froebel is the way of tact, love, kindness and sympathy: to be fully effective it demands a certain intuitive meeting of minds, between teachers and pupils: it makes *mutual understand-*

ing prior to rule. But there is another path by which the common teacher can attain to Froebel's principles, viz., that which makes *rule* prior to understanding and sympathy. This was the contribution of Herbart, who is acclaimed as the father of Modern Pedagogy. The aspect of education that represents exact and logical method was left somewhat undefined by Froebel. Herbart's systematic scheme completes the work which remained to be done. One aspect of education, as we have seen already, consists in the handing down of a progressively self-enriching tradition from the teacher to the taught. Knowledge is a thing which has to be preserved and handed down through the educational system. Our living traditions have to be realised by the teacher and presented to the child. It is essential that children should develop a *social sense* of their own in schools of the Froebel-type, but this is not enough : they have also to realise the best social traditions of their age and of the ages before. These have to be presented to them as interpreted by the teacher in an interesting and attractive form. The student of Froebel learns how to prepare the recipient mind ; that of Herbart learns how to prepare the interpretation, which the teacher has to give to the child. To Herbart, *instruction* is almost everything in the educative process. Knowledge creates and evolves mind. Knowledge is power, said Bacon ; Knowledge is more than power, it is *mind* in the strict Herbartian sense. Froebel, on the contrary, regarded the generation of authority in the child-life as a something evolved from his sacred self within. There is no mistaking *the ethical end* in Froebel. Freed from their mysticism and obscurity, Froebel's literary contributions have

become an educational force of unquestionable value in modern education. In Herbart we come to the same results by a different route. Though he had no conception of education apart from instruction, sequence and *method*, order, and suitability of material in his schemes of presentation, his doctrine of "cultured epochs" reveals the same central principles as are contained in the "gifts" of Froebel. That Psychology and Pedagogy must not be separated in the future, was the net result of the teaching of both masters. That Froebel maintained to the end of his life that the "soul-germ" is evolved *from within*, and that Herbart declared with equal emphasis his belief that "mind-growth was the result of operations *from without*", is after all not material to the main issue.

Viewed in the light of modern educational theory and practice, we are thus driven to the conclusion that we cannot accept either Froebel or Herbart, wholly and solely. The present-day problem, as Dewey points out, "is to get rid of the prejudicial notion that there is some gap in kind (as distinct from degree) between the child's experience and the various forms of subject-matter that make up the course of study." The highest and noblest educational work will be accomplished if we adopt what is best in both, Froebel and Herbart, accepting their united objective as the true educational goal, and adopting a happy combination of their methods". (Chalke: A synthesis of Froebel and Herbart.)

We can now return to our central problem, having equipped ourselves with all the best that these great educators of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries taught. Our degression into the History of Modern Education has

at least made one point clear, viz., that the social and the individualist aims of education are not essentially opposed to each other. The sociological and the psychological approaches are complementary to each other: even if they are antithetical to some extent, extremes meet in a pro-

Two aims of
education

per and judicious synthesis. Personality must be enriched and efficiency of the individual enhanced by *adjustment* to the society in which the individual has to live and carry on his work; and society is the better for having members who are sharply individualized. It is in this sense that Sir T. Percy Nunn acclaims boldly that "the autonomous development of the Individual" is the central aim of education, and insists that "the education that aims at fostering individuality *is the only education according to nature*". (Data and First Principles, our Italics). Nunn, however, does not repeat the pitfalls of Hobbes and Rousseau. When he reasserts the importance of the individual as the basis of a stable educational policy, he does not deny or minimize the responsibility of a man to his fellows, for the most original personality is unintelligible *apart from the social medium* in which it grows. "The individual life can develop only in terms of its own nature, and that is social as truly as it is self-regarding". Yet he reaffirms *the infinite value of the individual person*, reasserts his ultimate responsibility for his own destiny. The studies and discipline of a school will necessarily represent the cultural and moral traditions of a given society, but they should yet leave abundant room for the free development of individuality. "It takes all sorts to make a world, and the world becomes richer, the

better each becomes after his own kind ". " There is no limit to the number of *life-patterns* into which good or blameless actions may be woven." Thus the prudent teacher should not multiply his prohibitions beyond bare necessity. Social obligations can be discharged in an infinite number of ways, and none can foresee or set bounds to what the human spirit may do in this as in the other fields of its activity. A daring and powerful personality may raise *the whole moral quality of the social structure* by asserting its individuality that may at first seem hostile to its very existence ; e.g., Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Ellis, Gandhi.

The claim raised on behalf of the child raises another question, viz., that of the extent to which education might proceed by "*indoctrination*." By "*indoctrination*" is meant that ideas are conveyed to the child in such a form and in such an emotional setting that they will remain highly resistant to any later impacts which might change them. At the other extreme to indoctrination is the induction in a scholar of a critical attitude, so that he will seek for himself, and not necessarily take on trust, both information and ideas. Inevitably all education must contain some indoctrination, but the line of division is according to whether the teachers do or do not aim at the ultimate emergence of a critical mind. Societies differ widely in respect of the education which is given to them, in aims, in methods, in control, and finally in respect to the conditions of access. The amount and quality of education which a child will receive may be determined on the basis of its abilities, on the basis of the wealth and and social status of its parents, and perhaps according to

the political and religious views of its parents. In England all children receive some education : in India, the majority receive practically no education. In England, exceptional ability may secure a long and good education for the child even of poor parents; he may even proceed to Oxford or Cambridge at the state expense or with the help of organised private charities. In India, facilities for such help, either from Public or private funds, are very limited. In England there is no discrimination on political grounds, but in some countries of Europe only those are admitted to study at the Universities who hold views acceptable to the Government.

This raises the fundamental question: who should control the machinery of education? In view of the importance of the educational process within society it is not surprising that there has been much competition for its control. The chief claimants have been the family, the church, and the state. In modern times the tension has been particularly acute between churches and states. Where there is more than one religion within a single state, the position is still more difficult. Again, there may be groups with conflicting political ideals, or with conflicting cultures, within a single state. In all such cases the control of education is a matter about which the groups, religious or political or cultural, cannot be indifferent. Many forms of compromise as well as extreme points of view are to be found in England, America and the countries of Europe. In India the situation is highly confused and complicated on account of the indifference of the State as well as the conflicting trends of culture. The patterns set by the Hindu and the Muslim Universities

at Benares and Aligarh respectively are different from each other, and they are both different from the one set by our own University of Allahabad. The future citizens of India are thus being divided into groups, and not being unified under one cultural pattern. This is a chaotic state of affairs, highly deplorable, yet scarcely remediable.

It is, however, universally admitted that those who control and those who practise education have tremendous power in their hands to mould a new generation. But it is equally important to recognise that there are limits set to what they can accomplish. There are, first of all, the limitations set by the material. No amount of effort can make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, nor can the most skilful education make a really efficient man out of a dull wit. So diverse are men's gifts, and so powerful is the urge in the youth to experiment, that it is in point of fact difficult for even the most tyrannical Church or the most powerful Totalitarian State to crush out all spontaneity and all diversity. No one has assessed the transforming power of education more highly than Benjamin Kidd who, in a famous passage, wrote : "Give us the Young. Give us the Young, and we will create a new mind and a new earth in a single generation." (The Science of Power: page 298.)

But the question remains to be asked, who are the "*we*" to whom the children are to be given? If "*we*" are typical of "crabbed age", youth will be shaped according to the social heritage of the older generation. And if "*we*" are not typical of our generation, it is highly improbable that the young will be handed over to their moulding. Education is on the horns of a vicious dilemma :

the only way out of it is to catch the bull by the horns. Let the youthful spirits among the mature minds capture the control of the school machinery, and try to meet "crabbed age and youth" half-way, as it were. It is to such daring and powerful individuals like Bertrand Russell, Homer Lane, Grant and Sanderson, that modern experiments in "auto-education" have been carried out in England in the present century. Attempt has been made to stimulate the growth of personality by the removal of adult authority or by providing interest which shall open the doors of achievement to boys and girls at all stages of their school career. Removal of discipline, coupled with a really infectious spirit of achievement, "automatically brings in its train a reconciliation to self-mastery". In all these ways the problem of the collision between adult authority and the adolescent has been successfully evaded in certain directions by these heroic individuals, working independently on their own initiative, without any organisation or help from the State, and sometimes in face of active opposition from the authorities. Thus we find that though the child cannot urge the claim to a voice in the direction and control of education, this claim has received serious attention on his behalf in educational circles in our own time. Such experiments have given rise to a number of modifications in educational method. The fact that Froebel in Germany, and more recently Mm. Montessori in Italy, were compelled to stop their educational activity in their own countries, is a great blot on the political machinery of modern states. The democratic process had hardly yet worked out its thesis, when the anti-thesis of reaction set in. Recent experiments in Russia are not yet clear

on this point. Whatever the opportunities for freedom in various states may be, teachers would in any case find themselves restrained by authority, should they attempt to impose ideals far removed from those prevalent in the society of which they are part. It is still true, however, that a small number of men with clear views and strong convictions, who have gained control of even a small part of the organisation of education, can impress those views rapidly and effectively upon a large part of the younger generation. In this sense at least Kidd's dictum is, to a large extent, justified.

We cannot close this chapter without giving a very brief account of the Hindu conception of education and society. Hindu education tried to imbue its pupils with the tenets of their religion, to preserve the social gradations of the caste system, and to keep all within the sphere of their occupation. The three upper castes were supposed to gain a knowledge of the sacred works, the four *Vedas* or books of "knowledge", the six *angas* on philosophical and scientific subjects, and the *Code of Manu*, which is a collection of traditional customs; but really the *Brahmans* alone were allowed to take full advantage of this opportunity. The *Kshatriyas*, the warriors, were expected to pay more attention to martial exercises, and the *Vaishyas*, the industrial caste, to acquire through apprenticeship the arts necessary for its hereditary occupations. Sudras, Pariahs, and women were generally allowed no intellectual or vocational education. Except the Sudras, all the castes obtained elementary education from a study of the laws, traditions and customs. The king, it

Education in
Ancient India.

is important to note, was generally a Kshattriya, who respected the Guru, the Brahman spiritual teacher, as the intellectual leader of the State. Thus, *money* and *power* were divorced from each other, and knowledge or learning held sway over both. The inherent merit of the caste system was its flexibility: there are cases when by scholarship and religious exercises a Kshattriya by birth could attain the status of a Brahman. In any case the warrior-king was guided in all national affairs by the Philosopher-Guide and Raj-Guru, (the Teacher-cum-Priest of the State). In many respects, this was a better system than the "Philosopher-King" of Plato's Utopia. Again, the Raj-Kumar or the crown prince had to sit at the feet of the Guru or the teacher for several years in his forest hermitage for his education along with the sons of commoners. Thus a democratic touch was given to the future king by his early association and companionship with ordinary citizens. This sometimes led to life-long friendships, which in turn produced in the mind of some Hindu Rajas a real concern for the well-being of the State. This is why the traditional "*Ram-Rajya*", the government of *Ram Chandra*, the hero of the great epic, *Ramayana*, has such a hold over the imagination of the Hindu masses today. There were no Etons or Harrows, Oxford or Cambridge, in ancient India, reserved for Princes and sons of Lords. All alike studied in the forest Universities, like Nalanda or Taxilla, or even in the ancient Bharadwaj Ashram, situated only a few yards from our own modern University of Allahabad. Again, education was many-sided and complete; manual training and skills like archery and domestic labour were taught to the princes, as they had to hew wood and draw

water for the Guru, along with sons of poorer parents. It is true that Religion and Metaphysics, Law and Medicine, Logic and Ethics were emphasised; but the Ashram life of the Brahmachari, the self-controlled student, contained much of emotional and volitional training. Physical culture and control of breath were practised. Indeed, "Yoga" or union with the Infinite was declared impossible of attainment, unless the body was first purified and strengthened by means of simple and wholesome and regulated diet and austere *Asanas*, physical exercises, which a modern athlete or physical culturist might well keep as his model. Finally, though women, on the whole, were reserved for the home crafts, their moral, aesthetic and religious training was specially attended to. As Nicol Macnicol says, "No one who knows anything of India today can doubt that in all periods of her history, whatever may have been the social laws and conventions, the influence of women was powerful and profound." *Gargi* and *Maitreyi*, among the practical mystics, *Ahilyabai* and *Pandita Ramabai*, among the robust, practical and capable managers of kingdoms or households, *Mutta* and her pale Buddhist sisters, among the poets, are models on whom a modern Sarojini Naidu might well mould herself. These "God-intoxicated" women could not have been the products of any social tyranny. And the tradition is unbroken in history through more recent names like *Mukta Bai*, a Marathi Brahman poet, sister of the great *Jnaneshwar*, *Jana Bai*, a Gujrati servant woman in the household of Namdev, the tailor poet, *Mira Bai*, of immortal fame, *Rupamati*, the Hindu wife of Baj Bahadur, the last Mohammedan ruler of Malwa, *Lal Ded*, the

Kashmiri poetess, *Nur Jehan*, the charming Empress, *Zeb-un-nissa Begum*, and, in recent times, *Toru Dutt*. From the days of *Sita* to the modern days there have never been lacking in India women of true and loyal and passionate hearts, who could both *live* poetry and philosophy and also *create* them. This long list of illustrious names is sufficient to show that the education of women was not only not neglected in Ancient Hindu Society, but real and lasting contribution to Indian culture was made by women in all periods of Indian History, throughout the Muslim and the British periods, right up to the present day.

A modern reorientation of Hindu ideals is to be found in the work of our own poet-philosopher, Tagore, who is afraid of the spirit of Western materialism which is gradually impoverishing Indian life and spirit.

Tagore's Educational Ideals.

The modern educated Indians are poor imitations of their Western contemporaries. They are not persons but shadows. There is neither *art in their life nor music in their soul*. According to *Tagore*, the ideals of Indian education must be changed. True education must spring from the deeper side of man's nature. The educated Indian is cut off from his past, from the immemorial traditions and affections which bind him to his country. The education which he receives is not that of *the whole man*. The modern school is a factory, "especially designed for grinding out uniform results." Absolutely no account is taken of *individual variations*. The same method is applied to the mental needs of an infinite variety of minds. There is no freedom for the expansion of soul or the

progress of liberal thought. The religious and the artistic, the moral and the spiritual sides, are drowned in the study of scientific formulae and social laws. "The mechanisation of mind and the sterilisation of the intellectual seed-plot are the results of the tyranny of the educational policy." The Indian youth has no enthusiasm for knowledge, or respect for culture, or any motive for independent thought. The scheme of examinations vulgarises his mind. He does not care to know what is true, but what will fetch him marks. Not knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but knowledge for the sake of success at the examinations is the governing principle of his whole study. The result is that Indian children are forgetting their past, and they are unable to *understand their own nature*. They "stand as barriers choking the stream that flows from the mountain peak of their ancient history." The ideals which India possessed in the past should come back in essentials, though they need not be reproduced in their entirety. Education should make for the culture of the soul, and not merely for the feeding of intellect or the cramming of memory. "The highest education is that which does not merely give us information but makes our life in harmony with all existence". Tagore trusts to the instinct of the pupil and the atmosphere of the *Ashrama* for the kindling of the spiritual aspiration and the development of the spiritual life. In ancient India the ideal of Education was to instil the vision of the Eternal, so that the soul might reach its fulness and freedom. In his school at Bolpur, (*Shantiniketan*) Tagore combines modern methods of "Auto-education" with the ancient Indian ideal of soul-culture. To him the ideal school must be

an *Ashrama* where men have gathered "together for the highest end of life, in the peace of nature; where life is not merely meditative, but fully awake in its activities; where boy's minds are not perpetually drilled into believing that the ideal of the *self-idolatry of the nation* is the truest ideal for them to accept; where they are bidden to realize man's world as God's kingdom to whose citizenship they have to aspire; where the sunrise and sunset and the silent glory of the stars are not daily ignored; where nature's festivities of flowers and fruit have their joyous recognition from man; and where the young and the old, the teacher and the student, sit at the same table to partake of their daily food and the food of their eternal life."

Again, "one thing is truly needed to be Teacher of children, it is to be like children; to forget that you are wise or have come to the end of knowledge. In order to be truly the guide of children, you must never be conscious of age, or of superiority, or anything of that kind. You must be their elder brother, ready to travel with them in the same path of higher wisdom and aspiration. This is the only advice I can offer to you on this occasion, to cultivate the spirit of the *eternal child*, if you must take up the task of training the children of Man."

From the above quotation, we can get some idea of the educational theory and practice of *Vishwa Bharati*, the immortal legacy of the great poet-philosopher of India. It easily falls into line with the modern individualist trend of educational theory in the West today, without losing sight of the simple and spiritual message of the East. Another recent educational experiment in India in recent times is that of Shradhdhanand, who emphasised contact

with nature, plain living and high thinking, and Brahmacharya, for the student in conformity with ancient Hindu educational ideals.

The idea, then, that a main function of the school is to *socialise* its pupils in no wise *contradicts* the view that its true aim is *to cultivate individuality*.

Concluding remarks.

"The merit of originality is not novelty but *sincerity*". (Carlyle) But sincerity is an achievement possible only to those who are "*free to follow the larger movements of their own nature*"; to take from others not what is *imposed upon them, but what they need* to make their own. Hence, while the school must never fail to form its pupils in the tradition of *brotherly kindness and social service*, it must recognise that *the true training for service* is one that favours individual growth, and that the highest form of society would be one in which every person would be free to draw from the common medium what his nature needs, and to enrich the common medium with what is most characteristic of himself. Thus, "the proper aim of education is *positive, to encourage free activity, not negative, to confine or to repress it*". (Nunn) Here Nunn comes very near to the Idealistic reconciliation, attempted by a present day Italian educationist, Gentili; according to him, "a school without freedom is a life-less institution". The human spirit is essentially *active and free* in its activity. *Freedom, which is the condition of the entire life of the spirit, must be the result of education*. It is through education that man actualises his spiritual nature, which is truly *social and universal*. Man's individuality is not the particular and exclusive personality of the Pragmatists.

It is the *universal* which unites men and does not separate them. The *liberty* of the pupil can be reconciled with the *authority* of the teacher, only when the *unity of aim* of teacher and taught is recognised. The teacher should not suppress the '*personality*' of the pupil, but *expand* it, by helping his impulses and facilitating his *infinite* development. All false opposition between *discipline* and *instruction*, between one type of education and another, for instance, physical and mental, practical and humanistic, vocational and cultural, are the result of unphilosophical thinking and the failure to understand *the precise nature of education*. The old static conception of learning was the correlative of the conception of knowledge as "basically a handing down on authority." The duty of the pupil was to accept and acquire the knowledge set out authoritatively in text-books. The sign and test of learning was primarily *the ability to give back* on demand what was found in the book. The Curriculum was the orderly arrangement of what was thus to be studied and learned. The modern conception of study is a series of *activities*, which are responses to a social situation, a situation created by an *assignment*. The subject-matter of learning is identical with all the objects, ideas and principles which enter as resources or obstacles into the continuous intentional pursuit of a course of action.

Education has a new work and a new aim, the *first* of clarifying the basic principles of social relationship and of giving information concerning the very complex relations in society, and *second* of giving a new social motive. The first adds new emphasis to the importance of the *knowledge* side of education, the second, to the *moral* aim.

Education thus becomes the *force modifying social institutions*, by bringing about a better adjustment of individuals to one another ; and the chief demand upon education is the ability to adjust one's self quickly and properly to new and quickly changing social conditions. This is what is meant by "good citizenship", and this can, and ought to, be inculcated by good education.

CHAPTER V.

PROPERTY AND SOCIAL GRADATION.

We have seen from the psychological analysis of society that the sense of *possession* forms an important element

Family in the emotional undercurrent of the
Property. and family as a social institution. The

family supplies a powerful incentive to acquisition, accumulation and transmission of property.

"A solitary individual, with no one definitely dependent upon him, may lead a vagabond life Those who are eager to acquire large possessions are generally actuated, more or less explicitly, by the hope of 'founding the family', or at least of giving one a good start." (Mackenzie: Fundamental Problems of Life.) If the family thus stimulates the instinct of acquisition, property, in its turn, strengthens the family sentiment and solidarity. Family and property are thus closely connected with each other.

"Property is a matter of right; it is the title to the exclusive possession and use of goods. In its legal aspect,

The Right of property may be described as a body
Property. of rights and duties which determine
the relations of men regarding their control

over material things." (Dumle: Civics for Beginners). In all modern civilized society this right has been clearly defined and sanctioned by society; it gives a particular person or persons exclusive control over certain things.

But control over *persons*, which was typical of the institution of slavery, has been abolished: in its place, we have the system of *serfs*, personal attendants, valets and the highly organised system of Labour. In India, the village Zamindar has still a great deal of control over the personal services of his tenants, which has a social recognition in the "Begari" system. Such institutions have in them the legacy of slavery and serfdom. *The social recognition of the right of control over things*, thus, becomes the *differentia* of Property to-day. Property is, however, to be carefully distinguished from mere possession. "Possession is nine-tenths of Law" may be a good proverb, but

it has no social recognition. As Hob-
 house observes, "Property may be
 absolute or partial, held by one person

or many, or by a company, but it must be exclusive as against others." (Property, its Duties and Rights). The control of the owner is complete in the sense that he may not only use but also *abuse* his property so long as it does not cause injury to others. One cannot, for instance, set fire to one's house in a crowded locality, nor can one use one's land in a way which is a harmful to public health or the health of the neighbours. Full control further implies the right to alienate property, such as the right to sell, to mortgage, to exchange or to give it away. Social sanction is of special importance in the right of property. In the absence of such a sanction, the competitive and the aggressive instincts of man may lead to chaos. If it is industry that gives birth to property, it is social and legal sanction that ensures its security and sanctity.

We may roughly classify Property under three heads :

common, collective and individual. In ancient times, individual property was allowed only in the most personal things such as clothing, ornaments, weapons, etc. With regard to land, one comes across a variety of customs amongst primitive peoples. Where men live by hunting, land is held in common by a group of close blood relations, a clan or a tribe. The procuring of food is a co-operative task and the food is shared by the whole group according to custom, the strongest man usually getting the lion's share. The principle of communal proprietorship, meaning common use and common enjoyment, is generally followed. Where men live by agriculture, sometimes the land is held by the community, and sometimes by some group within the community; a part of the land may also be privately owned and cultivated. In certain communities the land is supposed to belong to the chief or nobility, who gradually appear on the scene. This means that a large majority of the people are reduced to the position of landless labourers called *serfs*. In this way society comes to be divided into classes: viz., the feudal lords or landed aristocracy on the one hand and the property-less serfs on the other. Thus private property in land assumes the form of big estates.

In ancient and mediaeval times, the economic organization of society was based upon agriculture and small handicrafts. The means of production were owned by the individual who used them. But the introduction of large-scale machinery in production made it impossible for individual workers to own the means of production.

Evolution of Property.

Rise of Industrialism.

This gave rise to the capitalist system. Capitalism in the words of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, is "that particular stage in the development of industry and the legal institutions in which the bulk of the workers find themselves divorced from the ownership of the instruments of production in such a way as to pass into the position of wage-earners, whose subsistence, security and personal freedom seem dependent on a relatively small proportion of the nation namely, those who own, and through their legal ownership control, the organisation of the land, the machinery and the labour force of the community, and do so with the object of making for themselves individual and private gains." (The Decay of Capitalist civilization).

The great significance of Capitalism in Social Philosophy to-day lies in the relationship that obtains between the two sections of society under it, between those who command the means of production and those who are

Significance of Capitalism.

mere wage-earners. The modern trend of thought is in the direction of strict social control being exercised over this relationship. Property, to a very large extent, is a social creation and society cannot allow its accumulation in private hands to an extent, and to be used in a manner, clearly injurious to social interest.

Thus the right of private property is not absolute, but relative and changing throughout the ages, according to the stages of social development. In

Psychological Basis of Private Property.

the earlier stages, property was valued more for use than for power. But to-day 'property for power' is valued most. The law of theft is older than the state. The state has not created

the institution of property, though it has done much to protect and develop it and also to modify it. The policy of the state in relation to property, in the words of Jenks, should be to "refuse to protect or favour any appropriation without a due return on the part of the appropriator, to restrain abuses of property, to raise the necessary revenue of the State from those best able to contribute to it, and to restrict the duration of proprietary powers within reasonable limits". Psychologically, private property is based on the acquisitive instinct, which man shares with the lower animals. Ants and squirrels store food to provide for the future. This instinct manifests itself in human beings at an early age. Children are fond of collecting all sorts of things such as pencil-ends, broken

**Acquisitive
instinct in
children.**

bangles, metal pieces, pebbles and broken china pieces, and are most unwilling to part with them, even when to our adult mind these cherished objects appear of no use to them. In adults, this instinct takes the form of accumulating property.

The psychology of property, however, cannot be wholly explained by the instinct of *acquisition*. Ownership is a very complex phenomenon. We value things because they directly or indirectly satisfy our wants: we begin to develop some sort of sentimental attachment towards such objects, e.g. old letters from friends or even bills and cash memos of objects purchased in the past and valued. More often than not, our passion for property is the result of such emotional attachment. Property is thus the result of a complicated psychological process. "Any funda-

**The emotional
element in Pro-
perty.**

mental need of human nature may serve as a centre round which the sentiment of ownership may gather." Sometimes the sentiment of property may be fostered by the vegetative and animal aspects of our nature, expressed in nutrition, sex and other matters, and sometimes by the purely rational aspect of our nature, the so-called higher interest in life, such as devotion to knowledge or quest of the beautiful. "All these instincts and interests require the direct or indirect use of certain instrumental things, which in course of time come to be valued for themselves. In this way confusion arises between means and ends; *the ends are forgotten* and we cling to the means." The miser who merely hoards his gold is an extreme manifestation of this tendency to confuse ends

Money
Power.

and

with means. Undue anxiety for the future is often the cause of excessive

accumulation. Many cases of "Anxiety Neurosis" in modern society show this symptom of extreme reluctance to part with money, which becomes a symbol for Power, Self-expression and Self-display. The man of property feels that he can command the services of persons and control their lives. Thus the instinct of acquisitiveness easily passes into aggression, domination and exploitation.

The institution of private property has become the subject of one of the most bitter controversies of our times. Antagonistic views are held

Property, 'sacred' or 'theft'?

about its origin, nature and function by economists, sociologists, anthropologists, politicians and social reformers. Some maintain that property is 'sacred', others regard it as 'theft'; still others follow a *via media* between these extreme views.

We must admit that there is no religious or ethical sanctity about private property,—there is no such thing as an absolute right of private property. But we need not look upon it as theft. We should impartially examine the social sanctions of property in a given social context in a scientific spirit. Its ultimate justification would lie in its power to contribute to general well-being, the social good. The institution of private property has served a useful purpose in so far as it has resulted in increased production and added to man's physical comforts. But it has also produced harmful consequences. Increased production, accompanied by inequitable distribution, has led to gross inequalities between the rich and the poor, and recently to total unemployment of large numbers of otherwise healthy and socially useful persons. Besides, there is in the present capitalist society a growing tendency to

worship wealth as power. It may be

Incentive effort. to true that individual ownership provides a powerful incentive to industry and thrift, but there are other incentives to effort. Men inspired by a strong sense of social duty and dis-interested service are found to put in hard work and to contribute to the total well-being of society in all ages and in all countries even today.

Again, property may be valued for the feeling of security it produces. A man enjoys peace of mind when

Feeling of security. he knows that he can fall back on his savings in times of illness, unemployment and old age, and that he has made provision for his family. Without peace of mind and leisure, a man can hardly make any progress in

science, philosophy, art and culture. But it has been pointed out that this peaceful frame of mind can also be

The "ethical equivalents" of Property.

secured by a guaranteed wage system, Insurance against accident, illness, unemployment and old age, coupled with the state taking charge of the education of children. All these measures may be regarded as the "ethical equivalents" of private property, and some of these have been, or are now gradually being, adopted in the Soviet Republic.

Private ownership, it may be argued, creates in man a sense of responsibility by giving him a stake in the community. This is really nothing but

Sense of responsibility.

the *bourgeois* argument for maintaining the *status quo* and obstructing the path of social progress of mankind, by allowing existing iniquities of society to continue indefinitely. Every man has indeed a right to work and a right to the fruit of his work. He has a right to earn and to save. But this right is never absolute. It is conditioned by the claims of social justice and public welfare. If some men find in property a means of self-realization and a medium of self-expression, this cannot justify the colossal accumulation in the hands of a few individuals. The State is justified in limiting the right of private property, for instance, by imposing death duties and adopting the principle of progressive taxation. It is the duty of the State to bring about an equitable distribution of wealth by laying the weight of heavy taxes upon shoulders that are best fitted to bear it and using the proceeds for the benefit of the poor. Communism, on the other hand, advocates

the right of the State to regulate and control the activities of individuals and organisations. The State not only performs the 'police' function but is bound to provide many social services in regard to health, housing, education and recreation, and other amenities of life for all citizens. "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need", seems to be the motto of the communists, who are satisfied with nothing short of the abolition of private property.

According to Marx and Engels, however, "the abolition of existing property relations is not at all a distinctive feature of communism. All property relations in the past have continually been subject to historical change consequent upon the change in historical conditions. The French Revolution, for example, abolished feudal property in favour of bourgeois property.

The Marxian View.

"The distinguishing feature of communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. In this sense, the theory of the communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.

"We communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man's own labour, which property is alleged to be the ground work of all personal freedom, activity, and independence.

"Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property. Do you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily. Or do you mean modern bourgeois private property?

"But does wage-labour create any property for the labourer? Not a bit. It creates capital, i.e., that kind of property which exploits wage-labour, and which cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a new supply of wage-labour for fresh exploitation. Property, in its present form, is based on the antagonism of capital and wage-labour. Let us examine both sides of this antagonism.

"To be a capitalist, is to have not only a purely personal, but a social *status* in production. Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion. Capital is, therefore, not a personal, it is a social, power.

"When, therefore, capital is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the property that is changed. It loses its class character.

"Let us now take wage-labour. The average price of wage-labour is the minimum wage, i.e., that quantum of the means of subsistence which is absolutely requisite to keep the labourer in bare existence as a labourer. What, therefore, the wage-labourer appropriates by means of his

labour, merely suffices to prolong and reproduce a bare existence. We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products of labour, an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and production of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command the labour of others. All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class requires it.

"In bourgeois society, living labour is but a means to increase accumulated labour. In communist society, accumulated labour is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer. In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in communist society, the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality.

"And the abolition of this state of things is called by the bourgeois, abolition of individuality and freedom! And rightly so. The abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is undoubtedly aimed at "....." You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society. In a word,

you reproach, us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend." (The Communist Manifesto.)

We do not owe any apology to the reader for citing this long passage from the Communist Manifesto, which

**Social Discon-
tent and Pro-
perty.**

was written 97 years ago and which is now for the first time being widely read and appreciated. The popularity of Marxian views in recent times makes it imperative for us to study the texts of Marx himself. We have allowed Marx and Engels, the joint authors of the Manifesto, to speak for themselves, for they have pleaded their cause with vigour, clarity, and brilliance, combined with bitter sarcasm. The modern Marxians, on the other hand, are comparatively confused and complicated in their version. It must be admitted that, whatever shape and form the Marxian attack on property may assume in the future, to day it symbolises a deep-seated feeling of discontent with our society and civilization, which stands for competition, power and exploitation as against cooperation, love and social service. Under the present system, the rich tend to become more rich, the poor more poor. Inequalities have become intolerable, distribution unjust; the human being has been dethroned and the machine or the impersonal state deified, with the result that, inspite of vast development of scientific technique, we are still so far removed from the ideal of 'universal plenty and peace' as ever. In so far as Marx stands for the poor, the down-trodden, the exploited and the social outcasts today, he may be rightly acclaimed as the prophet of the nineteenth century. His argument cannot, in any case,

be lightly dismissed in a few sentences.

Whether by abolishing private bourgeois property, the communists will be able to abolish all aggression, ill-will and enmity from society, is a different question altogether. According to some

Freud on Communism.

Communists man is whole-heartedly good and friendly to his neighbour, but the present economic system has corrupted his nature. The possession of private property, no doubt, gives power to the individual and thence the temptation arises to ill-treat his neighbour; the man who is excluded from the possession of property is obliged to rebel in hostility against the oppressor. If private property were abolished, all valuables held in common, and all allowed to share in the enjoyment of them, all needs and desires would be satisfied, none would have any reason to regard another as an enemy; all would willingly undertake the work which is necessary. No sane person would have any objection to, and all would have full sympathy with, and good will towards, the endeavours made to fight the *economic inequality* of men and all that it leads to. But human nature is not so simple; indeed, as we have seen in chapter II, it is highly complicated. Ambi-valence, rather than Pure Love, is the basis of all human societies. The sociological aspect of the world picture today must be supplemented with the psychological aspect. As Freud says, "By abolishing private property one deprives the human love of aggression of one of its instruments, a strong one undoubtedly, but assuredly not the strongest. It in no way alters the individual differences in power and influence which are turned by aggressiveness to its own use, nor does it change the

nature of the instinct in any way. This instinct did not arise as the result of property; it reigned almost supreme in primitive times when possessions were still extremely scanty; it shows itself already in the nursery when possessions have hardly grown out of their original *anal* shape; it is at the bottom of all the relations of affection and love between human beings—possibly with the single exception of that of a mother to her male child. Suppose that personal rights to material goods are done away with, there still remain prerogatives in sexual relationships, which must arouse the strongest rancour and most violent enmity among men and women who are otherwise equal". (Civilization and its Discontents).

This balanced criticism of the Marxian attack on property, coming as it does, from one who himself had been through the misery of poverty in his youth and had endured the indifference and arrogance of those who had possessions, "should be exempted from the suspicion that he has no understanding of, or goodwill towards, the endeavours made to fight the economic inequality of men and all that it leads to". We must remember that with the solitary exception of *Marx*, *Freud* was perhaps the only scientist in recent times who was really moved by the "discontents" of civilization and who did more than any one single person to discover the causes of, and to cure the existing social discontent and maladjustment. If we also remember that Freud was a genuine seeker after truth, and that he knew "the manifold variety of humanity and its mental life", and, above all, was keen to preserve "the truly precious things in life", we have to give due consideration to his weighty analysis of the human urges,

8826-1011-11-11-11

before rejecting an institution which has been exploited by capitalists and the Bourgeoisie for their own profit. We must not throw away 'the baby with the bath', and we need not reject a sound principle because of its unsound application.

We may conclude our account of Property by emphasising some of the points elaborated above. We must note *first*, that Property has from the earliest times played a very important part in the ordering of our individual and corporate life, that it has undergone considerable changes as society changed its structure and organisation, that its vitality is due to the fact that it satisfies fundamental human needs and urges and has contributed to the progress of civilization in the past. On the other hand, we have seen that property is not sacrosanct: it claims our loyalty only in so far as it helps self-expression and self-development and proves conducive to social welfare. In our own times property has been divorced from social obligation: it has been regarded as a privilege rather than a right. "This privilege of ownership constitutes the foundation of an inequality which hardly bears any relation to intelligence, skill or moral worth." What we have to denounce openly is the tyranny of "*functionless property*" and "the *Macht-politik* of the acquisitive society". We must relate property to work and worth and harness it to social service. A proper place must be assigned to wealth and power in the hierarchy or values by relating wealth to welfare and power to responsibility. Possession must not supersede personality, gold must not degrade the soul. Our economic and industrial organisation has become vicious, in as much as it allows human

beings to be treated as mere tools, *mere means to ends*. Kant said long ago that we have no right to treat any human being as a mere means to our end. Prostitution, Slavery and many other ancient institutions had to be rejected on this principle. There is no reason why the old historic institution of Private Property should not also go, if it cannot be transformed into some form of joint proprietorship, in which all alike workers as well as mill-owners, tenants as well as landlords can enjoy full rights of ownership. The communists visualise such a state of affairs, when they talk of the abolition of private property and the creation of a class-less state. The gulf between the masses and the classes has become so wide in modern industrial society that small doses of "democratic liberalism" will not help in bridging it. The social status of modern man depends upon his economic position and this gives rise to tremendous power in the hands of the few, *power to use the personality of others as a mere means*. The old argument in favour of private property was based on the sanctity of the human personality. That argument to-day is being utilised by the Marxians in favour of abolition of private property.

"Property," according to the *Hindu* view, "writes Sir S. Radhakrishnan," is a mandate held by its posses-

Hindu view of property.

sors for the common use and benefit of the commonwealth. The *Bhagwata* tells us that we have a claim only to so much as would satisfy our hunger. If anyone desires more, he is a thief deserving punishment. To gain wealth and power at the expense of society is a social crime. To destroy surplus products simply because we cannot sell them for

profit is an outrage on humanity." (*Eastern Religions and Western Thought*). Again according to *Ramayana*, "a man who is keen on wealth for its own sake is to be detested." (Kanda II, 21-58) A modern writer, J. A. Hobson, has coined a happy term for all evil forms of property, property which is worshipped as an end in itself, property which is concentrated in the hands of the few and used by them to control the lives of the many. He calls it '*Improperty*' and our attack must be directed at the modern degeneration of property.

The present economic discontent and the wide gulf between the classes and the masses leads us to raise the question of Social gradation. We speak

**Social
Gradation.**

of persons belonging to the upper, middle & lower classes. This common use of the term 'class' is sociologically inexact and has little scientific value. Even the Marxians sometimes roughly classify the modern society into three broad groups:—(1) the Capitalists, (2) the *Petit-bourgeois*, and (3) the Proletariat. Social classes are based on a "horizontal" division of the community, the idea of comparative status, or the distinction between higher and lower, being fundamental to this classification. MacIver defines the class as "any portion of a community which is marked off from the rest, not by limitations, arising out of language, locality, function or specialisation, but primarily by social status." (*Society, A Textbook of Sociology*.) It is really the sense of status, sustained by economic, political, or ecclesiastical power and by the distinctive modes of life and cultural expressions corresponding to them, which draws class apart from class, gives cohesion to each, and stratifies a whole society.

The definition of social class offered by *Max Weber* is an interesting attempt to give prominence to the economic aspect, while still retaining the essential subjective element. According to him, class is the community of those who as a group have the same lot in life, or the same life-chances, as determined typically by material possessions, rank or station, and cultural factors. (Vide *Wirtschaft und gesellschaft*, III, Chap. (4) Max Weber builds the concept of class upon three factors, (a) the possession of economic means, (b) the external standard of living, and (c) cultural and recreational possibilities. Thus class distinctions would seem to rest on status and not on function or occupation. The difference in social status may be due to distinctions of income-levels, occupations, birth, culture, race, and so forth, within a given society. *Subjectively*, members of the same class have a sense of equality and freedom while dealing with one another. A class acquires an exclusiveness which is expressed in all social intercourse and modes of behaviour; there is no ease and freedom in the social intercourse among persons belonging to different classes. Their rank in social hierarchy is an index of the value assigned by society to the respective modes of life they follow. Thus, in the ideal Republic, Plato gives the highest place of honour to philosophers, because they dedicate their entire life to the pursuit of ultimate Values,— Truth, Beauty and Goodness. The traders and craftsmen are given a lower position, as they minister to man's vegetative and animal needs and comforts, having merely instrumental value. Again, in the ancient Hindu society,

Brahmanas were given the place of honour, as the pursuit of intellectual, cultural and spiritual Values was their dignified function, Vaisyas occupying a lower place in the hierarchy, as they were concerned with wealth and material well-being.

The ownership of the instruments of production is the main principle upon which the Marxists divide society into the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The Marxian view.

The latter, i. e., the working class consists of property-less individuals who have nothing in their possession but their power to sell their labour for wages. But the commodity they sell, viz., their labour-power, is such as cannot be accumulated and sold at convenience. Hence they are compelled to sell it at a loss, or else they have to suffer starvation. They are thus thrown at the mercy of the employers for their subsistence. They enjoy little independence and exercise no control over the economic machine. The huge economic machinery controlled by the capitalists makes the rich richer and the poor poorer, and widens the gulf between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'. This means a bare subsistence-wage for the working class, a very low standard of life, and consequently, the lowest gradation in the social scale. The age of legalised slavery and serfdom is thus followed by the age of sweated labour, a disguised form of slavery and serfdom which is worse, because it cannot be abolished by any legislation, and is more subtle, inasmuch as it is *unconscious*, as the workers themselves do not realise that their status is hardly better than that of the ancient slaves and the mediaeval serfs. The Marxians undertake to awaken the proletariat to

realise the depth of their degradation and the intensity of their exploitation at the hands of the Capitalists, the Liberal Democratic State and the priests of all Bourgeois Culture, conspiring together in an unholy alliance, in order to maintain the *Status Quo*, and to suppress the masses by repression and force, even ruthless violence, if there is awakening and an organised demand for the recognition of their rights. We may refer to the use of force in recent times by democratic states, like the U. S. A., to suppress strikes in factories.

Between the property-less working class and the big property-holders there is an intermediate class known as the middle class or the '*petite bourgeoisie*'. Its composition is not quite homogeneous, including, as it does, many social groups; the different groups, however, conform to a particular standard of life and culture, different from the poor workers on the one hand and the rich capitalists on the other, — the "*Sufed-posh*", सुफेद पोश, سفید پوش the '*white-collar*' workers. According to the communists, this middle class is only a passing phase; it will have to side with one of the two contending parties in the struggle. This is, indeed, the chief "*Menace of Fascism*" in the coming "*Struggle for Power*," as *Fascism*, like its ally, *National Socialism* or *Nazism* by enticing this middle class to the side of the National state, is delaying the dialectical process. Communism, on the other hand, wants to precipitate class-struggle for achieving its cherished goal of a class-less society. That is why Nationalism is so hostile to Communism which is definitely International in character.

In modern capitalist society, the individual *in theory*

is free to follow any profession he likes and to make his way to the higher class by improving his economic status. But *in p. actice* his choice of profession and his rise in the social scale are very much restricted. The social status of the individual is mostly determined *for* him and not *by* him. "The present class structure of society involves much unfair competition, produces mutual distrust and bitterness among the different classes, and contains within the seeds of violent revolution." (Damle).

Thus we see that the Marxists define social class in purely economic terms. According to MacIver, this definition is inadequate sociologically

**The Marxian
view criticized.**

for two important reasons. In the first place there are class differences which do not correspond to economic differences. In the Hindu caste system members of the highest or Brahmin caste, without diminishing their "social distance", may be the employees or servants of members of a lower caste and very inferior to the latter with respect to wealth. Again, an old established landed class frequently regard themselves as socially superior to an industrial class of '*nouveaux riches*'. In the second place the concept of class loses its sociological significance if it is *defined* by any purely objective criterion, such as income level or occupational function. Class does not unite people and separate them from others unless they *feel* their unity or separation. Unless class-consciousness is present, then no matter what criterion we take, we have not a social class but a mere logical category or type. If 'white-collar' workers do not regard themselves as belonging to the same class as artisans, then they do not together form one social

class."

We have quoted at length from Professor MacIver partly because he is the leading sociologist in America, and partly because he has given due importance to the *psychological* element in sociological groups. The Marxists themselves lay emphasis upon the element of 'class-consciousness'; as a matter of fact, one of the important items in the programme of the communists has always been to develop the 'class-consciousness' of the peasants, the worker and other economic or occupational units, by organising Trade Unions, and educating the masses in civic matters. It is only by making the unconscious processes of History conscious that we can hope to speed up the slow movement of the dialectical transition from Capitalism to Communism. We do not see how the Marxian view could be called purely *objective*, because *Marx* and *Engels*, more than anyone else, emphasised the psychological element themselves. There is just one other difficulty which we find in MacIver's definition of class, and that is due to our emphasis on the unconscious side of human nature. It may be that the class-consciousness is actually dim or vague, or even totally absent, in a given group but that may be due to some severe '*repression*' or deliberate distortion by an organised conspiracy of silence or by inculcating false educational or ethical ideals. Much of what goes in modern society by the name of Culture, Morals and Religion is due to this tyranny of Society and Convention. '*The Discontents of Civilization*' may be really due to this social and economic maladjustment and 'mass-neuroses'. Social discontent may have roots in the pathological ways of thinking and acting, which

have been bequeathed to us through organised deception and self-deception of the past generations. Wrong attitudes of thought, emotion and will, have been passed on to us by our parents. Our emphasis on the 'individualistic' aspect of Education, (vide Chapter IV) and our plea for giving more freedom to the growing child, would provide a necessary corrective to this social malady. The breakdown of the old morality and the complete distintegration of old institutions like the Family and Marriage, may to a large extent be due to the *tyranny of codes and the hypocrisy of the so-called 'moral' or 'pure'*.

We have now to give a brief account of an ancient institution like the Caste system of the Hindus, and to try to correlate it to the modern concept of class. As MacIver says, "When status is wholly predetermined, so that men are born to their lot in life without hope of changing it, then class takes the extreme form of Caste. This is the situation in Hindu society". Quoting from a recent Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, he proceeds: "Every Hindu necessarily belongs to the caste of his parents, and in that caste he inevitably remains. No accumulation of wealth and no exercise of talents can alter his caste status; and marriage outside his caste is prohibited or severely discouraged". Thus "caste is a complete barrier to the mobility of class. In principle it involves an absolute and permanent stratification of the community" (Society: A Text-Book of Sociology). In the same connection, MacIver goes on to say that "In India, with its multitudinous caste compartments, the higher caste groups, at the top Brahmin and next in order the Kshattriya and the

The Caste System in India.

Vaishya, are thought of as beings of different clay from the low caste group of the Sudras, while still further beyond these lie the "outcasts", the "untouchables", whose very presence is a defilement to the rest, who pollute food and water by their touch, and who in some regions may not even approach the neighbourhood of the high-caste Hindu". (Ibid). As Prof. Damle sums up the difference, "Classes are elastic, whereas castes are rigid. Classes are interchangeable, while castes are watertight compartments. Classes are capable of adaptation to changing environment and are the sign and result of progress. Classes are determined by social needs, while castes are founded on a religious dogma, which makes them rigid and immobile. The doctrine of '*Karma*' is the inspiration, if not the foundation, of caste. Castes are determined by birth, which no one can help or change. The system of castes, therefore, proves a drag on social progress." (*Civics for Beginners*).

In its most perfect form, the institution of caste is found among the Hindus, and it constitutes a distinctive feature of their social organisation. It is bound up with Hindu religion; it has influenced Hindu law and custom. Indeed, it has coloured the entire Hindu outlook on life. The caste is, however, a very complex phenomenon. It is not the same everywhere, and it has undergone many changes in its long history. Many divergent views have been held by scholars about its origin, nature and function. We shall review some of its salient features here, in order to clear up the confusions arising from one-sided views held by European scholars who do not understand the essential "*spirit*" of the religion and philosophy of the Ancient

Hindus.

It is necessary at the outset to distinguish between "*Varna*" and "*Jati*", two terms, which are often confused with each other. "*Varna*" is the ideal of class system as pictured by the Hindus, while "*Jati*" represents its crystallized form, and refers in general to the actual social conditions in India (G. H. Mees: *Dharma and Society*). "*Varna*" literally means 'colour'. The usual view is that colour is an indication of race, and that originally there were only two *Varnas*, the fair-skinned *Aryans* and the dark-skinned *Dasyus*. Later, we have a four-fold division of society, "*Chatur-Varna*", into Brahmanas, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Sudras. In this later division the factors of culture and function are more important than the racial factor. The idea underlying the fourfold scheme is somewhat similar to the scheme of the Republic of Plato, viz., that "spiritual wisdom and cultural pursuits, executive and military power, skilled production and economic organisation, and lastly devoted service are the indispensable elements of any social order." By this scheme the ancient Hindu thinkers and seers intended "to hold the people together." They, therefore, admitted "primitive societies and foreign settlers, such as the Greeks and Scythians, into the Hindu fold and recognized their priestly families as Brahmanas and their fighting men as Kshatriyas" (Radhakrishnan: *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*).

This was the Hindu solution of the problem of conflict between different races, tribes and cultures. To begin with, no restrictions were imposed on inter-marriage and

A parallel in
Plato's Re-
public.

inter-dining. The occupations were not hereditary. "*Varna*" was based on "*Guna*" (Quality) and "*Karma*" (Heredity and Action). *Varna* defined duties, but conferred no privileges. We usually have now come to associate power and pleasure with social rank, but according to the original theory of *Varna*, the higher the individual's rank, the stricter his discipline and the more exacting his duties. A parallel conception is found in the fourth book of the Republic, which begins with the famous objection of *Adeimantus* regarding the happiness of the Guardian class in the Ideal Republic; "Then what defence will you make, Socrates, if any one protests that you are not making the men of this class particularly happy?—when it is their own fault, too, if they are not; for the city really belongs to them, and yet they derive no advantage from it, as others do, who own lands and build fine large houses, and, in fact, as you said just now, possess gold and silver, and everything that is usually considered necessary to happiness;". Socrates replies with his characteristic equanimity as follows:—"Our object in the construction of our state is not to make any one class pre-eminently happy, but to make the whole state as happy as it can be made. For we thought that in such a state we should be most likely to discover justice, as on the other hand in the worst-regulated state we should be most likely to discover injustice". And he gives an apt simile to illustrate his point: "Now, if some one came up to us while we were painting statues, and blamed us for not putting the most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the body, because the eyes, being the most beautiful part, were not painted purple but black, we should

think it a sufficient defence to reply, Pray, sir, do not suppose that we ought to make the eyes so beautiful as not to look like eyes, nor the other parts in like manner, but observe whether, *by giving to every part what properly belongs to it, we make the whole beautiful.*" (Our Italics: IV. 420. 21: Davies and Vaughan.)

In our own century, a German sociological writer, Dr. Rudolf Steiner, in his book on The Three-fold State, (*Die*

"The Three-fold State": Rudolf Steiner.

Dreigliederung des sozialen Organismus) has worked out a parallel conception to suit modern European condi-

tions. Like several other sociologists, Dr. Steiner begins by comparing a human society to a human body. He urges that there are three main functions in the social organism, just as there are three main functions in the human body: (1) The *nervous* system, having its centre in the brain, (2) the *circulatory* system, having its centre in the heart, (3) the *nutritive* system, having its centre in the stomach. Their distinctive characteristics are *Nerve*, *Muscle*, and *Nutriments*. The corresponding functions in the social organism are: (1) its more spiritual aspects,—science, art, literature, philosophy, religion, education, everything connected with the development and expression of human personality and the realization of the ultimate values in human life; (2) its more mechanical aspects,—the protection of life and property, the defence against aggression from without, the establishment and enforcement of laws, everything connected with justice and with the state in the narrower sense of the word; (3) its more assimilative aspects,—the use and control of natural forces, the practical application of science, everything connected

with the industrial side of life and with the production of *instrumental values*.

Dr. Steiner's use of the analogy between the physical and the social organism, though bearing a certain resem-

**Difference from
Plato's concep-
tion.**

blance to the scheme in the Republic, leads to very different results. Of the three aspects recognised by Plato

and by Dr. Steiner, only the *third* can be regarded as having any complete correspondence in the two schemes. What Plato refers to the region of the heart is the element of "spirit". The fact that he regarded this aspect of human nature as being essentially allied to the more rational aspect, and properly subject to its control, makes the fundamental distinction between his theory and that of Dr. Steiner less conspicuous than it would otherwise be. On both theories, it seems to relate essentially to the more purely animal impulses and emotions, such as anger, fear, natural affection, and the like, which *in the individual* have to be controlled by reason and *in society* have to be governed by law. In popular language, these are commonly referred to the heart, though it is not scientific to stress the analogy between the physiological and the social organisms too far. With regard to the *first* and the *second* aspects however, we may note an important divergence from Plato. "Plato, by connecting the first aspect purely with the head, tends to give it an exclusively intellectual interpretation; whereas Dr. Steiner, by thinking of it in relation to the whole nervous system, is able to give it a much wider application, including everything that can be properly described as spiritual—covering poetry, for instance, as well as philosophy and religion."

(The Three-fold State : Mackenzie, Hibbert Journal, XX,3.)

Whether we agree with Mackenzie's hostile interpretation of Plato's scheme or not, it is clear that he has given a brief and lucid summary of Dr. Steiner's conception of "a real trinity in the State" in the article quoted above from which we have freely drawn. "It is three in one, as well as one in three," says he, regarding the 'Three-fold State' of Dr. Steiner. The separation of its functions is as real as their essential unity. The philosopher is not to be the king, nor is he to be the captain of industry. It remains, indeed, to be seen whether there are to be any supreme captains. It is not the function of the brain, at any rate, to exercise any direct control over the circulation; and the stomach has to carry on its particular work without the immediate guidance either of the head or of the heart. This, in itself, is obviously a very important difference ;....." (Ibid). We are afraid that Mackenzie has here stressed the separation of functions to a breaking point; indeed, even if we follow the analogy of the physiological organism, the neurologists tell us that the nervous system directly controls the functions of the liver

Plato defended
against Macken-
zie's criticism.

and the intestines, and contemporary medical psychology has come to the definite conclusion that both the nervous system and the emotional life of an individual *directly* and *immediately* control his appetite, sleep and digestion. In grief and in anxiety, the circulation of blood and the entire digestive system are disturbed. If the connection is so intimate and direct in the psycho-physical organism, how much more so it must be in the socio-political organism of the state and society. The reverence for the State which

is so characteristic of the German attitude is due to their emphasising this fundamental unity of the whole civic and national life and their identification of the State with "*the central power* by which the whole of its '*Kultur*' is sustained." The Greeks, especially the Athenians, were lovers of freedom as well as of Art and Poetry; "yet they also tended to think of the State in the larger sense of the word, as being the power by which art and every aspect of the common life was rightly controlled; and Plato compares this control with that which the head, assisted by the active co-operation of the heart, exercises over the bodily organism. Hence he thinks of the rulers as being philosophers as well as kings, and as concerning themselves with every department of social life. The organism is one; and it has a single controlling organ". (Ibid)

We feel that in this matter the spirit of German Idealistic theories of the State is fundamentally identical with the Platonic view, and both Dr. Steiner and Mackenzie have been unduly influenced by the conception of the Trinity. Social Philosophy, like Philosophy in general, must return to Monism from Pluralism of all varieties, if we have to save society from the chaos of multiple loyalties, viz., loyalty to the Church, to the Family and to the State. It is only in this spirit that we can understand and even appreciate Plato's quarrel with Poetry. In spite of his own artistic gifts and temperament, Plato had no hesitation in banishing Homer from his ideal Republic. What Mackenzie regards as a "*limitation*" in Plato and "his failure to do full justice to the place of poetry in education and in life" we consider the essential wisdom of a great seer. Indeed, as Nettleship remarks, "the impression of an entirely

hostile attitude to poetry in general" is totally false. Plato's

Philosophy vs. Poetry.

idea is that the poet should take his place in the commonwealth, "not as an ornamental luxury, but as an integral part of it, with a work of his own, imprinting the first indelible ideas upon the souls of the young, revealing the nature of God in forms of imaginative truth, and surrounding the mind with an atmosphere of health and beauty." This is an enviable position of paramount importance which Plato assigns to the poet in his Republic. It is certainly not a position of which any poet need be ashamed. Plato does not make the poet "a literary tailor who cuts his wares to order", but on the contrary regards him as the central pivot, on whom the entire machinery of the state and the social organism rests. Indeed Plato gives to the poet a unique place of honour, comparable to what Milton gives in his famous eulogy of poetry. (Vide Nettleship: Plato's Educational Theory)

We must now return to the Indian conception embodied in the Laws of Manu, and the theory which lies at the

Difference from the Indian conception.

foundation of the Caste system. We may take the analysis of the bodily organism, given by Dr. Bhagwan Das, as a typical exposition in modern times of the ancient Hindu ideals. The human body is regarded as falling into four essentially distinct parts—the head, the breast and arms, the lower half of the trunk, and the feet and nether limbs. Corresponding to these, there are four distinct castes in the social organism—the Brahmanas, the Kshatriyas, the Vaishyas, and the Shudras. This correspondence is pictorially represented in the Hindu Mythology by the

Allegory that the Brahmanas issued from the mouth of *Brahma*, the Kshatriyas from his arms, the Vaishyas from his thighs, and the Shudras from his feet.

The Brahmanas, corresponding to the head, are the intellectual and spiritual leaders of the whole society. They are philosophers, but not kings. They may draw up laws, but it is not their business to enforce them. They are priests and teachers, supported by the community, and rewarded with high honour. The Kshatriyas, corresponding to the arms and shoulders (compare the "head men" and "shoulder men" of Ruskin) are the political and military rulers. In the framing of their laws they would generally be assisted and guided by the advice of the Brahmanas, but it is their special function *to see that the laws are carried out*, and to protect the general interests of the whole. Their reward lies in the possession of great power. The Vaishyas are the captains of industry. Their reward is their wealth which, however, they are expected to use for the good of the community. The Shudras, finally, have no special function but that of service, which they owe to the other three classes. They are supported with the necessities of life, and their rulers reward them with amusements.

According to Dr. Bhagwan Das, if the principles underlying the Indian scheme were more fully recognised and adapted to modern conditions, a better order of society would speedily be established. "All the true Brahmanas, the scientists, men of letters, priests, legislators, of all faiths and climes, could then co-operate, with lessened exclusiveness and thinned barriers of caste, creed, nation and race, and increased good will, in a world-wide edu-

cational organisation, for the advancement of sound knowledge and good law, for the benefit of the whole of humanity. So, all the true Kshatriyas of all countries and creeds could join in a federalist political organisation for the protection of the good from the evil, and for the preservation of peace and order throughout the whole world. So, all the true Vaishyas of all lands and religions could combine in an international economic organisation, for the enhancement of the comforts of life of all the populations of all countries. And so all the Shudras could similarly co-operate, under guidance, in an international industrial organisation, for the production of all necessities of life in ample measure, for the use of all the peoples of the earth" (Social Reconstruction).

CHAPTER VI.

THE STATE.

The State occupies the foremost place among all the associations and institutions in society. The state is

The State and Society

a political organisation with a controlling authority which regulates and co-ordinates the different phases of social life. In the absence of such a central authority, society could not be held together and there would be disorder and confusion. Society and the state were identified by the ancient Greeks, and the same essential spirit manifests itself in the great idealist systems of Germany. This identification was a characteristic feature of the socio-political life of the Greeks. The modern Nazis and Fascists also go back to Plato for their inspiration in this respect. To the ancient Greeks, as well as to the modern Germans, Italians and Russians, to be a good man was equivalent to being a loyal citizen. According to modern sociological thinkers, society and state must be clearly distinguished. The scope of society is wider than that of the state. A man's life is not exhausted by his political obligations. "The state," says MacIver, "is a structure not coeval and coextensive with society but built within it as a determinate order for the attainment of specific ends". (The Modern State). Society consists of many other institutions, (apart from the state,) in and

through which man seeks to satisfy his varied needs and aspirations.

Many definitions of the state have been given in recent times: but the subject has been much obscured by a failure to distinguish between problems of Sociology and Social Philosophy. The State has frequently been defined in terms of *what it ought to be*, and not in terms of *what it actually is*. Thus, many idealist philosophers describe the State as the agency within a territorially demarcated area, whose function is to harmonise and adjust *all* the interests and purposes of social life. This description is defective from two points of view: (a) it is by no means clear that the state always acts as such a harmonizing agency; (b) it might be held by some that there are numerous social relations which ought not to come within the scope of state regulation, e. g., family and education. "From a sociological point of view, we must regard the state", says Ginsberg, "as a genus with many species varying greatly in scope and function, and in its

Ginsberg and relations to other associations. As a
Hobhouse on minimum, we may say that the state
the State, exists in all communities in which the

protection of the members and the enforcement of common rules are functions of a differentiated system of organs" (Sociology). Hobhouse defines the state as follows: "A state is a fabric in which the principal functions of Government, the declaration of law, its execution, and common defence, are differentiated and coordinated". (Social Development). Thus we may say that those primitive communities in which rules are not enforced by *collective* action, but the protection of individuals is left

to individuals or other groups, possessed of no defined authority, like the *Indian Rajahs* or Ruling chiefs, are not states. The most generally recognised function of the state has been that of defence, internal and external, and the use of the collective resources for the common well-being. It is, however, even now a matter of controversy how far the state ought to play an active part in promoting the common good. Leaving aside some of the most primitive peoples, who have no differentiated governments at all, the state seems to be a universal institution. But the assertion that the state is '*natural*' is ambiguous and misleading. Some form of society is an inherent need of human nature. "All associations have their root," in this sense, "in man's sociality and in the fundamental need of cooperative enterprise". But no particular form of state, for example, the modern nation state, can be said to be natural, "either in the sense of issuing immediately out of man's inborn impulses, or of expressing spontaneously his final end or *telos*". Hence it is important not to confuse the state with society. The state is a species of society, viz., that described as an association. It is also a set of institutions, and in this sense includes the whole organised fabric of law and government.

The mechanism through which the laws of the state are enacted, interpreted and executed, is called government.

The State and Government

Government is the instrument with which the state performs its functions.

The state is relatively an abstract notion, while government gives to it a concrete shape and form. Forms of government change according to circumstances and the spirit and traditions of the people. The

State, however, remains, its chief purpose being the maintenance of social order and the promotion of social well-being. It accomplishes its purpose through the intricate machinery of government with its legislature, executive and judicial departments. "The state is a great and lasting partnership based on ineradicable factors. Government is a transient arrangement within the state, liable to change according to convenience" (Dr. Beni Prasad).

Etymologically, a nation means a people having a common origin, ("*natus*" being the Latin for "born").

The
State.

Nation

word 'nation' has, however, acquired a popular and semi-scientific import which goes beyond its original meaning.

Geographic unity, community of race, language and religion, community of culture, customs and traditions, and common economic interests and political aspirations are the important factors constituting a nation. But these factors are by no means essential or universal. Every nation, however, must possess some of them at least. There is no racial unity in the United States of America, yet it is a nation. Switzerland is a nation, though three distinct languages are spoken in the country. With the growth of religious freedom, the influence of religion as a bond of national unity has dwindled. It is, however, "the consciousness of being a nation that really makes a nation." "It is more a psychological and spiritual unity than a mere ethnic or geographic unity." (Damle) Zimmern defines a nation as "a body of people united by a corporate sentiment of peculiar intensity, intimacy and dignity, related to a definite home-country". As Prof. Damle observes, "Before a genuine and ardent desire to

live together and to serve and to suffer for the home-land, all considerations of race, language and religion fade into insignificance". Many modern writers attach a political significance to the concept of nation and maintain that a nation, to be a nation in the full sense of the term, must have a government of its own. A nation, they hold, is nationality *plus* the state. According to Ziminern, however, a nation is not a state, and where the two coincide, we have a nation-state.

According to Marxism, "a nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, *economic life and psychological make-up* manifested in a community of culture". The last two, viz. "community of economic life,

**Marxism and
Nationality.**

economic cohesion" and "community of psychological make-up, which manifests itself in a community of culture", are the chief characteristic features of a nation. None of the above characteristics is by itself sufficient to define a nation. If one of these is absent, the nation ceases to be nation. It is possible to conceive people possessing a common 'national character', but they cannot be said to constitute a single nation, "if they are economically disunited, inhabit different territories, speak different languages, and so forth. Such, for instance, are the Russian, Galician, American, Georgian and Caucasian Highland Jews, who do not", according to Stalin, "constitute a single nation". Again, "it is possible to conceive people with a common territory and economic life who nevertheless would not constitute a single nation because they have no common language and no common 'national character'. Such, for instance, are the Germans and Letts in the Baltic Region.

Finally, the Norwegians and the Danes speak one language, but they do not constitute a single nation owing to the absence of the other characteristics. *It is only when all these characteristics are present that we have a nation.*" (Marxism and the National Question, pamphlet written in 1912: Martin Lawrence, edited by Fireberg.)

According to R. Springer, "a nation is a union of similarly thinking and similarly speaking persons." It is "a cultural community of modern people no longer tied to the soil". O. Bauer goes further and defines a nation as "a

**The views of
Springer and
Bauer criticised**

relative community of character". National character, according to Bauer, is....."The sum-total of characteristics which distinguish the people of one nationality from the people of another nationality—the complex of physical and spiritual characteristics which distinguish one nation from another". This was the view held by the Social-Democratic theoreticians on the national question well-known in Austria. Stalin refuted this view in the pamphlet quoted above, as at that time there were two conflicting theories of nations and, correspondingly, two national programmes: the *Austrian* programme, supported by the *Bund* and the *Mensheviks*, and the *Russian* programme, the programme of the *Bolsheviks*. According to Marxians, however, subsequent events, especially the imperialist war (1914-1918) and the complete disintegration of Austria-Hungary into several national states, clearly demonstrated that history has condemned the 'Austrian-school'. As Stalin said in 1920, "even the Bund has been obliged to admit: 'the demand for national cultural autonomy,' which was put forward under the capitalist system, 'loses all

meaning in the conditions of a socialist revolution'. The Bund does not even suspect that it thereby admitted (inadvertently admitted) the *fundamental* unsubstantiality of the theoretical basis of the Austrian national programme and the *fundamental* unsubstantiality of the Austrian theory of nations". (Preface to a *Collection of Articles* by Stalin, 1920).

Bauer, of course, knows that national character does not fall from the skies, and so, according to him, *the character of people is determined by nothing so much as by their fate.....A nation is nothing but a community of fate* (which in its turn is determined) by the conditions under which people produce their means of subsistence and distribute the products of their labour." "A nation is the aggregate of people bound into a community of character by a community of fate." But "*what national community,*" asks Stalin, "can there be among people who are economically disconnected, inhabit different territories, and from generation to generation speak different languages? Bauer speaks of the Jews as a nation, although they 'have no common language'; but 'what community of fate' and national cohesion can there be, for instance, between the Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and American Jews, who are completely disunited, inhabit different territories and speak different languages?" How, then, can it be seriously maintained that petrified religious rites and fading psychological relics affect the 'fate' of these Jews more powerfully than the living social, economic and cultural environment that surrounds them?.....What, then, distinguishes Bauer's nation from the mystical and self-contained 'national spirit of the spiritualists? Bauer, by

divorcing the 'distinctive feature' of nations (national character) from the 'conditions' of their life, sets up an impassable barrier between them. But what is national character if not a reflection of the conditions of life, a coagulation of impressions derived from environment? How can one limit the matter to national character alone, isolating and divorcing it from the soil that gave rise to it?" (Marxism and the Question of Nationalities).

A nation is thus not merely "a historical category" but a historical category "belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism". This is the Marxian view. Modern sociologists, however, still maintain that "nationhood depends upon the existence of distinctive sentiments arising out of a conjunction of cultural traits. Many and diverse cultural elements may be involved, few of them seem to be indispensable.....What is indispensable is that there shall be a body of ideas shared by the great majority of members of the group: Thus Swiss nationhood is built on a passionate belief in local autonomy, a belief shared by citizens of all the cantons and overriding the differences in language, religion, and economic interests. (Social Structure: Mess).

Viewed psychologically, it is still more difficult to define 'national character' by which is meant "the totality of dispositions to thought, feeling and behaviour peculiar to and widespread in a certain people, and manifested with greater or less continuity in a succession of generations." We often also speak of 'national temperament', which means such *qualities of mind* "as the degree of intensity of response, the tempo of activity, the range of susceptibility to stimuli, the mood-colouring or

predominant feeling-tone of behaviour." By calling these qualities national we mean that they are *widely and continuously dominant* in a given people, and also that they are reflected in its social institutions and traditions and its public policy." Thus it is said, for example, that the Germans are 'heavy', slow to react, but once aroused energetic and persistent; patient and industrious, disciplined and thorough; lacking in impulsiveness and expansiveness, with a tendency to individualism and exclusiveness. Or again, we hear that the English nation has energy, initiative, a sense of individual responsibility, law-abidingness, the habit of compromise and moderation (Barker, *National Character*); or that the French are vivacious, mobile and expansive, sociable, lacking the strength of the English or the heavy patience of the German" (*Sociology*: Ginsberg).

The permanence and continuity of national character and temperament has been especially stressed by German writers, by some under the influence of a National "*Geist*" or Soul, by others under the influence of doctrines of *Race*. In England it has been stressed by McDougall in his *Group mind*. We must admit that there is unquestionably some continuity in the case of the great nations with a long historic past. Yet there seems to be no justification for thinking that national character is either unitary or unalterable. This was clearly pointed out by David Hume long ago in his well-known essay on *National Characters*. "The old Spaniards", he says, "were restless, turbulent and so addicted to war that many of them killed themselves when deprived of their arms by the Romans. One would find an equal difficulty at present (at least one would have

found it fifty years ago) to rouse up the modern Spaniards to war".

In English history also Hume notes important differences at different periods in the degree of enthusiasm for religion. Professor Barker has recently commented on the new habits and tendencies which are being developed in modern England: "a greater febrility of temper, and gregariousness of behaviour, and greater readiness to submit to state regulation" (National Character). The modern Germans furnish a good example of a change from an extreme individualism to the most exaggerated state-worship.

Thus we may conclude that the psychology of peoples and nations has hardly yet attained scientific precision. "It consists in the main", as Ginsberg observes, "of a series of impressions, often by very brilliant writers and acute observers of the behaviour of different peoples and of inferences as to disposition derived from a study of their institutions and contributions to art and science. We must not belittle these efforts, or make the mistake of denying the existence of national characteristics merely on the ground that they have so far not lent themselves to exact analysis or quantitative measurement. Better results may be expected when more is known of the genetics of character, and when a reliable technique has been elaborated for observing and recording group behaviour." (Sociology)

We must now return from our long discussion into the field of theoretical definitions to ask a practical question of everyday interest, Is India a nation, and if so, in what

Is India
Nation ?

a

sense ? In the words of Vincent Smith, "India, encircled as she is by seas and mountains, is indisputably a geographical unit". We need not lose sight of this unity of India behind its continental vastness and variety. It is true that there is a great diversity of races, languages and religious faiths in India, but that does not form an insurmountable barrier in the way of Indian nationality. "The common economic interests and political aspirations, the recent awakening of Indian national consciousness and the strength of the Indian Nationalist movement inspired by the desire to serve and the readiness to suffer for its freedom and progress, would certainly justify the claim that India is a nation. But if freedom from foreign domination is an indispensable element of a nation, India is not a nation, but a *nation in the making*" (Darnle). Again, if a common culture and social tradition is the indispensable condition of nationhood, the conflicting trends of cultural tradition among the Hindus, the Muslims and the Sikhs, are pointed out by some to prove that there are many nations within India. Still others would point out the different social and political conditions prevailing in the various Indian States, varying from advanced states like Mysore, Baroda, Travancore, Hyderabad and Kashmir to small kingdoms of petty Nabobs or Rajahs, where no individual has any political or social status but for the caprice of the ruling chief ; and the conclusion would inevitably follow that India is not a homogeneous nation at any rate, if it may be at all called a nation in any sense. Finally the Marxian definition would permanently bar India from ever *becoming a nation-state*, unless it first followed Europe and got completely industrialised. The concept of a nation-state is a

logical corollary in the Dialectic of History from Capitalism and Industrialism. It may be that on account of our vast agricultural resources, we may not follow the European model of industrialisation, but some form of large-scale mining, agriculture, Hydro-electric works and heavy industries may be visualised in the near future. Indeed, the trend of Public opinion has already begun to recoil from the Charkha Economics in favour of organised Cottage Industries and State-owned Large Industries. On the other hand, the increasing association of labourers in Bombay, Ahmedabad and Cawnpore in civic life and Trade Unions has given them an International status as wage-earners and workers. "Workers of the world, unite", need not long remain an empty dream of that Prince among dreamers-Marx. If that happens in the future, then India may be saved the bitterness and weariness which the younger nations of Europe have had to face during the last thirty years. For whatever the advantages and merits of the nation-state in consolidating and refining the national and patriotic sentiments of a people, sooner or later, nationalism leads to war and utter disruption of society.

"It is extremely difficult", as Professor Damle observes "to visualize precisely all the processes by which the state

Origin of the
State.

has come into existence". Though society rests upon a *natural* basis, the actual forms of association that we discover among mankind may be properly described as *conventional*, like the use of forks or glasses in eating which is a purely natural urge of mankind. Our rational nature implies that we have the capacity to choose between several alternatives, the power of adaptation to environ-

ment, physical as well as social, and the tendency to devise machinery and to improve our technique. We do not always select our friends and our enemies spontaneously and instinctively, but on various grounds, sometimes well considered, sometimes arbitrary, sometimes almost instinctive. Our laws and forms of government have, for the most part, been established through a slow process of development in which *conscious* choice has doubtless played a considerable part, but *unconscious* motives, force of circumstances, power of *tradition* and many other subtle influences that we cannot clearly explain have also played an important part in guiding or thwarting our deliberate plans. "It is as natural for man to have particular laws and customs and modes of government as it is for birds to have particular forms of nests; and it is natural that the former should be more variable than the latter. The results of instinct are, in their main aspects, uniform; those of choice are endlessly diverse". The state, being a highly differentiated, evolved and complicated association of man, is thus bound to combine in itself with the natural and the conventional elements in all community life. So far as we recognise that state is natural and vital, it may be characterised as an organic unity: so far as it involves accident and choice, it may be characterised as a social contract. It would be, however, incorrect to speak of the *origin of the state* in the sense that at a particular date in the past, the state, which was not there before, suddenly came into existence like a bolt from the blue, as it were. Many of the theories that have been advanced by different thinkers from time to time to explain the origin of the state are mostly speculative in character.

The theory of Divine origin holds that the state is established by God and governed by the **King, who derives** his authority from God. The King is, on this view, responsible not to the subjects over whom he rules but to God. The theory is unscientific and as such it has been rejected by modern political thinkers

**Theory of
Divine Origin.**

The theory of Force tries to explain the genesis of the state by referring to the brute fact of physical coercion — *Might*. The state is the creature of Force. The origin of all such theories lies in the constant feuds and warfare among the primitive peoples, the stronger party always ruling over the weaker after victory in a pitched battle. There is doubtless much historical truth in this theory, as force has been an important factor in the evolution of the state, but it cannot be held that the state is the outcome of *sheer brute force*. Sociability, consent and cooperation have also contributed to the origin and development of political groups; it would be inaccurate to explain them in terms of one single factor. Human nature, as we have clearly shown elsewhere, is so complex that an attempt at over-simplification in the explanation of the origin of any social institution is a futile endeavour.

**Theory of
Force.**

The theory of *Social Contract* regards the state as the outcome of a conscious and deliberate agreement on the part of the people. This agreement lifted the people from the *state of nature* into a civil society. In the state of nature, human relations were regulated by the law of nature. But when the state of nature became intolerable

**Theory of Social
Contract.**

or inconvenient, it was abandoned in favour of a civil society. Among the modern exponents of this doctrine may be mentioned the names of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, though there is a good deal of difference in the expositions of the theory, given by these three thinkers. This conception of social contract was already suggested in the Second Book of the Republic by Plato, only to be set aside. It is also present in Ancient Indian thought, where the state of nature is depicted thus: "the logic of fish (Matsya-nyaya)" prevails, the strong devour the weak like fishes in water (Mahabharata, Santiparva, LXVII, 16-17; Kautilya: Artha-sastra, I, 4).

The theory of social contract is suggested by Plato in the Republic in a form that pretty definitely anticipates that which was much later put forward by Hobbes. The Republic seeks to depict the ideal state and its main purpose is to discover in what way justice is better than injustice. In the first book, which is a prelude to the main argument, Plato asks the question, "What is justice?". Two current views of justice are put forward. The first is the conventional one that justice consists in doing good to friends and ill to foes. It receives a merciless criticism at the hands of Socrates. The second is expounded by the blustering Thrasymachus, who, "gathering himself up sprang at us like a wild beast as though he would seize and carry us off" (336B). It is the doctrine of "*Might is Right*", which Plato had already discussed in the *Gorgias*. "Rulers", he says, "are stronger than the ruled. Everywhere they pass laws in their own interest, and what is done in their interest they call just." It is the theory not only of

Thrasymachus :
Might is Right.

Thrasymachus but of countless others; this was the principle, according to Thucydides, on which Athens justified the existence of her empire. Thus Plato puts it forward as an ordinary view of the current politics of his day, for which he desires to substitute a higher ideal.

Thrasymachus defines justice as '*the interest of the stronger*'. He supports his definition thus: in every state it is considered unjust to violate the laws: the laws are framed to serve the interests of the government and the government is stronger than its subjects: therefore, universally, justice is the interest of the stronger, or, '*Might is Right*.' But Socrates proceeds to demolish the argument of Thrasymachus by showing that every artist—and among artists must be included *rulers*—aims at the perfection of his own art. A doctor *qua* doctor seeks the good of his patient; a ruler *qua* ruler that of his subjects. Again, a government may often make mistakes and enact laws which are detrimental to its own interest: according to Thrasymachus, justice requires the subject *in every instance* to obey the laws of the land: consequently, it is often just for the subject to do what is prejudicial to the interests of the government, that is, what is *not* for the interest of the stronger. Therefore, justice cannot be defined as the interest of the stronger. To avoid this conclusion, Thrasymachus retracts his previous admission, and explains that, properly speaking, a governor, in so far as he is a governor, cannot be said to make mistakes; and that, therefore, the government, strictly speaking, *always* legislates to its own advantage, while justice commands the subject to obey. Socrates, in reply, demonstrates that every art, and therefore the art of government among others, consults the

interests, not of the artist or superior, but of the subject or inferior. Upon this, Thrasymachus abruptly turns the discourse by declaring that a governor treats his subjects just like the shepherd who fattens his flock for his own private advantage; and that, really, injustice, practised on an extensive scale, is by far the best and most lucrative course that a man can adopt. But Socrates replies by quoting the rule, laid down by Thrasymachus himself, that, properly speaking, the shepherd, in so far as he is a shepherd, considers simply the good of his flock. How can then the shepherd fatten his flock for his own private advantage? Further, how can we explain the fact that a governor expects to be paid for his work, except on the supposition that the benefits of Government accrue, not to the governor, but to the subject? Translated in the language of modern society, we may ask, if the Prime Minister of England or the Viceroy of India or the President of the United States are so highly paid, is it not their duty to govern in the interests of the people rather than in their own interest? Plato, in refuting '*Might is Right*' of Thrasymachus, is only asserting the democratic principle that *an ideal government is always in the interests of the governed, rather than of the governors.*

The conception of Social Contract was put in modern times in its most brutal and perhaps also its most logical form by Hobbes, who represents the

**Hobbes' Theory
of Social Con-
tract.**

life of man in the state of nature as one of constant warfare and strife. To

Hobbes, the natural state of humanity is 'one of a war of all against all,' in which man is to man a *wolf homo*

homini lupus. Life in this state, however, was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." The approximate equality of human beings prevents any one from gaining permanently that dominance over others at which each one naturally aims; hence all become eventually disposed to call a truce to the universal war and establish some mode of *pacific* understanding. This they do by *entering into a contract with one another*, in accordance with which they abandon their more violent claims and set up a government for the maintenance of order to which they are then bound by the terms of the contract to offer their allegiance. By the establishment of such an authority, man becomes to man a god-*homo homini deus*. (Outlines : Mackenzie).

Hobbes, however, conceives of only one contract among the people themselves and not another one, *viz.*, that between the people and the sovereign. In this theory, no distinction is made between *the state* and *the government*. The sovereign is above the contract and not limited by its terms. His power is absolute. Hobbes' theory is thus known as Political Absolutism.

Spinoza and Locke, however, refused to recognize the absolute surrender to authority which Hobbes maintained.

Spinoza and
Locke.

In his own day, Hobbes found his doctrines rejected by all parties. The Cavaliers would have none of him, though he claimed to be on their side; for they wanted the King to rule by *divine right*. The opponents of Monarchy would not accept him; for they mostly wanted to limit the King's power. The Saints rejected him; for they wanted to base their rule on *theological* and not on *secular*

grounds. Only in the next generation, when the practical conflict had taken on a new form, did Hobbes' influence make itself plain. It appears very plainly in Locke, the philosopher of the English Revolution of 1688, though Locke does not admit it. Rather, he avows himself a follower of Hooker, the famous divine of the 16th century. He sets out, indeed, to limit the authority of governments and to confine them mainly to the duty of protecting the liberty and property of the subjects. He recognises that society is natural to man and rests his case on a quite different psychology from that of Hobbes. And he derives the principle of politics from the laws of God and Nature and not, like Hobbes, from an act of human reason which removes Man from the sphere and state of Nature. But all the same Locke owes a great deal to Hobbes; and his theory of the Social Contract could never have been formulated as it was without Hobbes' theory to serve as a foundation.

The state of Nature as depicted by Locke is "a state of peace, good-will, mutual assistance and preservation".

The Social Contract of Locke.

But when in course of time people began to interfere with one another and create trouble, they agreed to set up a civil society. Locke postulates *two* contracts, one to set up a civil society and another to form a government. If the government, therefore, is overthrown, it does not mean anarchy, as with Hobbes. Locke distinguishes, while Hobbes did not, between *society* and the *government*. Society is, indeed, based on a contract among men and sustained by their continuous consent to its being. In Hobbes the people set up a sovereign once and for all,

and in doing so transferred and alienated to him and his successors all their power for ever more. The contractual act was the setting up of the government. In Locke this theory changes its content. "The people do not for ever alienate their rights. They remain always sovereign with perpetual power to recall and abolish the government they have established, if it at any time prove false to its trust. And as sovereignty remains in them, absolute and unlimited, the power of government can be limited as much as you please, short of destroying its validity altogether," (G. D. H. Cole : Theories and Forms of Political organisation). Thus the sovereign who is a party to the second contract and is bound by its terms becomes a "limited" monarch. Hobbes' Absolutism serves as the framework for Locke's very different theory of "*limited and constitutional government*" as the defender of property rights,—a theoretical version of the practical achievement of the English Revolution of 1688. Locke thus remains an advocate of Monarchy, limited by the fundamental rights of the people.

Spinoza applied the absolutist principle of Hobbes on a universal scale. Whereas Hobbes had confined the principle to human beings—and to them only so long as they remain in the state of Nature,—to Spinoza "it is a principle which embraces not only man but the whole world of nature, *nay even God himself* ; and he works it out with a consistency which is proof against every scruple, however sacred, and quails before no consequences, however disconcerting". (Vaughan) In the *Tractatus Politicus* Spinoza says, "Every natural object receives from

The Social Contract of Spinoza.

nature, for all purposes of being and working, exactly as much *right* as it has *power*; that the natural right of nature as a whole, and therefore of every individual thing contained in her, extends as far as power; and consequently that, whatever any single man does by the laws of his own nature he does in virtue of *an absolute right of nature*, and that his right over nature extends precisely as far as his power" (T. P. ii, 2-4, our Italics). Again, "all men are by nature enemies" (T. P. ii, 140). But the question remains: Is this intended for an endorsement of Leviathan of Hobbes? Does it mean that to Spinoza, as to Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war, the war of all against all? At first sight, we might be tempted to think so. "But a more careful reading", as Vaughan reminds us, "will convince us that the '*war*' of Spinoza, if indeed it can be justly called a war, is at least something very different from the war of Hobbes. To both alike, the state of nature is built upon a volcano. But, whereas to Hobbes the eruption is constant and deadly, to Spinoza it is smouldering and intermittent. It is, in fact, *rather the fear of war, than war itself*, which makes the scourge of the state of nature. It is a state in which each man is thrown entirely upon his own resources; a state in which, so far from looking for aid from his fellow-creatures, he cannot even count, for long together, upon freedom from their actual hostility. But it cannot be fairly described as a state of war. It is rather a state of settled distrust and of the weakness which distrust, together with his own natural imbecility, brings with it." (Studies in the History of Political Philosophy, Vol. I).

It is thus clear that not only is Spinoza's state of nature a very different thing from that of Hobbes, but also that

Difference between Spinoza and Hobbes.

the *motives* on which man quitted it are to him very different from those demanded by the argument of Hobbes. The sole motive which induces man to enter the civil state, according to the English philosopher, is terror, the sense that any condition, however miserable, must be less odious than that to which he is naturally born. "To Spinoza, the war of the natural state is *potential* rather than *actual*, it is the fear, rather than the taste of it—the mistrust and suspicion, together with the sense of insecurity and weakness which these naturally breed—that weigh upon men's minds". (Ibid) Fear, in Spinoza, is no longer the sole motive which leads men to the civil state. The points on which Spinoza lays by far the greater stress are *the insufficiency of the individual*, when left to himself, to provide for anything more than the bare necessities of life, and *the desire to escape from the 'almost brutish existence'*, from the intellectual and moral vacuity, to which he was condemned in the state of nature.

Finally, it is clear that the two kinds of society, resulting from motives so different as those described above,

The 'positive' motives in Spinoza.

can have nothing in common. "The *negative* motive which Hobbes assigns for men's flight from the state of nature was bound to reflect itself," as Vaughan rightly says," and does in fact reflect itself but too faithfully, in the character of the bond which clamps them together in the civil state. It was terror, terror of each other, that drove them together. It is terror, terror of the sword of the despot, which

alone prevents them from flying instantly apart. The *positive* motives of Spinoza—not a blind flight from danger and misery, but a dim craving for betterment, intellectual and moral as well as physical—necessarily gives rise to a very different kind of state: a state in which the

The germs of
Organic Theory
in Spinoza.

'multitude' are in a position to make bargains or 'contracts' with their rulers, a power contemptuously denied to them by Hobbes; a state of which it is the first condition that *all shall freely resolve to be 'guided by one will'*; a state of which the ideal is—so Spinoza expressly assures us—that the service of all shall be actively enlisted in the attainment of one common purpose, that they shall live *not as slaves but as freemen*, and be bound together *not by fear but by hope*. The 'city' of Hobbes is at best no more than *an aggregate, a mere herd*. That of Spinoza, at least in ideal, is *a living organism, a corporate body animated by one will, a community every member of which contributes, according to his capacity, to the common good*.

The state of nature for Rousseau was a state of idyllic simplicity. It was an earthly paradise in which happiness, innocence and the joys of unrestricted

Rousseau.

freedom abound and equality reigns. But such a state of things does not last long, and with the advent of civilization many evils of inequality, etc., creep in and make the establishment of a civil society by contract a necessity. The parties to the contract are the people themselves, in their different capacities. The people in their *personal* capacity make the bargain with the people in their *corporate* capacity. Rousseau does not, however, transfer sovereignty to a ruler or a body of

rulers, but maintains the sovereignty of the *General Will*. He is thus a philosopher of "*the government by the people*" as distinguished from the *Political Absolutism of Hobbes* or the *Limited Monarchy of Locke*. He takes from Hobbes the idea of Sovereignty as indivisible and

Germs of Democracy.

unlimited, and as arising in society at the moment when the Social Contract is made. From Locke he takes the distinction between Sovereign and Government, which reserves supreme power for the whole people as sovereign and makes the government merely a derivative authority, always subject to the sovereign people's will. But unlike Locke, Rousseau seeks to make his sovereign active in carrying on the work of society and not merely passive and acquiescent in the work of government. Thus, in Rousseau's hands the theory becomes *fundamentally democratic* and the claim is made for the first time that *the people as a whole shall rule in fact as well as in name*. But he does not agree that the sovereign people can in any respect alienate or delegate its rights. Himself a citizen of Geneva, Rousseau thus brings us back to the City-state as the only kind of society in which the terms of the Social Contract can be carried really into effect.

This theory of Rousseau is open to serious criticism. It is historically inaccurate, for there is no evidence of any

Criticism of Rousseau's Theory.

such event in the past—when people in a primitive state met and deliberately came to an agreement to form a political organisation. It is psychologically inaccurate, for it assumes too much of *exclusiveness* on the part of the primitive people. Then there are the practical difficulties,

e.g., the validity of the original contract in the absence of any state-sanction behind it. However, it had an important historical function to perform in the popular movements of the 17th and 18th centuries. It supplied a philosophical basis for democracy and emphasized the importance of the Individual. It gave a theoretical impetus to the French revolution by pointing out the tyrannies of Society and the State. (Cf. Damle : Civics).

The Evolutionary theory maintains that the State is a very complex phenomenon, and various factors have contributed to its make up. It is very

**Evolutionary
Theory.**

difficult to ascertain them all and to know their nature precisely. We may, however, enumerate *three* of the important factors which have contributed to the rise and growth of the State. The first among these is *Kinship*, the bond that held the people together in primitive times. Blood-relationship was effective not only in holding the family together but also in knitting the people into clans and tribes. The tribal life thus came to be organised almost on the model of the family, consolidating itself internally and attempting to extend its sway over other groups under the leadership of a chief. The second important factor is *Religion*. The early social groups lived in a generally diffused religious atmosphere. By teaching obedience, religion helped the consolidation of the authority of the ruler over the ruled. The third important factor is *Political Consciousness*, arising from the fundamental needs of life for protection and order. For the satisfaction of these needs, the authority of the State is accepted ungrudgingly. Thus the modern state on this view is the

product of a long historical development in which several factors were involved. (Ibid, Pp. 96-97).

In the philosophy of Kant, the famous German philosopher, although he was much influenced by Rousseau, the

The Organic Theory.

theory of a Social Contract is abandoned. The allegorical implication of the social contract theory was that outside the political context men have *equal rights* to life and liberty, but without any concurrent duties to recognise these rights in others, that membership of a state implies a tacit compact by which one's original rights are transferred to the State in exchange for security and the other blessings that political life bestows, that because these blessings are more valuable than the empty unenforceable rights that would have existed in a state of nature, a man must really *will that the State should exist as sovereign power*. Kant dispenses with the contract theory, because even in its allegorical interpretation it implies the possibility of a society in which men have *rights without duties*, and this possibility Kant denies. *Such rights as freedom and equality accrue to an individual from his membership in the body politic*; they have no status outside it ('prior to its formation', in the language of the social contract doctrine). Conversely, their status within the body politic is guaranteed.

"The law-giving power can belong only to the united will of the people. For since this power is the source of

The Political Doctrine of Kant.

all right, it cannot through its law in any way do wrong to anyone ... Thus the concordant and united will of all individuals can be the universally united legislative will

of the nation only so far as each one makes for all, and all for each, the very same decision. The members of such a society, *i. e.*, of a State, who are united with respect to law-making are called citizens, and the rightful attributes, inseparable from the existence of each citizen in his proper capacity, are :— firstly, *Political Freedom*, by which he obeys no law save that to which he has given his consent ; secondly, *Civil Equality*, by which he recognises no one in the nation as his superior, unless one whom he may as lawfully hold morally obligated as the other him ; thirdly, the attribute of civil autonomy, by which he owes his existence and maintenance not to the caprice of any one else in the nation, but solely to his own rights and powers as a member of the common weal ; and as a corollary of this last attribute, *civil personality*, by which he may be represented by no one else in political transactions." (Kant ; Elements of Political Doctrine.)

The positive relation between political freedom and political submission is affirmed even more strikingly by

**Hegel's Political
Philosophy.**

Hegel. The most fundamental duty that the rational individual must recognise is, in Hegel's theory, to the State.

Hegel conceives *the State as a living organism* from which no part can be separated without death to that part. An individual finds full satisfaction of his real self only in fulfilling his civic duties. As he fails in these, and thus moves outside the pale of the State, he loses "the consciousness and self-respect implied in his being a member of the whole" ; and to just that extent he loses *individuality*. An individual without any political relations at all is a mere abstraction of discourse, like a colourless surface,

or a span of time without events. "Such also is the mere *ideality of all individual occupations, functions, and corporations*, great as may be their impulse *to subsist and do for themselves*. It is as in the organism, where the stomach assumes independence, and yet is at the same time superseded and sacrificed by becoming a member of one whole". (Hegel : The Philosophy of Right.)

The State, according to Hegel, is embodied Morality. It is the ethical spirit which has clarified itself and has taken substantial shape as Will, a Will which is manifest before the world, which is self-conscious and knows its purposes and carries through that which it knows to the extent of its knowledge. Custom and Morality are the outward and visible form of the inner essence of the State ; the self-consciousness of the individual citizen, his knowledge and activity, are the outward and visible form of the indirect existence of the State. The self-consciousness of the individual finds the substance of its freedom in the attitude of the citizen, which is the essence, purpose and achievement of its self-consciousness.

The State is Mind or Reason *per se*. In the State freedom attains to the maximum of its rights : but at the same time the State, being an end in itself, is provided with the maximum of rights over against the individual citizens, whose highest duty it is to be members of the State. Thus political obligation becomes morally binding upon the citizens. This phase of Hegelian doctrine identifies man's higher self with the relations into which he enters

Morality embodied in the State.

Hegel's Political Absolutism.

by virtue of membership in the existing State, and leads to an extreme form of *Political Absolutism*, providing a philosophical basis for the most reactionary type of *Fascism*. In opposition to this, it may be pointed out that there are other types of social relation than those centred in the State, through which an individual's rational self may find expression. Probably the rational self finds social expression most satisfactorily when the existing State is one to which it can freely and honestly pronounce allegiance ; but all too often existing states are not of this kind, and when a state is seen to be palpably unjust, the most valid expression of one's consciously social self may be to challenge it.

The general theory of the State as developed by Marx and Engels does away with the idea of the "eternity" of this institution, its obligatory character.

**The Marxian view
of the State.**

for every form of human community, its universality and "extra-historical" nature. *With Marx and Engels the State is above all an historical category.* It is historical in a double sense. In the *first* place, the state only arises in accordance with definite social and historical conditions, together with the rise of private property and the division of society into classes. *It "dies out" together with the disappearance of classes.* So it has its historical beginning and its historical end. Its existence does not coincide with the existence of society as such. It is not an indispensable attribute. In the *second* place, it is also historical in the sense that it really only exists in its concrete historical form of "an adequate, historical-concrete, social-economic formation. Consequently, just as in the sphere of economic categories,

means of production only become capital under definite conditions, under a definite historic form, in exactly the same way society appears in a state form only under definite conditions. "The state, then, is by no means a power forced on society from outside; *neither is it the realisation of the ethical idea, the image and the realisation of Reason as Hegel maintains.* It is simply a product of society at a certain stage of evolution. It is the confession that this society has become hopelessly divided against itself, has entangled

**Historical view
of the State.**

itself in irreconcilable contradictions which it is powerless to banish. In order that these contradictions, these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic interests, may not annihilate themselves and society in a useless struggle, a power becomes necessary that stands apparently above society and has the function of keeping down the conflicts and maintaining 'order'. And this power, the outgrowth of society, but assuming supremacy over it and becoming more and more divorced from it, is the State". (Engels: *Origin of the family*, pp. 215-6.)

Thus the State is the product of the class division of society. Being the product of the development of society as a whole, it is also a completely class

**Lenin on the
State.**

organisation. Functioning as a force which "moderates" the conflicts of classes, it is far from being "neutral". It moderates but is far from reconciling. It moderates by depriving the enslaved and exploited of the means and weapons of battle, by "stupefying" them with a number of ideological influences, by preserving the "order" which is the

condition of the process of exploitation. *The very existence of the State, according to Marx, is an expression of the complete irreconcilability of classes.* Consequently, at the basis of the rise of the State lies the process of the formation of classes. "The process of the formation of classes means, however, the conversion of the process of production and reproduction into the process of production and reproduction of the surplus product alienated by the ruling class". This is the economic foundation for the appearance and consequent functioning of the State. The economic conditions of production, which are simultaneously the process of exploitation, need "order", *i. e.*, an objective, forcible guarantee. Therefore economic exploitation is supplemented by political oppression. The category of oppression, corresponding to the category of exploitation, presupposes a relation between the social subject of oppression (*i. e.*, exploitation) and its object. In such a case the whole of society is an exploiting society. *The State is an utterly class machine of oppression, for it is the dominant class "constituted as state power".* So therefore here there can be no question of social "solidarity", of a really "super-class" force, of the representative of the "general" interest, "general" will of the so-called "whole". (Bukharin: *Marxism and Modern Thought*. Tr. Ralph Fox.)

We may sum up the Marxian view in the following words of Engels:— "The State, therefore, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies which have managed without it, which had no notion of the state or state power. At a definite stage of economic

development, which necessarily involved the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity because of this cleavage. We are now rapidly approaching a state in the development of production at which the existence of these classes has not only ceased to be a necessity, but becomes a positive hindrance to production. They will fall as inevitably as they once arose. The State inevitably falls with them. The society which organises production anew on the basis of free and equal association of the producers will put the whole state machinery where it will then belong—into the museum of antiquities, next to the spinning wheel and the bronze axe". (Origin of the Family : Chapter 9.)

CHAPTER VII.

THE STATE (*continued.*)

The social and political doctrine of Representative Democracy is a "tradition of ideas rather than a fully coherent system", according to a

**Representative
Democracy.**

contemporary writer. Abraham Lincoln defined democracy as "government of the people, by the people, for the people". But democracy is not merely a form of government. In its wider meaning, it stands for a particular *social order*. It implies recognition of the intrinsic value of the individual and a faith in the common man. It believes that the degradation of human personality through such causes as ignorance and poverty is a measure of our failure to apply the democratic principle in practical life. Its central principles are, *first*, that a society must not be so unified as to abolish vital and valuable differences; *secondly*, that it must not be so extravagantly diversified as to make an intelligently co-ordinated and civilized social life impossible; and *thirdly*, that the imposition of a universal plan of life on a society is at once stupid and immoral.

There are two main types of argument in support of democracy. The *first* is based on the doctrine of equal rights, from which is deduced the rightness of an equal distribution of political power. The *second* argument for democracy is pragmatic. Democracy should be preserved not only because individuals have equal rights, but because it offers individuals large opportunities for the

development of more inclusive social interests. Further, it is to the state's interest not to ignore any of its members who, even potentially, may have ideas to contribute, derived from their own particular way of life and manner of experience. The *first* argument itself is ambiguous.

**The Doctrine of
equal rights.**

The doctrine of equal rights may mean several things. It may mean that certain specific inequalities such as distinctions in wealth, social status, political rank, etc., are artificial products of society. Or it may go further, as do certain radical behaviourists and communists, declaring that men are actually born equal in all (or all important) respects and that differences of ability and achievement are not native but acquired by the individual, perhaps very early in his career. Hobbes seems to waver ambiguously towards this doctrine, although he would probably not accept the extreme form of it propounded by modern behaviourists. Finally, there is the normative meaning of rights, as expressed, for example, in the declaration of the Connecticut Bill of Rights (1818), "That all men, when they form a social pact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community". The same idea is expressed more pointedly in Locke's dictum that children are born not *in* full equality but *to* it. The aspect of the normative meaning that is essential to democracy is equality of *political* rights.—that is, of the right to vote to hold certain offices, to sue in courts, and the like. Optimists sometimes suppose that equality in these respects is a sufficient guarantee against too great an inequality in the distribution of goods.

No democracy, as a matter of course, can be pure. It is impossible in a State of any size, that the entire body of people should be consulted on every decision that confronts the commonwealth. Democracies are commonly 'representative' rather than direct, and in general the greater the number and diversity of people composing the democracy, the more clearly impossible it is that they should have a direct voice in its affairs. In a modern State any considerable degree of accord is usually either the result of propaganda or the expression of mob emotions. "In real life no one," says Walter Lippmann, "acts on the theory that he can have a public opinion on every public question, though this fact is often concealed where a person thinks there is no public question because he has no public opinion." (Public Opinion) For a democracy to have a stable character its affairs must be carried on by representation, *i. e.*, by delegation of governmental powers to a small number of citizens elected by the rest. But such delegation has its dangers. The electorate, besides having its vote restricted to candidates that were not of its own choosing, is too readily compelled to vote on the basis of campaign propaganda, the candidate's personality, and similar irrelevant factors. Again, though care is taken to elect a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of the country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations, the conditions of public life tend to confine and often to nullify these virtues. Political diplomacy, economic pressure and international rivalries take a subtle

form in modern times, thus leading to situations where representation ceases to be truly representative.

The strength of democracy lies in its emphasis on the principles of *liberty* and *equality*. It recognises the right of every individual to be left free to develop his personality.

**Strength of
Democracy.**

The citizen is free to decide what is best for himself, and he is given full opportunity to serve the state by his considered judgment on public questions. Liberty, to be real, needs to be supplemented by equality. The right to the pursuit of happiness and a share in government should be available equally to all persons. *Democracy implies a social order in which no man or group of men will exploit the weakness of others.* In the context of the State, the democratic principle takes the form of popular sovereignty. It means that *the supreme authority of the state is vested in the last resort in the people.* Citizens in a democratic state are thus both rulers and ruled. Democracy, thus, supplies the most congenial atmosphere for the development of the spirit of citizenship.

In actual life and practice, however, we find endless misuses and perversions of the word "democracy".

**Democracy in
practice.**

Indeed, the common individual is asked to fight, endure all kinds of hardships, and die for democracy; and it is but natural if he asked for some clear definition of what he is fighting for. Mr. H. G. Wells suggests the following definition:— Democracy means the subordination of the state to the ends and welfare of the common individual. Democracy demands the protection of the individual life from the state. It is the denial of the right of the state

organisation to interfere in the life of the common individual except for the common convenience and with the common consent. But when we attempt to bring such idealistic definitions into effective contact with the realities of life, we find that there is no such thing as absolute freedom or unrestrained democracy. Limitless freedom, anarchy, would be a world of chaotic conduct, ruled only by impulse, a jungle life. All freedom in any society is conditional; it is a compromise; it implies "rules of the game", that is to say, *law*. A detailed, comprehensive, agreed-upon, accessible and understandable system of laws, which are really rules for behaviour in predigested situations, is a necessary preliminary condition for a modern democracy. Our modern democratic community would frustrate its own declared aims without a complete, detailed, *legal framework* enforced by a judiciary and a police acting strictly under the law.

The contrast between democracy and the forms of community with which it is generally contrasted lies essentially in this *reliance upon law*. Until

**Reliance upon
Law.**

the laws are altered they must be respected by all, small or great, in the community. *The President or the Premier is as much bound by the law as the most humble citizen.* On the other hand, the dictatorships, and undemocratic social organisations generally, subject a large part of the common man's activities to "uncovenanted restrictions, interference and compulsion." Most existing dictatorships, indeed, claim a sort of legality based upon some forced plebiscite some snatched election. Again, we find that the consent of the governed in a democracy can never be a

finally silenced and irrevocable consent. It must be a "continuing consent". It must be subject to sustained revision and renewal. From the point of view of democracy all absolutisms are illegal, and resistance to their commands is as justifiable as resistance to any less general "hold-up" or act of violence.

This fundamental "*legalism*" of democracy has been and is a deterrent to swift collective action, and human history is full of special emergencies, recurrent crises, like flood, fire, pestilence, earthquake, war, which give rise to the need for swift action. Especially in *war*, men have had to relinquish their liberty of individual action more or less completely in favour of a High Command of some sort with unqualified immediate powers. The "*gradualism*" of legal and deliberative government under democratic conditions fails during such periods of crisis. At the end of such a period, however, a vigilant democracy would demand the resumption of power by the community. The most recent example of such vigilance, exercised by a modern democratic society, was the dramatic exit of Churchill from the leadership of the English nation, within a few weeks of the cessation of hostilities in Europe. The Labour party in England, declared by the elections to be the true representatives of the community, assumed power immediately. The question is, indeed, being seriously asked nowadays whether modern democratic government should not be able to devise some suitable machinery to deal with such recurrent crises with an efficiency and a toughness far beyond that of a system subjected to the freaks and

Legalism in Democracy.

inspirations of a single individual. As a matter of fact, modern crises have become very elaborate affairs, and are less and less controllable by single individuals. A modern democracy will have to develop a class of competent public servants, with a "co-operative morale and a sense of public criticism". The vast communities of today must work with the distinctive freedom and the conscious, individual co-operation of a team of football players, and they must be subjected to the continual criticism of an enlightened public opinion, with unlimited freedom of expression and with an ultimate, if deferred, right of intervention.

Most popular definitions of democracy involve some reference to "that magnificent outbreak of the common sense of mankind, the first French Revolution. That remains still a cardinal event in the history of human liberation. "It was not the beginning of liberation but it was its most outstanding assertion." (*Wells: The Outlook for Homo Sapiens*). The democracies of England and America are plainly based on that French initiative. And since in those days titles and privileges were the most conspicuous infringements of men's liberties, democracy from the outset would have none of them; it was *equalitarian* without qualification. "It was republican, it denied and repudiated any form of class rule whatever—and wherever it is still in health it remains republican and equalitarian." (*Wells*).

But conditions in eighteenth-century France were quite

different from conditions in the world today. The chief offence against human liberty at that time was *class privilege*. For many people in those days the possession of private property was a means of independence ; freedom of ownership seemed a reasonable provision for democratic liberty. It was realised by a very few persons that the free play of proprietorship could, in its turn, give rise to new types of "abuses", only another form of serfdom. Political equality by itself proved in practice to be no equality at all. Thus when we ask the meaning of democracy to-day, we find a definite cleavage from this point onwards in the replies to the question, "What is democracy?". It is now generally agreed on all hands that collective economic controls, "Industrial Democracy", as Beatrice Webb first called it, constitute a necessary completion of the democratic proposition. A dwindling minority still clings to the private profit system as the

Equalitarianism in Democracy.

Socialism in Democracy.

logical method of the sturdy individualism of the revolution. But, as we have seen in Chapter V, the profit motive is not the only incentive to effort. The general implication of modern democracy is that unrestrained economic advantage can be an even graver infringement of human liberty than privilege. Modern democracy is not only legalism and equalitarianism ; it is socialism ; it sets its face against all abuse of the advantages of ownership.

Thus we see that the economic pressure of our "business civilization" is gradually making mere political democracy more and more futile and even self-contradictory. Modern society is definitely capitalistic ; its chief enter-

Our business civilization and democracy.

prises are motivated by a competitive struggle for profits. We cannot assess the worth of political democracy to-day without analysing the character and working of existing States in their concrete setting. The problems of *Social Philosophy* can be made concretely intelligible only by reference to the actual conditions and manner of operation that prevail in a given society. The problems of *Social Justice* and the effective administration thereof cannot be seriously discussed without reference to *the structure and functioning of the society for which justice is sought*. The fact that the existing social order is *capitalistic* determines certain vital respects in which contemporary social ideals, if they are to stand any chance of becoming effective, must differ from the ideals projected by previous forms of society. *An understanding of the nature of Capitalism is therefore requisite to a serious discussion of Social Philosophy today.* (Cf. *Significance of Capitalism, Chapter V, Page 99* above).

Capitalism appears to involve *four* essential characteristics :—

Essential Characteristics of Capitalism,

- (1) competition for profits.
- (2) the mechanisation of industry,
- (3) the purchase and exploitation

of human labour-power, and—

(4) corporate, absentee ownership. Let us deal with each of these points briefly to examine their relation to modern democracy in practice.

Competition is not in itself peculiar to capitalism, nor to civilization, nor to the human species. Struggle and rivalry in one form or another are found wherever there is life. Capitalist competition, however, is a strug

I. Competition for profits.

profits, and consequently for whatever conduces to greater profits, *e. g.*, cheap raw materials, cheap labour, financial loans, and large markets. In the course of this competitive process and indeed as a necessary part of it, industry is carried on ; but the competition is waged in terms not of producing more and better products but for the sake of profits. Thus quality is sacrificed for the sake of profits. As against this we may conceive of '*productive competition*', competition between artists and craftsmen, for example, who would care more about the quality of what they produce than about the accruing profits. For business enterprises to-day the policy of producing more and better products is secondary and incidental to their *profit-making aim* ; when greater profits are promised by a curtailment of production or by a deterioration of the product, the industrial policy is usually governed accordingly.

Capitalism involves not only competition for profits but competition by means of increasingly mechanized industrial processes. Industrial mechanization shows itself principally in two ways : in specialization of functions and in standardization of products. Primitive societies develop little specialization. As societies become more civilized, wants are increased and in order to supply them industry becomes gradually specialized. Specialization in modern industry has gone to such an extent as to reduce the artisan's work to mere drudgery. A present-day shoe factory, for instance, contains probably no one individual who, if left to himself, could make an entire shoe. Specialization is still more striking and boring in the

II. Mechanization of industry :—

manufacture of more mechanical products like the automobile, where an individual worker may be restricted to drilling uniform holes in millions of uniform plates as they are passed up the assemblage line. Specialization of function both requires and makes possible a greater uniformity in the product. This standardization is possible by the principle of the *transfer of skill from the worker to the machine*. Such standardization and precision as are needed in modern industry could not be achieved by human hands: the area of variation of human effort is too wide. The accuracy of work no longer depends on the skill of the operator but on the accuracy of his tools. Sometimes a transfer not only of skill but of thought or intelligence is also made from the worker to the machine, leaving the former to perform his mechanical work without any expense of intelligence or mental labour. This tends to reduce the living personality to a dead machine.

A third aspect of capitalism, which according to the theory of Karl Marx is the most distinctive of all, is

**III. Exploitation
of human labour-
power.**

summed up in the Marxian word '*exploitation*'. When a capitalist promoter hires some workers he is considered by Marx to have purchased his employees' 'labour-power'. By labour-power Marx means the total amount of physical effort that an employee is capable of putting forth. In return for their labour-power the capitalist pays his employees wages, and the wages tend to reach the lowest level at which there are workers to be found: in the long run, apart from such amelioration as may be effected by trades-unions and strikes, this level tends to coincide with the level of bare subsistence. The

value of what the worker produces is, however, determined not by the amount of labour-power he puts forth, but depends on various factors, partly on the efficiency of the machine that he operates and on the efficiency with which his factory is managed, partly on the degree to which society has need of his product. The price differs from the value of a product, depending not only on the extent to which there is a social need of it and on the extent to which this need is supplied from other sources, but on a complicated set of market factors, one of the most important of which is the "price-pegging" done by monopolistic combines. Since the wages of labour are determined by the level of bare subsistence, and since the price of a commodity normally rises much above the cost of producing labour and of raw materials, a *Surplus Value* is created. This surplus value becomes the property of the capitalists (*i. e.*, directors, share-holders, bankers, etc.,) who have started the enterprise and taken the risk.

The process by which surplus value is created is considered by Marxists to be an 'exploitation' of the

**Marxian theory of
Surplus Value.**

workers because of the Marxian postulate that nothing which the capitalist does produces any value, and that therefore the value that remains as a surplus over the cost of materials and the cost of labour must have been created by wage earners and should rightfully belong to them. This aspect of Marx's doctrine offers a clue to the most serious of his attacks on capitalism, and it is therefore of some importance that it should be rightly understood. Marx evidently means that the capitalist *qua* capitalist is not a creator of values but merely a profiteer, receiving

whatever surplus values are created by whatever means ; and that so far as a particular individual is instrumental in creating values, even though he may do so by the work of managing or of merchandising, he ought to receive wages (not profits) commensurate with the values he creates. The fact that the same individual can be, and frequently is, both a capitalist receiving interest on his investments and also a salaried worker complicates but does not invalidate the issue. Of course if everybody were capitalist and salaried worker at the same time and to the same extent, the distinction would be of no practical importance, for everyone would then be exploiter and exploited to an equal degree. Such, however, is not the situation that exists. There is in every highly industrialized country today a class of individuals whose incomes are wholly or predominantly dependent on profits from investments and another class whose incomes are in the form of wages. The formation of these two classes and the exploitation by the one of the other is in Marx's view essential to the existence of capitalism : hence his corollary that the resultant inequalities can be removed only by bringing capitalist methods to an end.

Corporate ownership is a fourth essential attribute of capitalism. In the normal form of capitalist enterprise the owner—*i. e.*, the legally rightful receiver of the created surplus values—is not one individual, nor a few acquainted individuals, but a large number of individuals, having as a rule no interest in the enterprise except to demand that it be run in such a way as to yield the largest financial return on their investment. This fact is of great importance

**IV. Corporate,
Absentee Owner-
ship.**

as indicating the entirely *Impersonal* nature of capitalism, is fully developed it becomes completely dehumanized ; where capitalism the reason for which is easy to see. When a single employer owns and manages a business his personal character is likely to make some difference as to his mode of handling it and of dealing with his employees. When the ownership and management are in the hands of a small group of active partners, the conduct of the business is likely to become more impersonal, although it is still possible for the characters of the several partners to be reflected to some extent in their business practice. But in the typical large-scale business enterprise of to-day the personal characters of the individuals who own and manage have little or no causal relation to the business practices of the firm. The manager who comes in contact with the employees is himself a salaried employee : should he on his own initiative altruistically reduce the working hours of his subordinates or increase their wages in such a way as to lessen the profits of the firm, he would probably be removed from his position. The owners, for their part, are a board of business directors (not industrial directors) and, in a secondary sense, a large number of scattered shareholders. None of these owners normally knows anything about the actual manner of conducting the industry from which his profits are derived. Each requires only that the profits be as large as possible. Problems of industrial technique are left to salaried technicians. If largest profits are created best by industrial practices unfavourable to the worker or consumer the possibility of effective protest is minimized by the

**Industry versus
Business.**

greatness of the 'economic distance' between those who receive their income from ownership of shares in the corporation and those who control the industrial details. Thus we find that, in modern capitalist society, industry and business tend to run along separate channels. Some industry is a necessary condition of any human life whatever, whereas business is a secondary form of operation and its ultimate importance for human life and happiness can be significantly questioned. Robinson Crusoe on his island, for example, carried on various types of industry but no business whatever. Thus the special development that business technique has taken in modern times raises a query for the student of Social Philosophy, *viz.*, how far and in what specific ways capitalism is of benefit or hindrance to industry, and how far the modern way of business is conducive to human health and happiness.

**Democracy and
Nationalism.**

We have so far seen the difficulties arising in the actual working of the democratic ideal on account of its alliance with capitalism: we have next to turn to another set of difficulties arising out of its alliance with Nationalism. *Democracy, we have seen, is socialism.* Political equality, with the inequities of modern capitalist society, proves in practice to be no equality at all. The political freedom of the slum-dweller, the vote, is a mockery and sham; he is not really free to vote as he would like, his vote can be easily purchased. But by a natural extension of the equalitarianism of democracy, as the problem of world law becomes urgent, *democracy becomes cosmopolitan.* Almost tacitly and unconsciously democracy has

accepted and assimilated the necessity that law must be world law and equally protective of every individual human being. So far as cosmopolitanism goes, modern democracy reverts to far older revolts of human common-sense against racial, national and class distinctions. Cosmopolitanism, universal brotherhood, has indeed been appearing and reappearing in human thought for the past two thousand years and more, ever since the rise of Buddhism. *Internationalism*, the disappearance of the oppression of one nation by another, the end of the struggle between nations, the emergence of a brotherhood of all mankind, is an important part of all *Utopian socialism*. Socialism, to its votaries, is not primarily an affair of economics. Economics in socialism are really only regarded as means to an end. The socialist hopes that socialism will bring about a society without inequality, oppression, war and violence, he expects the advent of socialism to mark a fundamental change in human relations. *He regards it as a moral and religious affair as much as an economic one.* Modern democracy, in spite of its socialist ideals, is faced with the grim realities of the *Nation-state*.

The democracy that found its expression in the first French Revolution was not only incomplete upon the economic side but also it was very sketchy and indefinite in the matter of education. This was due to the fact that the ideology of the Great Revolution was essentially middle-class in its origin. It sprang from a social stratum already educated and so satisfied with the sufficiency of its general education and so accustomed to a supply of books

Democracy and Education.

and pamphlets that it did not realize that there was anything exceptional in the knowledge and freedom of thought it enjoyed. It launched its generous proposition of universal equality indeed, but not only did it fail to realize the need to insure freedom from economic pressure, but also it neglected to organize the education of the community as one whole. The American Revolution, in this respect, with its provision of State universities, seems to have been ahead of the French. Nevertheless it took the better part of a century for democracy to realize, even to a limited extent, this most vital implication of its demand for *liberty, equality and fraternity*, viz., the free and necessary *universal education of the democratic community* to a common level of understanding and co-operation. Communities in which every mentally normal citizen is educated to a level much above the three K's do not yet exist anywhere in Europe or America. But freedom and equality are incomplete without *freely accessible knowledge* and free and open discussion is a necessary completion of the democratic idea. It is still therefore possible for the equalitarian impulse to be effectively frustrated in practice by deliberate and systematic mis-education and mis-information. The common man and woman know now in general terms what they want, but they still do not know how to state and express their demands. The pity is that ordinarily the common man and woman to-day resent being told that they are under-educated or wrongly educated; to them education still means "just any old education, and news is what a press run entirely for profit and political and social ends, and (in the British system) a government-controlled radio,

choose to tell them. It is the education they have grown up to, and so far they have not been awakened to its insufficiency". (Wells: Outlook for *Homo Sapiens*, p. 43.) Thus we find that private enterprise is able to defend its appropriations quite effectively, because it owns the press almost entirely, as well as the news agencies and the distributing trades; it can thus distort values and distract the public from crucial issues in the boldest fashion. There is no counteracting agency or equipment of the public mind in the educational machinery of any modern State. The common schools are essentially conservative institutions, adapting the common man to the social order in which he finds himself, preparing him for that state of life to which he has been called, and giving him no reasonable intimation of the great drama of change in which he has to play his part. The whole thing is an organized conspiracy of silence and misleading propaganda. As Aldous Huxley puts it, "At no period of the world's history has organized lying been practised so shamelessly or, thanks to modern technology, so efficiently or on so vast a scale as by the political and economic dictators of the present century." The important thing for us to note is that there is not much difference in this matter between the practice of Dictators and the so-called democratic governments. The chief aim of these liars is "the eradication of charitable feelings and behaviour in the sphere of international politics". (Ends and Means: p. 7). In face of the essential ignorance of the modern democratic community, the enterprising owner, the profiteer, can keep his grip upon his advantages far more effectively, than he can in the face of a dictator

with unqualified powers. He can resist socialization far more effectively.

This fact has led many thinkers to suggest that Dictatorship of some variety is inevitable for the speedy realization of the socialistic scheme of things in the matter of State organization. Against the capitalist's obstructive power the wilfulness of the dictator is able to operate far more vigorously than the will of the under-educated, ill-informed and suggestible "democracies". Actually we find in recent times that in certain ways the dictatorships have undoubtedly been able to get ahead of the democratic states: they have gone further on the way to socialization. The dictator of the totalitarian state takes the industrial exploiter or the rich man firmly by the collar, and handles wealth with an extraordinary disrespect. Thus dictatorships in recent history have implied "*collectivism*". Dictatorships are forced towards a comprehensive efficiency in the face of the claims of their own supporters. As Wells puts it, "The only effective response to totalitarian collectivism on the part of a freedom-seeking community is a scientifically planned and directed socialism". (*Ibid*, p. 44).

Indeed, it has been seriously suggested by able advocates in modern times that on account of the difficulties (some of which have been enumerated above) inherent in Democracy, the only practical alternative in the modern world is dictatorship. Theoretically, dictatorship means the control over the whole nation by a select few who alone claim to understand and to be able

Alternative
Democracy.

to

to promote the common good. The select few are loyally devoted to a *'leader'* in whose name they act. Every method of persuasion, as well as of force, is employed to make the people submissive. The working of Dictatorship is illustrated in certain recent forms of government: *Russian Communism, Italian Fascism and German Nazism*. We must, however, note at the very outset an outstanding difference between the two classes and types of Dictatorships, sometimes pooled together indiscriminately under the title of Totalitarian states. The Communist Ideology of Soviet Russia is absolutely and diametrically opposed to the Ideology practised by the late supporters and leaders of Nazism and Fascism, Hitler and Mussolini. As a matter of fact we should find on further examination that, really and truly, there is no resemblance between the two systems beyond the surface similarity of mere *form*; the content of the government, the details of the administrative machinery and the outlook of both the rulers and the ruled are fundamentally opposed to each other. As a matter of fact we should hope to find more similarities among the Ideals of Representative Democracy and those of Soviet Communism. This confusion is so wide-spread in modern socio-political thought that it would be worth while for us to dilate a little further on these essential differences between the two leading types of Dictatorships. We may even have to revise the principle of classification ultimately, and to oppose Fascism to two forms of Democratic organisation, (1) Representative Democracy, and (2) Communist Democracy. The fact that England, America and Russia ultimately found themselves on the same side in the World-war goes very far in favour of our

revised classification.

It is said by many in the present day that Communism and Fascism are the only practical alternatives in politics,

Communism and Fascism, or "Scylla and Charybdis," and that whoever does not support the one in effect supports the other.

Bertrand Russell, in one of his brilliant essays, seems to think that we would be on the horns of a vicious dilemma, if there were no third alternative. He says, "I find myself in opposition to both, and I can no more accept either alternative than, if I had lived in the sixteenth century, I could have been either a Protestant or a Catholic." (In Praise of Idleness, Chapter VI, p. 109.)

The Communists maintain that their dictatorship is a matter of expediency in the transitional period, its ultimate goal being a classless society. The

Communism. Russian dictatorship claims to be the true voice of the 'proletariat'. Any criticism of the Soviet system is condemned as corrupting the mind of the proletariat, and is regarded as being due to moral depravity or to instigation by the capitalists and may be visited by the penalty of death or imprisonment. Bertrand Russell has briefly, but in his characteristic lucid style, set forth his objections to Communism in the essay mentioned above. In view of the generally progressive nature of Russell's views, it would be profitable for us to examine his attack.

According to Bertrand Russell, Communism is not democratic. "What it calls the 'dictatorship of the

Russell on Communism.

proletariat, is in fact the dictatorship of a small minority, who become an oligarchic governing class. All history shows that government is always conducted in the in-

terests of the governing class, except in so far as it is influenced by fear of losing its power. This is the teaching not only of history, but of Marx. The governing class in a Communist State has even more power than the capitalist class in a democratic State To suppose that it will always act for the general good is mere foolish idealism, and is contrary to Marxian political psychology." (Ibid, p. 110). Another argument of Russell is that Communism restricts liberty, particularly intellectual liberty, more than any other system except Fascism. "The complete unification of both economic and political power produces a terrifying engine of oppression, in which there are no loopholes for exceptions. Under such a system progress would soon become impossible, since it is the nature of bureaucrats to object to all change except increase in their own power. All serious innovation is only rendered possible by some accident enabling unpopular persons to survive. Kepler lived by astrology, Darwin by inherited wealth, Marx by Engel's "exploitation" of the proletariat of Manchester. Such opportunities of surviving in spite of unpopularity would be impossible under Communism". (Ibid. p. 111).

There is another argument of some psychological importance advanced by Russell against Communism. He thinks that there is so much of hate in Marx and in Communism that "Communists can hardly be expected, when victorious, to establish a regime affording no outlet for malevolence". If victory is the result of a fierce and doubtful war, the arguments in favour of oppression are likely to seem to the victors stronger than they really are. "After such a war the victorious party are not likely

to be in the mood for sane reconstruction. Marxists are too apt to forget that war has its own psychology, which is the result of fear, and is independent of the original cause of contention". (Ibid, pp. 112-113) Apart from these arguments, Russell's objections to Communism are based on broader theoretical difficulties, and specially on his individualistic philosophy. He does not believe in any dialectical necessity in historical change, he sees no reason for the Marxian thesis that the next stage in human development *must* be in some sense a progress; in Economic Theory, he does not believe in the theory of *surplus value* and thinks that "Marx's economics do not form a logically coherent whole, but are built up by the alternate acceptance and rejection of older doctrines," (e. g., Ricardo's theory of rent and Malthus' theory of population) "as may suit his convenience in making out a case against the capitalists".

Russell's objections to Fascism are more fundamental, as we would naturally expect. Indeed, he is in agreement with the ultimate end of the Communists; his disagreement is as to *means* rather than the end. But in the case of the Fascists he makes it quite clear that he dislikes the end as much as the means. According to Russell, the essentials of Fascism are that it is anti-democratic, it is nationalistic, it is capitalistic, and it appeals to those sections of the middle class which suffer most through the development of the socialistic process. Communism, also, according to Russell, is anti-democratic, but only for a time, at least in theory, and as a transitory stage. Moreover, it aims at serving the interests of wage-earners,

Russell on Fascism.

who are a majority in advanced countries, and are intended by Communists to become the whole population. As against this, Fascism is anti-democratic in a much more fundamental sense : it does not accept the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the right principle in statesmanship, but selects certain individuals, nations, and classes as the best and as alone worthy of consideration. The remainder are to be compelled by force to serve the interests of the few elect". (Ibid, p. 114.)

Both in Germany and in Italy, Fascism arose out of Socialism, by rejecting whatever was anti-nationalistic in the orthodox programme. From

Rise of Fascism.

Socialism it took over two ideas, the idea of economic planning and that of an increase in the power of the State, but the planning, instead of being for the benefit of the whole world, was to be in the interests of the upper and middle class in one country. And it tried to secure these interests not so much by increased efficiency as by increased oppression, both of wage-earners and of unpopular sections of the middle-class itself. Thus "the root-objection to Fascism is its selection of a portion of mankind as alone important. In this respect it has done much to divert modern governments from the moral ideals of Christianity, from which modern democracy has derived considerable strength." Fascism is thus a return to what was worst in pre-Christian morals, *viz.*, exclusive preoccupation with the interests of the rich and the powerful.

It appears that *Fascism is really the logical extension of Capitalism*. If ever it could succeed it would do

Fascism and Capitalism.

nothing to cure the evils of Capitalism ; on the contrary, it would make them worse. The manual work would be performed by forced labour at subsistence level ; the workers would have no political rights, no freedom to choose their place of work and abode, and probably not even a permanent family life. The Nazi method of dealing with the problem of Unemployment showed these tendencies abundantly and clearly. It is really an inevitable corollary of Capitalism, freed from the control of Democracy. This is the modern substitute for the old forms of slavery or serfdom, which is an inherent part of all Absolutism, Despotism or Dictatorship.

Fortunately for the world there is no chance of Fascism succeeding permanently, or even for long, as

Fascism and War.

there is no solution in Fascist Ideology for the problem of Economic Nationalism. The most powerful force on the side of the Nazis was heavy industry, and it has now been clearly demonstrated that heavy industry, especially steel and chemicals, organized nationally, is the greatest influence making for war in the present day. If every civilized country had a Fascist government, war would be unavoidable. Thus each fresh victory of Fascism brings war nearer ; and war, when it comes, is likely to sweep away Fascism itself, along with many other existing institutions. All this is obvious to any student of current International Affairs : but the tragedy is that, much as the democratic governments are condemning Fascisms of all variety today, they themselves are not prepared to shed off the roots of Fascism that are present in all contemporary

"*Industrial Democracy*". Modern industry, as we have seen, is organized in the main in such a way as to obstruct democracy. The existing system under which the capital-owner or his agent can decide what is to be produced, whether anything is to be produced, and whom he shall employ,—this system is fundamentally undemocratic, not only because it interferes with free choice by voters, but also because it degrades those so employed, and gives arbitrary powers to a few over the goods and services useful for all. Thus manual work is as demoralising in the modern democratic State as in a Fascist State, on account of the arbitrary power over production retained by the owners of capital and their agents. Thus, in its economic policy, Fascism is a reinforcement of the traditional system and of the assumptions inherited from slave-civilization. And so far as *political democracy is wedded to heavy industry, run along nationalist and capitalist lines, it also is Fascist in germ and is bound to lead to international rivalry and war*, as in the domestic policy it is equally undemocratic towards manual workers. *The Communist economy, on the other hand, is really an extension of the democratic idea and process*, though there is a new technique, a revolutionary method of procedure.

What then, we are tempted to ask, is the Philosophy of Fascism? Has it any ordered set of beliefs, like Socialism, Communism or Liberalism?

The Philosophy of Fascism.

The answer to this question seems to be an emphatic *No*. As Russell observes, "There is no philosophy of Fascism, but only a psycho-analysis". (Ibid, p. 116) Fascism seems to be largely and essentially an emotional protest, partly of

those members of the middle-class such as small shopkeepers) who suffer from modern economic developments, partly of certain individualistic capitalists and industrial magnates whose lust of power has grown to abnormal proportions, has in fact become a disease "megalomania", as Russell rightly calls it. Fascism is clearly irrational, in the sense that it cannot achieve what its supporters desire; probably they know its utter futility, and yet are driven forward by an inner urge on account of serious frustrations, like a hysterical patient of "the compulsion neuroses", or of obsessions. If Fascism could have succeeded at all, the result would have been widespread and untold misery, and a definite set-back to civilization; but its inability to find a solution for the problem of war and its philosophical bankruptcy makes it impossible that it should succeed for more than a short period. But our recent experience of even a brief course of Fascism in three important States, *viz.*, Germany, Italy and Japan, has been so bitter and the memory thereof so fresh that we must go still deeper into the ultimate bases and the "ancestry" of Fascism. Besides, we have seen that there are germs of an incipient Fascism in all representative, democratic governments; and it is just likely that Fascism may again raise its head in a new shape or form in some new climate, if the roots are not destroyed, and the germ exterminated for good.

It is important to remember, as Russell reminds us, that political events very frequently take their colour from

**The Ancestry of
Fascism.**

the speculations of an earlier time : there is usually a considerable interval between the formulation of a philosophical doctrine and its translation into practice.

"English politics in 1860 were dominated by the ideas expressed by Adam Smith in 1776; German politics to-day" (written in 1935) "are a realization of theories set forth by Fichte in 1807; Russian politics since 1917 have embodied the doctrines of the Communist Manifesto, which dates from 1848. To understand the present age, therefore, it is necessary to go back to a considerably earlier time."

The modern revolt against reason aims at *power*; the modern "irrationalist" on account of his lust of power is of necessity involved in Politics.

Lust of Power. His genealogy among philosophical writers is Fichte, Carlyle, Mazzini,

Nietzsche, and Bergson. As opposed to this movement, we have the Benthamites and Socialists. The end which statesmen should pursue, as conceived by almost all the irrationalists out of whom Fascism has grown, is most clearly stated by Nietzsche. In conscious opposition to Christianity as well as to the Utilitarians, he rejects Bentham's doctrines as regards both happiness and the "greatest number". "Mankind", according to Nietzsche, "is much more of a means than an end mankind is merely the experimental material". The end he proposes is the greatness of exceptional individuals. "The object is to attain that enormous *Energy of Greatness* which can model the man of the future by means of discipline and also by means of the annihilation of millions of the bungled and botched, and which can yet avoid *going to ruin* at the sight of the suffering *created* thereby, the like of which has never been seen before".

(The Will to Power : Vol. II, p. 368).

This conception of the end, however much we may dislike it, is very hard to disprove : yet it is irrational, inasmuch as "the cult of the great man" has always implicit in it the assertion : "I am a great man." As opposed to this, reason demands impartiality, equality, and consequently, democracy. The founders of the school of thought out of which Fascism has grown have certain characteristics in common. They seek the good in *Will* rather than in *Feeling or Cognition* ; they value *Power* more than happiness ; they prefer *Force* to argument, *War* to peace, *Aristocracy* to democracy, *Propaganda* to scientific impartiality. They advocate a Spartan form of austerity, as opposed to the Christian form ; they view austerity as a means of obtaining mastery over others, not as a self-discipline which helps to produce virtue, and happiness only in the next world. Popular Darwinism is enlisted in their service, in the form of the doctrine that the struggle for existence is the source of a higher species; only it is to be rather a struggle between races than one between individuals, such as the apostles of free competition advocated. "Pleasure and knowledge, conceived as ends, appear to them unduly passive. For pleasure they substitute glory, and for knowledge, the pragmatic assertion that what they desire is true. In Fichte, Carlyle, and Mazzini, these doctrines are still enveloped in a mantle of conventional moralistic cant ; in Nietzsche they first step forth naked and unashamed". (Russell : *In Praise of Idleness*, p. 91.)

The whole philosophy of Fichte develops out of the proposition "I am I," as to which he says : "The Ego

**Fichte's
physics.**

Meta-

posits itself and it *is* in consequence of this bare positing by itself ; it is both the agent and the result of the action, the active and that which is produced by the activity ; *I am* expresses a deed (*Thathandlung*). The Ego *is*, because it has posited itself". The Ego, according to this theory, exists because it *wills* to exist. The non-Ego also exists because the Ego so wills it ; but a non-Ego so generated never becomes really external to the Ego which chooses to posit it. Thus, Fichte comes to the conclusion, "*The Universe is Myself*", though he explains that by "I" he means "God". This was the theoretical basis of his Political philosophy. In 1807, Fichte delivered his famous "*Addresses to the German Nation*", in which, for the first time, the complete creed of Nationalism was set out. These Addresses explain that the German is superior to all other moderns, because he alone has a pure

**His Political
Philosophy.**

language. The purity of the German language makes the German alone capable of profundity ; he concludes that "to have character and to be German undoubtedly mean the same". But if the German nation is to be capable of acting as a whole, there must be a new kind of education, (to preserve the German character from foreign corrupting influences) which will "mould the Germans into a corporate body". The new education must aim at completely destroying "freedom of the will". There is to be universal military service : everybody is to be compelled to fight, not for material well-being, not for freedom, not in defence of the constitution, but under the impulse and drive of "the devouring flame of *higher*

patriotism, which embraces the nation as the vesture of the eternal, for which the noble-minded man joyfully sacrifices himself, and the ignoble man, who only exists for the sake of the other, must likewise sacrifice himself."

This doctrine, that the "noble" man is the purpose of humanity, and that the "ignoble" man has no claims on his own account, is of the essence of the Fascist attack on democracy. But there is no objective criterion of "nobility" except success in war: therefore War became the necessary outcome of this creed. Carlyle, whose outlook on life was, in the main, derived from Fichte, added something which has been characteristic of the school ever since: a kind of Socialism and solicitude for the proletariat which is really dislike of industrialism and of the "Nouveau riche". It appears that Carlyle deceived even Engels, whose book on the English working class in 1844 mentions him with the highest respect. But when we read his chapter on Democracy in *Past and Present*, we find most of it occupied with praise of William the Conqueror, and he goes on to describe democracy as follows:— It "means despair of finding any Heroes to govern you, and contented putting up with the want of them."

Morals above Democracy.

All this would have been subscribed to by Hitler and Mussolini easily. Mazzini was a milder man than Carlyle, from whom he differed as regards the cult of heroes. Not the individual great man, but the nation, was the object of his adoration; he placed Italy highest among the European nations. He believed, however, like Carlyle, that Duty should be placed above Happiness, and thus put Morals above Democracy, saying:— "The simple vote of a majority does not

constitute sovereignty, if it evidently contradicts the supreme moral precepts . . . the Will of the People is sacred, when it interprets and applies the Moral Law ; null and impotent, when it dissociates itself from the Law, and only represents caprice." This was also the opinion of Mussolini.

Only one important element has since been added to the doctrines of this school, namely the "pseudo-Darwinian belief in race". Fichte had made

The Racial Doctrine.

German superiority a matter of *lang-uage*, not of biological heredity. Nietzsche, unlike his modern followers, was not a nationalist or an anti-Semitic ; he applies the doctrine only as between different individuals ; he wishes the unfit to be prevented from breeding. He hopes, by the methods of the "dog-fancier," to produce a race of Super-men, who shall have all power, and for whose benefit alone the rest of mankind shall exist. But subsequent writers, like Houston Chamberlain, have extended the doctrine, and have tried to prove that all excellence has been connected with their own *race*. Chamberlain, for instance, argues at length that Dante was a German and Christ was not a Jew. This whole business of introducing "pseudo-Darwinian jargon" in the racial question is of no scientific value. Whatever the genetic mental differences between races may be, we now know that in an adult man, the effects of *environment* mask those of *heredity*. Even Hitler had to supplement his racial theory by a theory of the individual. "To attempt to judge a person's worth by his race and to declare war on the Marxian axiom 'One man is like another' would be folly, unless we were ready to carry it to its logical conclusion." (Mein Kampf).

We may summarize this entire movement, from Fichte onwards, in the words of Bertrand Russell, as "a method of bolstering up self-esteem and lust for power by means of beliefs which have nothing in their favour except that they are flattering. Fichte needed a doctrine which would make him feel superior to Napoleon; Carlyle and Nietzsche had infirmities for which they sought compensation in the world of imagination; British imperialism of Rudyard Kipling's epoch was due to shame at having lost industrial supremacy; and the Hitlerite madness of our time is a mantle of myth in which the German ego keeps itself warm against the cold blasts of Versailles. No man thinks sanely when his self-esteem has suffered a mortal wound, and those who deliberately humiliate a nation have only themselves to thank if it becomes a nation of lunatics." (In Praise of Idleness, p. 99.) The remarkable psychological insight which is displayed in the above passage by Russell is ample justification for quoting it in full. But when we recall that it was written in the early thirties, viz., about 1933 or 34, then its almost prophetic warning for the present international politicians seems remarkably appropriate. If the psychological errors of Versailles are repeated at the present critical juncture in the treatment to be meted out to the Japanese and the German nations, then this repression of the national surge is bound to give rise to pathological symptoms in the International Body-Politic. The recent applications of Psycho-analytic theory to the fields of Sociology and Politics leave us in no doubt as to the correctness of Russell's diagnosis of the Fascist

disease. Freud himself, who in his old age suffered a great deal at the hands of this "Hitlerite madness," we are told, was contemplating to work out a detailed theory of the psycho-analytic causes of the rise of Nazism in all its grim and sadistic aspects. This shows that at certain periods of history in certain countries, the special circumstances of the time produce a mood to which all sorts of Irrational and even Anti-Rational doctrines make some special appeal, and consequently succeed in attaining popularity. The emphasis on Will, as opposed to Thought and Feeling; glorification of Power; belief in Intuition as opposed to Observation and Experiment; these are some of the characteristic doctrines of the modern Irrationalists. The Will to Power of Nietzsche was a philosophy, psychologically adapted to the mental needs of all the discontented elements in a modern industrialized society. Whatever the purpose of the philosophers or the speculative founders of such doctrines may have been, the industrialists and militarists, the admirals and armament firms, very cleverly made use of this philosophy to "weld" the discontented sections into a party of mediaevalist reaction in everything, combined with everything modern in the way of scientific technique. Germany found a most congenial soil for the growth and perfection of this movement. The fear of the Socialists, the Bolsheviks and Pacifists led many people of the middle classes, like the small shopkeepers, to join this movement in a fantastic hope and belief which was really their only refuge from despair. Dazzled by the vision of glory, heroism and self-sacrifice, they became blind to their own serious and genuine interests, and in a blaze of emotion allowed themselves to be used for purposes not their own. This is "the Psycho-pathology of Nazism," as it caught the mind of the German middle class.

CHAPTER VIII

COMMUNIST DEMOCRACY

We are now in a position to ask the question : Is there anything common between the Nazi philosophy, the psychopathology of Nazidom, as Russell calls it, or the Nazi Religion, as H. G. Wells calls it, on the one hand, and the Communist Ideology, on the other ? In dealing with the question of a practical alternative to Representative Democracy, (Vide. p. 180, above) we hoped to find more similarities between the Ideals of Democracy and those of Communism than between the two types of Dictatorships. In spite of the spirited attempt made by Russell to show that there are conclusive objections which according to him "apply to Communism and Fascism equally", we must come to the conclusion that ideologically as well as from the point of view of Aims and Ends, there is really nothing in common between the two types of Totalitarian governments, except the mere Form. The oft-quoted lines of Pope :

" For forms of government let fools contest ;

Whatever is best administered is best "—

may thus be defended in the context of our argument. A modern writer has said that "an important lesson of History is that the value of a system of government does not depend merely on its form, but chiefly on its spirit." (D. J. Hill, *People's Government*, preface, p. vii, quoted by J. S. Mackenzie, *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, Book II, Chap. 4). As Russell himself admits, "the purpose

of the Communists is one with which, on the whole, I am in agreement; my disagreement is as to means rather

Fascism and Communism have really nothing in common,

than ends. But in the case of the Fascists I dislike the end as much as the means." (In Praise of Idleness). Yet we

find that the Individualistic Philosophy of Bertrand Russell does not allow him to deal with Communism fairly and sympathetically. According to him, both Communism and Fascism *equally* are "attempts by a minority to mould a population forcibly in accordance with a preconceived pattern. They regard a population as a man regards the materials out of which he intends to construct a machine: the materials undergo much alteration, but in accordance with his purposes, not with any law of development inherent in them...Fascists and Communists, having in their minds a picture of society as a whole, distort individuals so as to make them fit into a pattern; those who cannot be adequately distorted are killed or placed in concentration camps. I do not think an outlook of this sort, which totally ignores the spontaneous impulses of the individual, is *Ethically justifiable*, (Italics ours) or can, in the long run, be politically successful. It is possible to cut shrubs into the shape of peacocks, and by a similar violence a similar distortion can be inflicted upon human beings. But the shrub remains passive, while the man, whatever the dictator may desire, remains active, if not in one sphere then in another... The inevitable effects of artificial moulding upon the individual are to produce either cruelty or listlessness, perhaps both in alternation. And from a population with these characteristics no good thing is to be expected.

(*Ibid* p. 117-18.)

Let us try to understand the problem from another point of view, the point of view of an acute and powerful

**H. G. Wells on
Communism.**

idealistic thinker of the calibre of H. G. Wells. Like Russell, he is also a Socialist, more Utopian than In-

dividualistic, but vehemently anti-Marxian in his Ideology as well as Mentality. He is, however, refreshingly honest in confessing his anti-Marxian mentality. He admits that he has "always had a peculiar contempt and dislike for the mind and character of Karl Marx, a contempt and dislike that have deepened with the years". "I have watched," he says, "the tradition of Marxian bad manners and Marxian dogmatism wrapping like a blanket of fog round the minds of two crucial generations. They seemed to me to be lost in the fog. It was difficult for me to think they could be advancing under that fog." (Homo Sapiens, p. 66.) In spite of this dislike, which is to be regarded as a purely personal matter, to be eliminated from an objective (scientific or logical) argument, Wells seems to appreciate the efforts of some leading Marxist thinkers of our generation, notably Professor J. D. Bernal and J. B. S. Haldane. Referring to the latter's Haldane Memorial Lecture (Birkbeck College, May 24th, 1938) he considers it to have been "to my mind, a brilliant yet obstinately perverse overvaluation of the role of Marx (and Engels) in human thought, which may well have made the worthy uncle whom he was commemorating turn in his grave. Lord Haldane also professed the Hegelian faith and that was his nephew's justification. This lecture made the most of Marx, I insist, and more also. And then more." Again, writing about The Social

Function of Science by "that very considerable writer, Professor J. D. Bernal," Wells admits that he gets at times, "inspite of his very distinct Marxist twang, a curious sense of parallelism and co-operation." And even in Haldane he finds much he "could subscribe to, except that I reject the Marxian attribution." (Ibid).

Thus we find that inspite of the temperamental difficulties of H. G. Wells, he is forced to admit that if we

The Socialistic pattern.

could formulate a liberal, progressive and scientific view of the human outlook, then intelligent men and women, starting from all sorts of different standpoints, will converge upon the same conclusions, and work out towards practically the same pattern, — *the Socialistic pattern*. We must then ask once more the question in a purely objective fashion, Is there something specially sinister in the tenets of Marxism, Bolshevism or Communism, whatever term we may like to use, which is *anti-Socialistic* or frightful to our traditional conceptions of Liberty, Individual Rights and Moral Justice. *The old anti-thesis between Collectivism and Individualism cannot hold any longer*. We must build towards a new synthesis in our Socio-political theory as well as practice, based upon a progressive *Economic doctrine* and a sound *Philosophy of History*. Nothing short of such a radical and lucid *Social Philosophy* will avert the impending disaster to our Civilization such as Wells seems to visualize.

The pessimistic outlook of Russell towards Communism is to be deplored even more than the *Utopianism* of Wells. "Preoccupation with machines has produced," says Russell, "the manipulator's fallacy", which

Russell on Communism.

consists in treating individuals and societies as if they were inanimate, and manipulators as if they were divine beings. The ultimate psychological argument for democracy, according to Russell, thus is that an element of "free growth" and "untrained natural living" is essential if "men are not to become misshapen monsters". Communist and Fascist dictatorships are thus *alike undesirable* in his view, and he deplors the tendency to view them as the only alternatives in modern times. Fascism is the formidable and violent retort to Communism, and Russell comes to the conclusion that so long as Socialism is preached in Marxist terms it will always rouse such powerful antagonism that its success would become highly improbable. But our account has already taken the bull by its horns, *i. e.*, we have tried to show that modern civilization has a way of escape out of the dilemma, as visualized by Russell. The *Scylla and Charybdis* of Russell are henceforth to be dismissed as creatures of his imagination. Socialist Democracy must be looked upon as *Democracy freed from the clutches of Capitalism*. From our point of view, Fascism was the result of *Capitalism freed from the control of Democracy*.

Capitalism run amuck, as it were. It
Democracy minus Capitalism. is perhaps true that Marxian communism is dominated by the psychology of proletarian *revenge*, at least in its *first emotional protest* of the down-trodden humanity. But we would reply to Russell as follows: Your protest against Communism in the name of individual liberty is *a gospel of Bourgeois fear*. As students of Psychology, we should avoid the danger of *Hate and Revenge*, as much as those of *Fear* and

Cowardice. Nothing good has been achieved by Humanity through cowardice. A bold and daring venture of *Faith in the Common Man* is what is requisite at the present moment, if mankind is to be saved from the impending catastrophe, which threatens to ruin the advance of centuries. As Russell is acknowledged on all hands as a daring social and educational experimenter, it is to be extremely regretted that we find in him a champion of reaction on this fundamental issue. Indeed, as he himself proclaims, he is as convinced a Socialist as the most ardent Marxian. What, then, is the confusion which keeps him at a distance from the latter? What is his Socialism, in essence and in practical details, we have then next to enquire, in order to clear up this last remnant of confusion underlying the contemporary socio-political muddle.

Russell regards Socialism primarily as an adjustment to machine production demanded by considerations of

common sense, and calculated to increase the happiness of all members of the human race. He does not regard it

**The Socialism of
Bertrand Russell.**

as a gospel of proletarian revenge, nor even, primarily, as a means of securing economic justice. His affiliation in Moral Philosophy is thus to Bentham, Mill, and the Utilitarians rather than to Kant, Hegel, Green, and the Idealists in general. His definition of Socialism consists of two parts, economic and political. The *economic part* consists in *State ownership* of ultimate economic power, which involves, as a minimum, land and minerals, capital, banking, credit and foreign trade. The *political part* requires that the ultimate political power should be democratic. Unless there is popular control, there can be no reason to

expect the State to conduct its economic enterprises except for its own enrichment, and therefore exploitation will merely take a new form. "Democracy, accordingly, must be accepted as part of the definition of a Socialist regime." (The Case for Socialism, VIIth. Essay in 'In Praise of Idleness', (pp. 121-123.)

With much of the above definition of Socialism no Marxian would have any serious quarrel. Indeed, under

**The Break-down
of the Profit Mo-
tive.**

Socialism of Russell's variety we have a conviction that Economic power of exploiting masses of human beings

will not belong to individuals but to the State. Though Russell is not prepared to go so far as to abolish private property altogether, he is quite sure that private investment must be legally prohibited, so that no one will be in receipt of interest or profits, "with the result that private wealth will gradually melt away except as regards a reasonable modicum of personal possessions". Thus *Profit*, as a separate economic category, as leading under modern capitalism to 'exchange', will disappear. The confusions and dislocations that result from leaving modern large-scale industry to be directed by the motive of private profit of the capitalists will vanish automatically in a Socialistic regime. *The Profit Motive must break down completely.*

When we come to the urgent problem of *International Relations* and the strong need at the present moment of preventing War, we again find Russell on the right track. The two questions to which he confines himself are :

**War and Social-
ism.**

(1) How far is the danger of war at the present time bound up with Capitalism? and (2) How far would the establishment of Socialism remove the dangers? It is no use wasting time on the question of the likelihood of war or on its harmfulness. War, as Russell himself rightly reminds us, is an ancient institution not brought into being originally by Capitalism, although its causes were always mainly economic. According to an old Persian saying, *War is due to Money, Land and Woman*. The first *two* causes are included in the term '*Economic*', the *third* is *psychological*. Among the latter set of causes may be mentioned Ambition, Aggressiveness, Rivalry, Adventure and Conceit, whether of individuals or of nations, of monarchs or tribes. So far as *sex* is concerned it comes in, as vigorous *males*, confident of victory, enjoyed War, while their *females* admired them for their courage and physical strength and prowess. A fresh source was supplied by *Religion*; in that name much blood was spilled in the Middle Ages. On the whole, we may say that these ancient motives still survive to the present day, though War has travelled very far from its primitive beginnings. Those Pacifists who wish war to cease altogether must not forget these psychological motives in their utopian zeal. As we shall try to show later, *Socialism without Internationalism* would not be able to give a complete safeguard against war; but Socialism in all the civilized nations might diminish its likelihood to a great extent.

The desire for *Peace* is no doubt much stronger today among all civilized peoples than at any time during the

**Modern Industrial-
ism and War.**

last few centuries. We know that the two *World-wars* which our generation has witnessed caused a tremendous loss of life and property, and they brought no prosperity to the victors. Most civilized people and even nations realize today that the third World-war might mean the virtual end of all that Western Civilization stands for. *Yet there is, inspite of all this, an imminent danger of War.* This is the crux of the whole situation today, and we must ask ourselves the question, Why? As Russell visualized the problem in 1930 or thereabouts, "Permanent peace cannot issue from this endless see-saw, but only from elimination of *the causes of enmity between Nations.* In the present day, these causes are mainly to be found in the *economic interests of certain sections,* and are therefore only to be abolished by a *fundamental economic reconstruction.*" (The Case for Socialism, In praise of Idleness. p. 147.) It is to be admitted that the diagnosis of Russell, made about 15 years ago in the above Essay, is correct to a remarkable extent even today. Why then do the Statesmen of the civilized Nations not make a concerted attempt to put an end to the muddle in which the world finds itself? Indeed, there seems to be today a much clearer formulation of the whole problem than there ever was at any other period in recent History. And yet the prospects of a third World-conflagration on a yet grander scale are brighter today than ever. The situation is extremely intriguing and almost ridiculous, inspite of the impending tragedy.

It is necessary then that Social Philosophy should make a fresh attempt to find out the true explanation of

A psychological explanation of the tragic situation.

the problem, which, but for its grim tragedy, would look like a Comic Farce. If politicians and economists have failed to find a practical solution of the problem of ever-recurring wars, the reader may well be sceptical when the philosopher makes the futile attempt. We can almost read the cynical smile on the faces of practical statesmen as a fore-warning to us. How can the proverbial philosopher, who inhabits a dream-land, an Utopia, ever hope to solve a living practical issue of this magnitude, when *Plato, Kant, Hegel, Rousseau and Marx* failed miserably in their equally sincere and honest endeavours? Human Nature, such cynics remind us with a cheap sneer, is greater and mightier than the greatest of all philosophers. But we would respectfully ask these sceptics, 'What is this Human Nature, and who will analyze its nature but a Philosopher, well-versed in Social Psychology?' And we would venture to put another counter-question to the practical sceptic, 'Where would the world have been to-day, but for the mighty intellectual constructions of the above-named giants and others?' It may be true that they were not always able to realize their dreams *immediately and wholly* to their entire satisfaction, but can any statesman or politician deny their lasting contributions at each critical epoch in the History of Western Civilization? And when we turn to our own mighty giants in the intellectual and spiritual field, can any Indian politician deny the permanent influence, on the trends of our Culture and Civilization, of the profound speculations of the great *Buddha*, the mighty dialectician, *Shankara*, and an innumerable host of lesser giants. And

to come nearer to Contemporary Social and Political issues, is not Gandhiji essentially and primarily a Philosopher, Seer and a Visionary? And is not he who has shaken our continent from the Himalayas to the Cape Comorin, and from the N. W. Frontier to Assam? It is perhaps true that these dreamers and visionaries sometimes forget *the solid foundations of Human Nature* in their emphasis on the tall superstructure which they visualize and wish to construct; in short, they do not take a psychological but an *Ethical or Idealistic* stand.

We have briefly reviewed the various trends in contemporary social, political and economic affairs, in order

to discover the causes of the unprecedented chaotic situation with which we are face to face. As H. G. Wells put it several years ago, "It is not simply the forcible misuse of purely mechanical inventions that is producing such frightening retrogressions of those brave, free hopes that culminated in the later twenties. Every fresh development of radio, of the film and mass information generally, and all the new educational devices to which we had looked for the rapid spread of enlightenment and a common world understanding, are being subordinated more and more to government restriction and the service of *propaganda*" (our italics). "They were to have been the artillery of progress. They are rapidly being turned against our mental freedoms with increasing effectiveness." (The Fate of Homo Sapiens, 1939.) What, then, are we to do? Must we sit and watch silently the cruel spectacle of the ruin of Humanity? Man has made a real conquest of Nature by developing his scientific resources. Is he

going to be defeated by his own mechanical creations? The Atom Bomb, which is soon going to be manufactured in every National Scientific Laboratory, is the most frightful creation of Man's scientific genius, and like Frankenstein it challenges to annihilate its own Creator. Where are those great Ideals of Peace, Liberty, Equality and Brotherhood, for which we had been asked to fight,—during the last two Wars,—and to lay down our lives? Rousseau and Kant must surely be feeling restless in their graves. We have been told by the Press, the Radio, the Films, that we must fight, endure and even die for Democracy. If Democracy means economic justice and the attainment of that universal sufficiency that science assures us is possible today; if Democracy means "*the intensest possible fullness of knowledge*" for everyone who desires to know and "*the greatest possible freedom of criticism and individual self-expression*" for any one who desires to object; if Democracy means "*a community saturated with the conception of a common social objective and with an educated will*" to cooperate willingly and understandingly upon that objective; if Democracy means "*a complete and unified police control throughout the world,*" to repress the financial scramble and gangster violence which constitute "*the closing phase of the sovereign state and private ownership system*;" then certainly we would welcome such a democratic, international socialist organization, for which we will be prepared to live, fight or die, as circumstances may require. But where is this realization of the democratic process to be found? Has it been established anywhere, on earth? It has not yet even been established as the "*guiding faith of any*

political or social organization whatever." If we ask ourselves frankly the question, Is the Democratic idea growing and deepening in significance and is its hold on Mankind widening?—we may be doubtful even about a positive answer. Just before the end of the World war, we were beginning to be optimistic, with the United Nations Organization. Perhaps the venerable gentleman, the late President Roosevelt, brought a humanitarian, emotional and almost spiritual touch to bear upon the problem. Be it as it may, the present governments in the so-called Democratic nations hardly show that an international organization is possible in the near future. The only light in this dark world today comes from the spark which was lit about a hundred years ago by Marx and the only State today which is dimly, vaguely and partially trying to guide its destinies by the faint light of that spark is the U.S.S.R. But hedged in as it is on all sides by the various Nation-states, misguided into patriotic fanaticism by the combined might of the old and the new Imperialisms masquerading under the title of Democracies, the Russian experiment is in danger of pre-mature extinction, unless its spark is fanned by the Idealistic sentiment,—viz., *Love of Man for Man*. What we need today is a fresh synthesis of JESUS and MARX on a scientific and rational basis.

CHAPTER IX.

GANDHISM : WAR AND PEACE

What is Gandhism and what does it stand for? What are its teachings about the social, political, economic, educational and moral problems, facing not only India to-day, but the entire civilized world at the present critical moment in the history of Civilization and Culture? Quite recently there have appeared a number of books, articles and short essays, with the title of Gandhism; it is true that Gandhi has denied that there is such a thing as Gandhism. This denial is nothing more than the almost Socratic modesty which is common to Gandhi along with all great leaders and prophets of the past. The fact remains that Gandhism has already caught the imagination of a large number of thinkers and social workers both in India and abroad. It has indeed been offered as a serious rival to Marxism. In this chapter, however, we shall try to analyze some of the essential features of Gandhism from the point of view of Social Philosophy.

Variously described as a saint and a political charlatan, a seditious faqir in loin-cloth and a true oriental ascetic, Gandhi remains one of the most discussed men in the world to-day. He wears a calm and unruffled face in the midst of all the storms and fury of ungenerous criticism

Gandhism, a Utopian creed.

on the one hand and unintelligent praise and devotion of his followers on the other. He has an inflexible will, a deep-seated conviction in his Gospel, symbolic of a Cosmic Will and Attitude, almost like the 'Inner Voice' of Socrates, the wisest man in all Hellas. In short, he is a Mystic and a visionary, an Utopian Idealist and Social reformer.

Gandhian Utopia has innumerable aspects ; it is like a glittering diamond with an infinity of facets. Let us take a

Utopian Socialism of Gandhi. few of these in review, in order that we may get some idea of the whole gem.

Gandhism is essentially a Socialistic creed, Gandhi is intensely and primarily a man of the masses. Born in a despotic Ruling chief's territory, of orthodox, devout Hindu parents, his Socialism could hardly have been of the scientific variety. His Ideology naturally comes into clash again and again with the Economic and Materialistic Socialism of Marx. Even when in London, preparing for the Bar, we find him studying and meditating on the disease of Modernism, which in his own mode of thinking had destroyed the primitive village life of India, which had herded them in factories and was enslaving them spiritually and economically. Even at that stage in the evolution of his thought we find him, like Bunyan, " a God-intoxicated man ", to whom the soul was everything and the machine was abhorrent. Modern civilization was to him the enemy of spiritual life and Germany and England were living in the Hall of Death. " Their hands were full but their hearts were emptied of all that gives significance to life."

In order to understand the full and far-reaching signifi-

cance of the Gandhian Ideology, we must fully appreciate this Utopian, Oriental and Mystical aspect of his convictions. For Gandhi was always essentially, as he is to-day, a man of conviction,—with strong ideas, and he knew even as a Law student at the Temple, what his end in life should be. And as John Stuart Mill once remarked "One man with conviction was more powerful than a hundred who had only interests, he was destined to "shake the world with his ideas and conviction." Indeed, we may usefully contrast his personality with another man of conviction, who was also by sheer accident his contemporary in London at that point of time, a young man, small of figure, large of head, who might be seen daily in the reading room of the British Museum. This other was Lenin, the great revolutionary who also was destined to shake the world in his own style. Their ideas were, indeed, poles apart. The Russian dreamt of "a mechanized world in which God was out of place and in which humanity was welded into a machine of soulless efficiency." If we dissect these two dynamic personalities of the present century carefully and critically, we find that their genius has travelled in two different directions, starting from the same starting point and having similar humanitarian aims. Each of them starts from the bare fact that the lot of the vast masses is intolerable, that Socialism is the only creed which will help in their salvation is a conviction common to each. But Lenin was a Marxian in his outlook, a Scientific Socialist, whose attack on the Capitalistic civilization of Europe was a corollary from the Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism; he had no quarrel with the Machine or Industrialization as such, only with the fact that Industry must not be run by

a few Capitalists from the Profit Incentive. Gandhi was, however, from the start influenced by Ruskin, Tolstoy and other critics of the Machine itself, to him industrialization in itself is an evil, a degradation of the human personality. His Socialism was thus purely Utopian, Spiritual and Humanistic.

In order then to understand Gandhi, we must first try to appreciate his Spiritualism. All his activities, social, economic, political and educational, hinge upon this central pivot. Gandhi is, above all, a deeply religious person.

The Spiritualism of Gandhi.

If we take him as a social reformer, we must be quite certain that it would be ultimately in a religious spirit that he takes to social reform ; if we take him as a political rebel, his revolt must necessarily take the form of spiritualizing politics. Religion to him is the essence of all human activity. On the other hand, he has extended the connotation of Religion in the modern age so wide that he cannot possibly conceive of any religious activity which is purely "other-worldly". In one of his written statements, he says, "I could not be leading a religious life, unless I identified myself with the whole of mankind, and that I could not do unless I took part in politics. The whole gamut of man's activities today constitutes an indivisible whole. You can not divide social, economic, political and purely religious work into water-tight compartments. *I do not know any religion apart from human activity.* It provides a moral basis to all other activities which they would otherwise lack, reducing life to a maze of 'sound and fury' signifying nothing." The above exposition of the concept and function of Religion is clearly the centre and

essence of Gandhism. It represents the philosophy of life that undertakes to reconstruct our society and civilization on a basis obviously opposed to the scientific outlook of the West, which is wedded to a materialistic and a mechanistic philosophy of life, a "Welt-anschauung", which, according to Gandhi, has led to the muddle in which we find ourselves today.

But the question remains to be asked, why should there be any antagonism between Science and Religion, as is evident in the World today ? Is there

The Scientific Attitude.

an inherent cleavage between the scientific and the religious attitudes ? Is it impossible to work for an ultimate synthesis of the two attitudes, so as to make Religion scientific and Science spiritual ? This question is fundamental both to the students of Gandhism as well as to the critic of Marxism, for we may ultimately hope for a synthesis of Scientific and Utopian Socialism, only if a satisfactory convergence of the two divergent tendencies could be arrived at. We feel that though Science today has become a mere tool in the hands of the rapacious and power-seeking elements in society, producing in its turn a profound conflict in the life of individuals as of nations, Science need not necessarily be, and originally and essentially never was, a disruptive and a destructive force.

Let us then go back to the Greeks, in whom the scientific impulse took its birth at least in the West. And

The Search for Truth.

let us ask ourselves the question, Did not the Greeks originally and primarily seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge ? And is not Science and the Scientific attitude the

attitude of an inquirer, the critical outlook of an investigator, a seeker after truth? Without attempting here to answer these fundamental questions in detail, we may sum up the entire position somewhat dogmatically as follows. Science, in the course of the few centuries of its development in the west has undergone a vast and revolutionary change. In its beginnings, Science was due to men who were in love with the world, men who perceived the beauty of the stars and the sea, of the winds and the mountains. The Greek giants, Pythagoras and Herakleitos, Anaxagoras and Demokritos,—“felt the strange beauty of the world almost like a madness in the blood. They were men of Titanic passionate intellect, and from the intensity of their intellectual passion the whole movement of the modern world has sprung”. (Bertrand Russell). But step by step as Science developed and gradually broke off from its almost Mystic and intensely spiritual beginnings, the impulse of Love which gave it birth has been increasingly thwarted, while the impulse of Power has gradually usurped command in virtue of its unforeseen success. As Bertrand Russell beautifully expresses it, “The lover of Nature has been baffled, the tyrant over Nature has been rewarded.” (The Scientific Outlook, Chap. XVII, cf. p. 2, above)

This brings us back from our digression into Ancient History to our present problem. We have seen how

Science has more and more substituted
Science vs. Religion. Power-knowledge for Love-knowledge.

To the man who wishes to change his environment, Science offers astonishingly powerful tools, and if knowledge consists in the *Power to produce intend-*

ed changes, then Science gives knowledge in abundance. In the development of Science, since the days of Bacon who identified Knowledge with Power, the Power impulse has increasingly prevailed over the Love impulse. *This is the fundamental reason why the prospect of a Scientific society has been viewed by modern Utopians like Gandhi with apprehension.* For Knowledge is good and ignorance is evil. But the desire for Knowledge has a purer form, belonging to an entirely different set of emotions. The Mystic, the Lover and the Poet are also seekers after Knowledge—not, however, for the purposes of Power, but for the sheer joy and ecstasy of Contemplation. (See p. 3, above)

Thus we find that the scientific attitude at the present moment is threatening to engulf and overpower our proper and just appreciation of the Ultimate Values of Life. It is true that Power, in and by itself, is not dangerous. What is dangerous is *Power, wielded for the love of Power, and not harnessed to the Social Good.* Science stops short at this point, and a Society and Civilization, based wholly upon Science, necessarily does violence to the Ultimate Values, Ends or Ideals. Power is not, and can never be, one of the Ends of life, but merely a Means to other Ends, and until men remember the Ends that Power should subserve, Science will not do what it might to minister to the Good life. What then are the Ends and Ideals that we should place before ourselves, so that we may contribute our share to the well-being of Society? For Man is *not Pure Intellect, nor Pure Will, nor Pure Feeling*, but a higher synthesis of all these and possibly something else besides. Our emotional aspirations must be supported by an acute and critical

intellect and realized in our life through our activities. The organic unity of Intellect, Emotion and Will is an essential feature of the Spiritualism of Gandhi.

According to some critics this emotional and sentimental Spiritualism is the real cause of Gandhi's wide-spread popularity in India and abroad.

Popularity of Gandhism. It has been alleged that he appeals to the uneducated sentiments and untrained emotions of the masses: what we would emphasize, on the other hand, is that he appeals directly to the poor, the destitute, the exploited, the Harijan, the social and economic outcaste. The Mahatma has brought the message of Christ home to the suffering humanity. As the Late Rev. C. F. Andrews said, he is the greatest living exponent of Christianity, in all its finest and noblest aspect, as exemplified in the life of Jesus himself.

This leads us to the next vital aspect of Gandhism, which aspires to stem the tide of violence and strife, prevailing in Modern Civilization and Governments, by the organized use of the message of *Peace, Love and Non-Violence*. **Non-Violence or Ahimsa.** '*Ahimsa*' is essentially a doctrine of *Individual Development and Salvation*, but has it any power to mould whole *societies* into peaceful communities doing away with police, military and government by force? Can the individual be so changed or radically transformed as to act voluntarily in a peaceful way and cooperate with other individuals in evolving a perfect society and an ideal Government? If we may quote Plato, we would say that such a state of affairs can be realized only, when philosophers are kings and kings are philosophers. "All men

desire peace, but very few desire those things that make for peace". The thing that makes for peace above all others is the *systematic practice in all human relationships of Non-violence*. Violence can never produce peace, but still more violence. If violence is answered by violence, the result is a physical struggle, which inevitably arouses in us emotions of hatred, fear and resentment. In the heat of conflict all scruples are thrown to the winds, all the habits of forbearance and humaneness, slowly and laboriously formed during generations of civilized living, are forgotten. Nothing matters any more except *victory*. But victory in war does not provide a lasting settlement, except when those defeated are completely or very nearly annihilated. In modern wars waged between densely populated countries, extermination is extremely unlikely, except if the Atom Bomb becomes popular and is allowed by Nations to be used ruthlessly and indiscriminately. One war, therefore, tends to beget another. Today entire populations must be involved in their country's battles. Again, victory may lead to a permanent peace where the victors settle down among the vanquished as a ruling minority and are, in due course, assimilated by them, as for instance, in the case of Muslim invaders of India in the past. This, however, does not and cannot apply to contemporary wars. Finally, victory is sometimes followed by an *act of reparation on the part of victors* to disarm the resentment of the vanquished and lead to a permanent settlement, as was the policy of the English after the Boer War. Such a policy is essentially an application of the principles of *Non-violence*. But the longer and the more savage the conflict, the more difficult it is to make an act

of reparation after victory. It was psychologically almost impossible for the makers of the Versailles Treaty to be magnanimous, and it would be equally hard to expect charity and magnanimity by the United Nations at the present moment. Thus common sense demands that the principles of Non-violence should be applied, not *after* a war; when their application is supremely difficult, but *before* physical conflict has broken out and *as a substitute for such a conflict*. Non-violence is the practical consequence that follows from the belief in the fundamental *Unity of all being*, viz., in a Monistic philosophy. But quite apart from the validity of its philosophical basis, Non-violence can prove its value *pragmatically*, by a practical working test; that it does work *in private life* we have all observed, *e. g.*, how anger feeds upon answering anger, but is disarmed by gentleness and patience. Those who would use Non-violence must practise self-control, must learn moral as well as physical courage, must pit against anger and malice a steady good will and a patient determination to understand and to sympathize.' Violence makes men worse; Non-violence makes them better. In social life the precepts of religion, morals and good manners represent a crude attempt at systematization of the principles of Non-violence in regard to personal relations more complex, more emotional, more passionate than those of the drawing room and the street.

Men of exceptional moral force and even ordinary people, when strengthened by intense conviction, have demonstrated over and over again in the course of history *the power of Non-violence to overcome evil*, to turn aside anger and hatred. In the course of the last 150 years,

**Non-violence and
Social Reform.**

the principles of Non-violence have been applied even more systematically and with a growing realization of their *practical value*, to the solution of social, educational and medical problems regarded before that time as completely insoluble. The problems of the insane, the criminal, the savage and the child, were insoluble only because violence had made them so. Thus, the cruel and harsh treatment of the insane and the criminal resulted in the former's disease being aggravated and becoming incurable, and in the latter's confirmation and consolidation in the career of crime. Towards the middle of the 19th century a considerable effort at reform was made and since then, doctors have come to rely in their treatment more and more upon kindness and intelligent sympathy, less and less upon harshness and constraint. The difference is the difference between organized violence and organized Non-violence. The story of Prison reform is essentially similar to that of the reform of asylums. Prisons used to be houses of torture in which the innocent were demoralized and the criminal became more criminal. Thanks to the labours of John Howard, Elizabeth Fry, and the Prison Discipline Society, the movement in all democratic countries in the West has been in the direction of greater humaneness. The Colonial administrator and the Anthropologist have also discovered that organized and intelligent Non-violence is the best, *the most practical policy*.

So much for the power of Non-violence in the relations of individuals with individuals. What about its power in mass movements, where the same principles are applied to the relations between large groups or entire popula-

**Non-Violence and
the State.**

tions and their Governments? History has shown that the results which follow attempts to carry through *intrinsically desirable social changes by violent methods are thoroughly or mainly undesirable*. The French Revolution and the Terror was followed by the extinction of the Republic, the rise of Napoleon, Bismarck and British Imperialism. This in turn led to the Great War, to militant Communism and Fascism and, finally to the rise of Hitler and return to *Universal rearmament*. Again, the Russian revolution, using essentially violent methods, inherited from the old Tsarist regime, gave birth to a highly centralized and economic dictatorship, using conscription, secret police methods, press censorship, intensive propaganda for the purpose of keeping the people in unquestioning subjection. By way of contrast let us consider a few examples of *non-violent revolution*, especially the movements organized by Gandhi in South Africa and later in India. The South African movement may be described as completely successful.

Here in India also, several important successes have been recorded and it has been conclusively "shown that very large groups of men and women could be trained to respond to the most brutal treatment with a quiet courage and equanimity that profoundly impressed their persecutors, the spectators in the immediate vicinity and, through the press, the public opinion of the entire world." (Aldous Huxley : Ends and Means, Chap. X) There are other examples in recent history, even in Europe, where non-violent movements have been crowned with partial or complete success. We may mention the Finns' campaign of non-violent resistance to Russian oppression from 1901 to 1905 (which was completely successful and in 1905 led to

the repeal of the law imposing conscription). In an earlier period the long campaign of non-violent resistance and non-cooperation conducted by the Hungarians under Deak was crowned with complete success in 1867. Deak refused political power and personal distinction, was unshakably a pacifist, and without shedding blood compelled the Austrian Government to restore the Hungarian constitution. In Germany two campaigns of non-violent resistance were successfully carried out against Bismarck—the 'Kultur-Kampf' by the Catholics, and the working-class campaign, after 1871, for the recognition of the Social Democratic Party. More recently Non-violent resistance and Non-cooperation were successfully used in modern Egypt against British domination.

Boycott is a weapon in the armoury of Non-violence. It was employed by the Persians to break the hated tobacco monopoly. The Chinese employed it against British goods, after the shooting of students by British troops. Gandhi used it here in India. A good example of the way in which even a threat of Non-violent Non-cooperation can avert war was provided by the British Labour Movement in 1920. The Council of Action warned the Government and threatened a general strike, and a complete boycott of the war, in case British troops were sent to Poland for an attack upon the Russians. Faced with this ultimatum the Lloyd George Government abandoned its plans for waging war against Russia.

To return from our digression into History, we may conclude by saying that Non-violence should be successful not only in the relations of individuals with individuals but also of whole populations with Governments. The tradition of Politics is "a thoroughly dishonourable tradition". The

world seems "to sanction two systems of morality,—one for private individuals, another for national and political groups. It is against this 'duality' in our moral conceptions that Gandhi rightly protests. His introduction of Spirituality and Morality into Politics has been a subject of endless criticism : but that seems to us a fundamental aspect of his Social Philosophy.

Indeed, Gandhism is essentially based on the fundamental *Unity of Man*. Thus Gandhi repeatedly emphasizes

**Duality in Moral
Conceptions.**

the point that Religion to him is a very mundane affair, a matter of our secular life, social, economic as well as political and cultural day-to-day living. We cannot be religious and yet practise unethical methods in business and politics. When he comes to modern political behaviour he finds a saddening array of facts. Men who, in private life, are consistently honest, humane and considerate, believe that, when they are acting as the representatives of a group, they are justified in doing things which, as individuals, they know to be utterly disgraceful. The Nation is personified, in our imagination, as a Being superhuman in power and glory, sub-human in morality. We deify the State, but de-moralize it in the process. We never even expect the State to behave in any but the most discreditable way. Thus examples of genuine *Non-violent behaviour between Governments* are rare, except in cases of trivial disputes which are settled easily by means of the existing machinery of conciliation. But where important issues are at stake, National Egotism is allowed free rein, and the machinery of conciliation breaks down completely.

Non-violence is so often regarded as unpractical, or

at best a method which only exceptional men and women can use, that we tend to forget that even when used unsystematically, as has been the case so far, the method actually works, and *secondly* that, it can be used by quite ordinary people, and "even, on occasion, by those morally subhuman beings, kings, politicians, diplomats and the other representatives of national groups, considered in their professional capacity." (Cf. Aldous Huxley : *Ends and Means*).

But if we have a band of devoted individuals, an association for the propagation of ' *Ahimsa* ' and Non-Violence, their *first* task would be "the systematic cultivation of non-violent behaviour in all the common relationships of life, in personal relationships, in economic relationships, in relationships of groups with other groups and of groups with Governments." *The social structure of the community* has to be so arranged that individuals shall not be tempted to seek *Power*, to bully, to become rapacious and to exploit each other.

The *second* line of attack would be on the *ethical plane*,—the Individual Will, *viz.*, the individual must be taught, and taught to teach himself, how to control his tendencies towards aggression, rapacity, bullying, power-seeking and the like. Further training will be necessary in the elimination not only of *fear*, but also of *anger* and *hatred*. The members of such a group must be able to meet violence without answering violence and without fear or complaint, and this not only in moments of enthusiasm, but also, and this is infinitely more difficult; when the blood is cold and when there is no emotional

support from friends and sympathizers. Non-violent resistance to violent oppression is relatively easy in times of great emotional excitement, but it is very difficult at other times. It is so difficult as to be practically impossible except for those who have undergone systematic training for this very purpose. When we consider that it takes three to four years of training to make a good soldier, we might at least double the period of training—say six to eight years—to make a good non-violent resister, a trained soldier of peace, capable of putting his principles into practice under any circumstances however provoking.

A *third* line of attack would be psychological, *viz.*, to attempt to find out and remove the causes which lead to the abnormal quest for *Power* and glory, aggression and violence in the modern age. Our present society and civilization lacks emotional balance and adjustment, we are infantile in our pleasure-seeking as well as in our hostilities and resentments, we are savage and brutal in aggression and violence : in short, our primitive natural healthy instinct for life,—the '*elan vital*' (cf. Bergson) or the '*libido*' (cf. Freud)—is "*repressed*". This repression takes the sadistic form of mass cruelties and murders. We have to lift this terrible burden of "*repression*" from our soul. The modern man is in frantic search of his lost soul : we have, somehow, to regain it. Modern society is diseased and disintegrated, it requires thorough overhauling. No bandages and appliances, but only a major surgical operation, can save the situation. The skill of the surgeon, however, must be supplemented with his love and sympathy for the patient. It is in the fitness of things that the vast masses of suffering humanity look upon Gandhi as their Guide, Philosopher and Friend, who may be entrusted with such a delicate operation.

Appendix

Readings and Questions for Discussion

CHAPTER I

THE SCOPE OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. S. Radhakrishnan: An Idealist View of Life.
2. Bertrand Russell: The Scientific Outlook.
3. Aldous Huxley: Ends and Means.
4. Mackenzie: Outlines of Social Philosophy.
5. Hobhouse: The Elements of Social Justice.
6. Hobhouse: Social Development.
7. Ginsberg: Sociology.
8. Barnes: Fascism.
9. G. D. H. Cole: Social Theory.
10. Edward Caird: The Social Philosophy of Comte.

QUESTIONS

1. What do you understand by the scientific outlook ? Discuss the chief characteristics and limitations of the scientific method.
 - ✓ 2. Describe the subject matter of Social Philosophy. Why should Social Philosophy be studied ? (B. A., Allahabad, 1940).
-

Important

(2)

1952

3. Define the scope and method of Social Philosophy, and briefly indicate its relation to (a) Sociology, (b) Ethics, (c) Politics. (B. A , Allahabad, 1943).
4. What is the ideal goal of human effort in social matters ? Discuss in this connection some of the limitations of large scale social reform.

CHAPTER II

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIETY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Mackenzie: Outlines of Social Philosophy.
2. Ginsberg: Sociology.
3. McDougall: Social Psychology.
4. Rickman: Selections from Freud.
5. MacIver: Society: A Text book of Sociology.
6. Bosanquet: The Meaning of Teleology.

QUESTIONS

- Imp.
1. Bring out the significance of the remark, "Man is a social animal." Is man the only social animal ?
 2. What are the advantages of community-living ? Discuss the role of custom, law and morality as the regulating principles of social life.
 3. What do you understand by (a) "The Unsocial Sociableness of Man" (Kant) (b) "Ambi-valence" (Freud) ?
 4. Is there necessarily a conflict between self-assertion and the social impulses ? What do you understand by Egoism and Altruism ?

5. Can you visualise a society based on Pure Love and *Ahimsa*? Discuss this question in the light of recent developmens in Social Psychology.
6. "Nothing has been accomplished without interest on the part of actors.....nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion." (Hegel)

Discuss the meaning of Social Purpose in the light of the above quotation.

7. *Place of religion in society.*

1952

CHAPTER III

THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Mackenzie: Outlines of Social Philosophy.
2. Calverton: The Bankruptcy of Marriage.
3. Carpenter: Love's Coming of Age.
4. B. Russell: Marriage and Morals.
5. Lindsay: Revolt of Modern Youth.
6. Marx and Engels: The Communist Manifesto.
7. Plato: The Republic; The Laws.
8. Adam: Plato.
9. Rousseau: Emile.
10. Gandhi: Self-restraint vs. Self-indulgence (Parts I & II).
11. Ernest Jones: Psycho-analysis.

QUESTIONS

- ✓ 1. "Home is the primary school of civic virtues."
Justify this remark, giving illustrations.

Comp 2. Discuss the place of the Family as a social institution. Examine the Platonic and modern criticisms of it. (B. A., Allahabad, 1941).

1952

3. "If we may treat the family as a little state, the child is its legitimate sovereign". (Mackenzie) With reference to the above quotation, write short notes on (a) Upbringing of Children, (b) Educational Functions of the Family, (c) The Family in Ancient India.
4. What is the importance of the economic aspect of the Family in modern times? Critically evaluate the contribution of Marxism on this question.
5. "The decay of the marital institution of the modern world is a revolutionary development in our civilisation" (Calverton).

Discuss marriage as a social institution in the light of the above question, with special reference to (a) the emancipation of women, (b) the Gandhian view of marriage as a "union of souls".

CHAPTER IV

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Henry A. Mess: Social Structure.
2. Varkey: The Wardha Scheme.
3. Meek: Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe.
4. Quick: Educational Ideals.
5. Monroe: Student's History of Education.
6. Benjamin Kidd: The Science of Power.
7. Chalke: A synthesis of Froebel and Herbart.

8. W. Boyd: History of Education.
9. T. P. Nunn: Education, Data and First Principles.
10. Bertrand Russell: On Education.
11. Rousseau: Emile.
12. Rusk: Doctrines of Great Educators.

Imp , **QUESTIONS**

1. Discuss the place and character of Authority in the life of society (B. A., Allahabad, 1942).
2. How would you reconcile the individualistic and the sociological aims in Education? Explain by means of suitable examples from schools in India with which you are familiar.
3. What is the function of the School in Society? Is it the duty of the State to guide and control the educational policy of a nation? (B. A., Allahabad, 1943).
4. Write short notes on any *two* of the following :—
 - (a) Tagore's Educational Ideals.
 - (b) The Wardha Scheme of Education.
 - (c) The Gurukula Ideal in Education.
 - (d) 'Auto-Education'.
5. What do you understand by the following ?
 - (a) "Society must give freedom to the Individual".
 - (b) Individuals must give freedom to Society".

In this connection, discuss Rousseau's position in the History of Education ?

6. *Individual and Social Conception. Ed.*
1952

CHAPTER V

PROPERTY AND SOCIAL GRADATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. N. G. Damle: Civics for Beginners.
2. Mackenzie: Fundamental Problems of Life.
3. Hobhouse: Property, its Duties and Rights.
4. Sidney and Beatrice Webb: The Decay of Capitalist Civilization.
5. Marx and Engels: The Communist Manifesto.
6. Sigmund Freud: Civilization and its Discontents.
7. S. Radhakrishnan: Eastern Religions and Western Thought.
8. J. A. Hobson: Property and Improperly.
9. Strachey: The Coming Struggle for Power.
10. MacIver: Society, A Text-Book of Sociology.
11. G. H. Mees: Dharma and Society.
12. Plato: The Republic.
13. Rudolf Steiner: Die Dreigliederung des Sozialen Organismus.
14. Mackenzie: The Three-fold State (Hibbert Journal).
15. Bhagwan Das: Social Reconstruction; the Laws of Manu.
16. Nettleship: Plato's Educational Theory.

QUESTIONS

1. ✓ "Property is a matter of right". 1952
Discuss the nature and limitations of the right of Private Property. In what way is it sacred ?
2. Discuss the significance of *Capitalism* in Social Philosophy today. What place does it occupy in the historical evolution of Property ?

3. How far is economic equality a practicable ideal ? Indicate the lines along which you would proceed to realize it. (B. A., Allahabad. 1941).
4. Explain fully the Economic Interpretation of History. (B. A., Allahabad, 1940).
5. Describe Plato's classification of the Soul, and discuss its significance for Social Philosophy. (B. A., Allahabad, 1940).
6. Discuss the place of Evolution and Revolution in Social Progress. (B. A., Allahabad, 1942).
7. Detail the Rights of Man as evolved in course of man's development. Indicate the Rights which are to the fore today. (B. A., Allahabad, 1942).
8. How can Communal Unity be best brought about in India today ? (B. A., Allahabad, 1942).
9. What is the meaning of Justice ? Is it found anywhere in a modern Commonwealth ? Discuss Plato's contribution to the problem of Social Justice. (B. A., Allahabad, 1943).
10. Do you believe that, by abolishing Private Property, the Communists will be able to abolish all aggression and enmity from society ? Discuss this question fully, in the light of your studies of modern Psychology.

CHAPTER VI

THE STATE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Beni Prasad : A. B. C. of Civics.
2. Hobhouse : Social Development.
3. Cole : Theories and Forms of Political Organization.

4. Kant : Elements of Political Doctrine.
5. Hegel : The Philosophy of Right.
6. Engels : Origin of the Family
7. Bukharin : Marxism and Modern Thought
8. Vaughan : Studies in the History of Political Philosophy
9. Stalin : Marxism and the Question of Nationalities.
10. McDougall : The Group Mind.
11. Barker : National Character.
12. Ginsberg : Sociology.

QUESTIONS

1. Define clearly the following terms :

(a) State, (b) Nation, (c) Government. In this connection, discuss fully the question, "Is India a nation"?

- 1952
2. Trace the Origin of the State, as depicted in the Social Contract Theory, in one of the following philosophers :—

(a) Rousseau (b) Hobbes (c) Locke

3. What is the Organic Theory of the State? How far is the Marxian view of the State a development out of the Hegelian view?
4. How far do you agree with the following :—
 - (a) The State is the realization of the ethical idea ;
 - (b) The State "dies out" together with the disappearance of classes ;
 - (c) The State is a psychological necessity.
5. Is there anything common between the Marxian view of the State and Anarchism? Discuss critically.

CHAPTER VII

THE STATE (*continued*)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. H. G. Wells : The Outlook for Homo Sapiens.
2. Philip Wheelright : Ethics.
3. Aldous Huxley : Ends and means.
4. Bertrand Russell : In Praise of Idleness.
5. Nietzsche : The Will to Power.
6. Fichte : Addresses to the German Nation.
7. Barnes : Fascism.
8. Hitler : *Mein Kampf*.

QUESTIONS

1. How far do you consider Representative Democracy as an ideal form of Political Organization ?
What are the dangers of representation in Democracy ?
2. How far would you maintain that Fascism and Communism are the only alternatives for the modern statesman ? Is there any real clash between Communism and Democracy ?
3. Why has Democracy been handicapped in the present century by Capitalism ? In this connection give a brief account of the essential characteristics of Capitalism.
4. Is Democracy compatible with Nationalism ? How would you evolve a National goal for India which would be really democratic ?
5. How far is it true to say that Democracy is

meaningless without Free and Compulsory Education in any country today ?

6. Discuss the merits and de-merits of Democracy and point out a modern alternative. How far Plato's attack on Democracy holds good today ?

CHAPTER VIII

COMMUNIST DEMOCRACY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. D. J. Hill : People' Government.
2. J. B. S. Haldane : Haldane Memorial lecture, 1938.
3. J. D. Bernal : The Social Function of Science.
4. Bertrand Russell : The Case for Socialism.
5. H. G. Wells : The Fate of Homo Sapiens, 1939.

QUESTIONS.

1. Why do progressive writers like Wells and Russell attack Communism ? Do you agree with their views generally ?
2. Communist Democracy is " Democracy freed from the clutches of Capitalism ". Discuss this statement critically.
3. What is the relation between War and Fascism ? Has Modern Industrialism any part to play in wars today ?
4. Has War any psychological foundation ? How far, in your opinion, is it true to say that Peace will permanently come, if the Profit Incentive vanishes in modern society ?

CHAPTER IX

GANDHISM : WAR AND PEACE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Pattabhi Sitaramaiyya : Gandhi and Gandhism.
2. Gandhi : Non-violence in Peace and War.
3. Ambedkar : Gandhism and the Untouchables.
4. Aldous Huxley : Ends and Means.
6. C. F. Andrews : Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas.
6. J. M. Murry : The Necessity of Pacifism.
7. Rene Fullop-Miller : Lenin and Gandhi.
8. H. N. Brailsford : Property or Peace.
9. Henry George : Social Problems.
10. Stuart Chase : The Tragedy of Waste.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the essential features of Gandhism ?
2. What is the main point of divergence between Utopian and Scientific Socialism ? Can you point out any line of convergence between the two ?
3. How has the principle of Non-violence been worked by (i) Individuals, (ii) Societies in the past ? Is Gandhi's 'Ahimsa' merely an extension of the old humanitarian principle to the State ?
4. Does Gandhism offer a better prospect of World Peace than Communism ? Discuss critically.
5. Satyagrah. 1952.

Social Philosophy for Beginners

INDEX

- Adam Smith, 188
Andrews, C. F., 215
Aristotle, 26
Bacon, 80, 214
Benthamites, 188
Bhagwan Das, 126, 127
Bergson, 188, 223
Bernal, J. D., 197, 198
Buddha, 204
Carlyle, 93, 188, 189, 191
Chalke, 81
Chamberlain, Houston, 192
Churchill, 166
Dante, 192
Damle, N. G., 116, 132, 140
Darwinism, 189
Dewey, 81
Engels, 39, 41, 53
Fichte, 188 fol.
Freud, Sigmund, 30 fol., 63 fol., 108, 109, 224
Froebel, 77, 80
Gandhi, 60 fol., 71, 205, 208 fol.
Gentili, 93
Ghalib, 61
Ginsberg, 21, 41, 130, 138
Green, T. H., 200
Haldane, J. B. S., 197, 198

- Hegel, 41, 78, 155 fol.
 Herbart, 76, 80
 Hill, J. D., 195
 Hitler, 192
 Hobbes, 143, 162
 Hobhouse, 13, 17
 Hume, 137
 Huxley, Aldous, 219, 222
 Jesus, 207, 215
 Kant, 78, 111, 159, 206
 Kautilya, 143
 Kidd, Benjamin, 85
 Lenin, 159, 210
 Lincoln, Abraham, 161
 Lippmann, Walter, 163
 Locke, 73, 143, 146, 147, 162
 MacIver, 116, 117, 129
 Mackenzie, 26, 43, 44, 58, 104
 Marx, Karl, 39, 41, 53, 71, 83, 104 fol., 109, 114, 116,
 133, 134, 157, 171, 172, 182, 183, 207
 Malthus, 183
 Mazzini, 188, 191
 Mess, Henry A., 68, 69, 73
 Mill, J. S., 210
 Mussolini, 191, 192
 Nietzsche, 188 fol., 194
 Nunn, T. P., 93
 Pestalozzi, 78
 Plato, 56, 57, 59, 88, 103, 123, 124, 126, 128, 143, 204,
 215
 Radhakrishnan, Sir S., 111
 Ricardo, 183



Rousseau, 59, 75 fol., 143, 157, 206

Russell, Bertrand, 181 fol., 186, 187, 193, 195 fol., 199,
200 fol., 213

Shankara, 204

Springer, 134

Spinoza, 146

Socrates, 19, 21, 143

• Sophists, 19

Tagore, 90

Thrasymachus 143

Tolstoy, 211

Utilitarians, 138

Weber, Max, 16, 113

Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 99, 163

Wells, H. G., 164, 167, 178, 197, 205

57517

360/36